Danish-American diplomacy, 1776-1920

8T SERIES, NO. 64

SEPTEMBER 1, 1922

§■ JNIVERSITY OF IOWA STUDIES

^^^S""

k

STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

VOLUME VIII

NUMBER 2

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

1776-1920

BY

SOREN J. M. P. FOGDALL

PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY, IOWA CITY

Issued semi-monthly thronghout the year. Kntered at the post office at Iowa City, Iowa as

second class matter. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for

in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized on July 3, 1918.

UNIVERSITY OF IOWA STUDIES
IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

A. M. ScHLESiNGER, Editor
C. M". Case, Advisory Editor J. Van der Zee, Advisory Editor

VOLUME VIII NUM;BER 2

lPanish-american diplomacy

1776-1920^

BY

SOREN J. M. P. FOGDALL, Ph. D.

PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVEESITY, IOWA CITY

Digitized by the Internet Archive

in 2007 with funding from

IVIicrosoft Corporation

http://www.archive.org/details/danishamericandiOOfogdiala

IHSi

V3
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CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

Editor's Introduction 5

Author's Preface 7

I. Early Relations Between the United States and

Denmark, 1776-1800 9

II. Problems op the Napoleonic Era, 1800-1815 - - 29

III. The Negotiation of Treaties and the Settlement

OF Claims, 1815-1847 47

IV. The Abolition of Sound Dues and Other Problems,

1841-1860 66

V. Danish-American Relations Resui^ting From the

Civil War, 1860-1872 93

VI. Miscellaneous Problems op the Latter Part of

the Nineteenth Century, 1868-1900 - - - - 110

VII. Recent Relations Between the United States aistd

Denmark, 1900-1920 140

Appendices 152

Bibliography 159

Index 166

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

Dr. Fogdall sets forth in this volume the relations of the
United States with one of the smaller countries of northern
Europe. His account makes it amply evident that these re-
lations have, at times, been of more than ordinary impor-
tance. To Americans of to-day it is a matter of peculiar
interest that the waterway connecting the Baltic Sea with
the Atlantic Ocean was converted into a free international
highway largely upon the initiative of the United States.
It is also a matter of gratitude that during the Civil "War,
when certain more powerful nations were unfriendly to the
United States government, Denmark was found in the ranks
of our friends. Finally, the transfer of the Virgin Islands
to the United States in our generation is an earnest of the
future harmonious relations between the two nations.

Arthur M. Schlesinger.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

This work was originally intended to cover the diplomatic
relations between the United States and Denmark from the
Revolutionary War to the end of the nineteenth century.
Because of the recent purchase of the Danish West Indies,
a short chapter has been added in which a brief survey has
been made of the leading events that have taken place
during the last twenty years. An attempt has been made
to arrange the chapters of this volume in chronological
order, but it has been found necessary at times to allow
them to overlap.

In preparing this volume the author wished to use the
files of the Department of State at Washington, D. C, but
was unable to gain access to them. Having asked for
permission the following reply was received: "The Depart-
ments regrets to say that it has discouraged application to
do research work of this character as it has not the facilities
or space to properly supervise and examine the work, and
that therefore it is reluctantly compelled to decline your
request at this time." It has thus been necessary to rely on
the material found in the various libraries and archives
mentioned below.

In the city of Des Moines, Iowa, the author has worked
in the Des Moines University Library, the Iowa State Law
Library, and the Library of the Historical Department of
Iowa. Most of the material in foreign languages has been
obtained in the Library of Congress at Washington, D, C.
The libraries of the University of Iowa and of the State
Historical Society of Iowa, both located at Iowa City, have
been of much value in verifying references.

During the summer of 1921 it was the author's privilege
to spend four months in Europe, Some of this time was
spent in Copenhagen where access was obtained to the
Royal Library, the Archives of Foreign Affairs, and the
Archives of the Kingdom (Rigsarkivet) . Some of the material

8 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

in these archives is not yet released for general use, but
three large packages of original dispatches were examined.
These covered the period from 1783 to 1850. It must be said,
however, that the material so far released by the Danish
government is practically the same as that which is already
published by the government of the United States.

The author is indebted to Mr. Herbert Putnam, Librarian
of Congress, and his assistants for the personal interest shown
and the valuable privileges extended to him while in Wash-
ington during the winter 1920-21. Thanks are also due to
Kristian Erslev and his assistants at Copenhagen. Similar
appreciation is extended to Mr. Arthur J. Small and Miss
Mary Rosemond for valuable assistance in the Iowa State
Law Library. Special thanks are due to Dr. Benjamin F.
Shambaugh and Dr. Ruth A. Gallaher for privileges en-
joyed in the library of the State Historical Society of Iowa.

The author wishes to express his sincere appreciation to
Professor Gilbert G. Benjamin, under whose guidance this
work has been done, and to Professor A. M, Schlesinger, editor
of the Studies in the Social Sciences. Their suggestions and
criticisms have been very valuable.

CHAPTER I

EARLY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND DENMARK, 1776-1800

1. The Attitude of Denmark toward the American Revo-,
lution.

One of the early problems that confronted the American
patriots in connection with the Revolution was that of es-
tablishing commercial and political relations with foreign
nations. This was necessary in order to fight England suc-
cessfully and also to establish the credit of the infant
state. Consequently Silas Deane, a business man from Con-
necticut and a delegate from that state to the First and
Second Continental Congresses, was sent to France in Febru-
ary, 1776, as government agent, to borrow money and se-
cure supplies. It is in a letter from him to the Committee
of Secret Correspondence, dated at Paris, August 18, 1776,
that Denmark is mentioned for the first time in connection
with our international relations. Explaining the political
situation in Europe, Silas Deane showed that Spain, France,
and Prussia were likely to go to war against England, and
he added: "With respect to Russia, it is as closely allied
to Prussia as to Great Britain, and may be expected to be
master in the contest. Denmark and Sweden are a balance
for each other and opposites."^

It will be remembered that ever since the days of Charles
XII, Sweden had been hostile to Russia. Denmark on the
other hand had generally been friendly to Russia. Silas
Deane without doubt intended to convey the idea to Amer-
ica that Denmark standing with Russia against Great Britain
would be a friend of the new nation.

That Denmark was considered as a nation that would
at least not aid Great Britain in the struggle against her

1 Francis Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Bevolu-
tion, Vol. II, p. 119.

10 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

colonies was also brought out in. 1777 when Arthur Lee,
one of our commissioners to France, wrote to the Committee
on Foreign Affairs: "As to the reenforcement of troops
which Great Britain will receive from other powers of
Europe for the approaching campaign I can assure you,
sir. that your nation has nothing to fear from Russia or
Denmark." This he again affirmed in the year 1778.^ The
previous year Franklin and Deane had written to the Com-
mittee of Secret Correspondence urging that the American
government try to get a free port or two in Denmark, for
the sale of prizes as well as for commerce.^

That the Danish people were in sympathy with the Amer-
ican Revolution cannot be doubted. We shall see later,
however, that the man who was at the head of foreign
affairs in Denmark was decidedly hostile to the Revolution
and the independence of the colonies. This was so in spite
of [the fact that he knew the people of the country were
opposed to his views. His correspondence shows both his
own stand on the subject as well as that of the people.* The
fact that Denmark took a leading part in the formation of
the League of Armed Neutrality is additional proof of the
same fact, since that organization was created as the re-
sult of hostility to Great Britain.'^

In the hope of negotiating a treaty of commerce, Stephen
Sayre visited Copenhagen. In regard to this visit the
foreign minister of Denmark, Andreas Peter Bernstorff,
wrote to his friend Ditlev Reventlow December 30, 1777:
"We have here an agent of the American colonies, the
famous Sayre, who has come from Berlin. He proposes a

2 Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 429, 612.

8 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 288.

* Bernstorff to Reventlow, October 26, 1776. "Le public d'ici eat ex-

tremement port^ pour lea rebelles (de I'Am^rique), non par connoisance

de cause, mais parce que le manie de 1 'ind^pendance a r^ellement infects

tous les esprits, et que ce poison se r6pand imperceptiblement des ouvragea

des philosophes jusques dans les ^coles des villages." Aage Friis,

BernstorffaTce Fapirer, Vol. II, p. 498.

8 J. B. Scott, The Armed Neutrality of 1780 and 1800 is one of the best

accounts of this alliance in English.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 11

plan of commerce with America, very broad and very ad-
vantageous. With precaution I have not seen him, but I
am sufficiently instructed concerning his proposal, and I see
very clearly that the inhabitants of the colonies continue
to hate the French at the bottom of their heart and that
their relations with them are based on necessity and are
rendered indispensible. ' '^

"What Bernstorff's answer was to Sayre's proposal we
are unable to say, but we may infer that in his own
peculiar, crafty way he informed the American agent that
Denmark wanted to make a treaty and would continue
negotiations. At any rate, Sayre apparently was not
offended.'' He evidently got the impression that Denmark
was not unfavorably inclined toward the colonists. Later
John Adams wrote to Congress that Denmark was aiming
to defend herself at sea against Great Britain.^ It would
thus seem that Denmark was a friend of the new nation
or that at any rate she was a friendly neutral.

2. The Bergen Prizes.

The event that tested Denmark's stand in regard to the
independence of the American colonies came in the fall of
1779 and is known as the case of the Bergen prizes. The
famous Scotchman John Paul Jones was plying the Eur-
opean waters with an American squadron, bent on harass-
ing British commerce. One of his frigates, the Alliance, was
commanded by Captain Peter Landais, a Frenchman who had
made himself famous in America by transporting war supplies
to the colonies under very dangerous circumstances. While
stationed in the North Sea Captain Landais captured three
English merchantmen, the Betsy, the Union, and the Charming
Polly. Soon after, he met with bad weather, which caused
considerable damage to his prizes. He therefore sought refuge
and aid in what he supposed to be the friendly port of Bergen,

6 Aage Friis, BernstorffsTce Papvrer, "Vol. Ill, pp. 12-13.

7 Stephen Sayre was an adventurer who went to Europe and attempted
to force his service on the United States. Later he made a claim on
Congress for money. His work was investigated and his claim refused.
Wharton, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 618-619; Vol. Ill, p. 107.

8 Wharton, op. oit.. Vol. Ill, p. 505.

12 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Norway, a part of the Danish domain. The British consul
in that port, learning of the presence of the prizes, reported
it to the British minister at Copenhagen who insisted that
Denmark should restore the vessels to the owners. The
Danish foreign office complied with his demand and ordered
them to be delivered to the British government on the ground
that Denmark had not yet acknowledged the independence of
the United States. The American seamen were left to shift
for themselves without any means of subsistence.

M. de Chezaulx, the French consul at Bergen, made a
report of the affair to Benjamin Franklin, who on December
22, 1779, wrote a long letter to Andreas Peter Bernstorff,
Danish Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs. In this
letter Franklin showed that the law of nations recognized
every people as a friendly nation unless it had committed
a hostile act. As the United States had never committed
a hostile act toward Denmark, she could by the rights of
humanity claim that Denmark should treat her as a friend.
In ancient times among barbarous nations, none was recog-
nized as a friend except by treaty, but it would not be
well for Denmark to revive that rule. He therefore re-
quested that, if the three prizes had not left Bergen, they
should be given back to the lawful captors. If on the other
hand the vessels had left, it became his duty to claim the value
of the prizes, which, as he understood, was about fifty thou-
sand pounds. The amount, however, might be settled ac-
cording to the best information obtainable.'

This affair excited much attention among our diplomats
abroad. John Adams who was at Paris in the spriag of
1780 proposed to John Jay that l£ Denmark should be un-
willing to make restitution, we ought not to allow her pro-
ducts to be consumed in America.^" Congress passed a res-
olution approving the conduct of Franklin and pledged its

• For full text of the letter see Wharton, op. oit., Vol. Ill, pp. 433-435;
Jared Sparks, Diplomatic Correspondence of the American BevoUttion,
Vol. Ill, pp. 121-124. As the works of Wharton and Sparks largely
contain the same material, no subsequent references will be made to
Sparks unless the material is found there only.
10 Wharton, op. cit., Vol. Ill, pp. 678-679.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 13

support in asserting our rights as an independent and sov-
ereign nation,^^ As Denmark had not answered yet, Frank-
lin confidently hoped that she would make amends for her
action, and he so informed Jones under whom Landais had
acted.^^

In the late spring of 1780 Count Bernstorff replied, that,
had it not been for the fact that Franklin was such a
sage, he would have believed that he was simply trying to
place Denmark under a new embarrassment. Since, however,
Franklin's integrity was universally recognized, he would
divest himself of his public character and answer his
letter, thereby proving that he was a friend of merit, truth
and peace. Turning to the question of the prizes, he wished
to state that the whole unfortunate affair had from the be-
ginning caused him much pain. There was, however, situa-
tions where it was impossible to avoid displeasing either one
party or the other. He appealed to Franklin's magnanimity
asking him to consider the dilemma in which the Danish
government was placed. The Danish representative in France,
Baron de Blome, would be instructed in regard to the matter
and it was hoped that the affair might be settled to the sat-
isfaction of all concemed.^^

It is clear from this letter that Bernstorff wanted Franklin
to believe that it had been a disagreeable duty for him to de-
liver the prizes to England, but that he had done so to
avoid unpleasantness with his next door neighbor. For the
present we do not care to deal with the question of inter-
national law pertaining to the case, but it is desirable to
set forth the motives for Bernstorff 's action.

One of the memorable periods in Danish history is that
which is known as the "Era of Struensee." In November
1766, King Christian VII of Denmark had married the six-
teen year old princess, Caroline Mathilde, sister of George
III of England. The King was mentally weak and inclined

11 Secret Journals of Congress, Vol. II, p. 313.

12 Wliarton, op. oit., Vol. Ill, p. 528.

13 Wharton, op. cit., Vol. Ill, p. 528. The letter was signed R. Bern-
storff. We know of no reason for this as his initials were A. P.

14 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

to immorality, drunkenness and brutality. He soon found
the marriage tie to be an inconvenience, and to the chagrin
of the young queen indulged in a ridiculous love affair with
a woman of the street, known popularly as "Boot Kathrine,"
who became his special and much favored companion at social
functions of the court. In her misery the queen formed an
intimate friendship with Fru Plessen, a woman of parts who
was opposed to the levity of the court. This displeased the
king and his friends, who styled Fru Plessen the queen's
"flea catcher" and had her dismissed from court. In 1768
the king made an extended trip through Europe. When he
returned in 1769 two things were noticeable : first, his mind
was rapidly failing; and second, he had fallen entirely under
the influence of his private physician, Johan Frederik
Struensee. Morally this man was of the king's type, but
intellectually he was his master. With marvelous rapidity he
advanced from one position to another until in 1770 he had
concentrated all governmental powers in the hands of the
king and made himself "Maitre des requetes." In view of
the mental condition of the king this meant that Struensee
was de facto king in Denmark. With wonderful skill he now
inaugurated a reform movement which compares favorably
with the work of the most enlightened of the absolute mon-
archs. His activities created a large number of enemies
among the conservatives, who sought diligently for an op-
portunity to ruin him. He then committed the inexcusable
blunder of becoming too familiar with the queen, who wel-
comed his attentions as a variation from the monotony of her
dreary life.

This situation afforded his enemies their opportunity. A
coup d'etat was carried out in the early morning of January
17, 1772. Struensee and his close friend, Enevold Brandt,
were arrested, as was also Caroline Mathilde, who was taken
to the famous castle Kronborg at Elsinore as a prisoner. Th**
two men were condemned to death and executed with barbaric
cruelty, while a court of thirty-five judges declared the king
and queen divorced. It was the intention to immure her in
the castle Aalborghus; but through Sir Robert M. Keith, the
British minister to Denmark, George III, backed by public

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 15

opinion in England, secured her release. The queen, however,
was (forced to leave her two little children in the hands of
strangers. She was taken to Celle in Hanover where she
died brokenhearted at the age of twenty-two.^* A conspiracy
was soon formed by a number of Danish malcontents, who
had been exiled as a result of the coup d'etat of January 17,
1772. This was backed by Sir N. W. Wraxall, an English
nobleman. In spite of the fact that George III denied it,
rumor would have it that the British monarch was back of
it all. The evident object was the overthrow of the Danish
government and vengeance for the treatment of Struensee
and Caroline Mathilde.^^ At any rate those in power in
Denmark felt very uneasy. This was accentuated by the
fact that George III became so angry, as a result of the
unjust treatment of his sister, that he broke off all diplomatic
relations, as soon as the queen left Denmark.

When Prance became a partner with the colonies in the
war against Great Britain, England's need for friends
changed the attitude of her king and government toward
Denmark somewhat, and an envoy was again sent to Copen-
hagen in 1778.^° With this as a background we believe the
Danish historian, Edvard Holm, is correct when he says of
Bernstorff: "Without doubt it was pleasant for him under
those conditions to have the opportunity to put himself on
the side of England. Some English trading vessels were
captured in the fall of 1779 by an American privateer near
the Norwegian coast and taken into Bergen. As Denmark
had not yet recognized American belligerency, Bernstorff

14 For a complete account of the Era of Struensee and Caroline Mathilda,
"the Queen of Tears," see John Steenstrup, et al., Danmarlcs Eiges
Eistorie, Vol. V, pp. 281-380; "Caroline Mathilde, Queen of Denmark,"
Blackvwod's Magazine, Vol. IX, pp. 142-147; "Danish Revolution under
Struensee," Edinburgh Eeview (1826), Vol. XLIV, pp. 360-383; "Count
Struensee and Queen Caroline Mathilde," Westminster Eeview, (1882),
Vol. CXVIII, pp. 336-361; P. Uldall, Efterladte Optegnelser, passim.

15 Lascelles Wraxall, "The Hapless Queen of Denmark," Eclectic Maga-
evn, (1864), Vol. LXin, pp. 296-297. The author was the grandson of
N. W. Wraxall and claimed he had access to his grandfather's papers.

16 Edward Holm, "Danmarks Neutralitetsforhandlinger 1778-1780," His-
torisTc Tidsskrift, 3dje Rsekke, Vol. V, pp. 4-8.

16 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

forced the privateer to give up the prizes."" The political
situation, supplies us with one of the deeper reasons for the
action of the Danish foreign minister.

A second motive for Bernstorff's action in regard to the
Bergen prizes was his unrelenting hatred of Sweden. Holm
caUs him ' * an untiring and irreconcilable enemy of Sweden. ' '"
For nearly three hundred years the two countries had been
enemies. Recently a secret treaty had been agreed upon
between Prance and Sweden, by which France was to pay
to Sweden one and one-half million livres a year for six
years beginning January 1, 1779. Although this was sup-
posed to be secret, Bemstorff had gotten wind of its existence.^'
He knew that it was the custom of the great powers to play
off iSweden and Denmark against each other in case of a
European conflict. He was therefore hostile to the Franco-
Swedish-American combine. Consequently he was unwilling
in any way to offend England.

But probably after all the most potent reason why Bem-
storff was pro-English was a personal one. He was against
revolution and the liberal tendencies of his times. He had
been one of the powerful opponents of the reforms of
Struensee. He complained that the Danish people were in
favor of the American rebels because they had been poisoned
in the village schools by the philosophy of the day.^" He
also believed that the independence of the colonies would be
a positive menace to Denmark. He feared that it would
endanger the safety of the Danish possessions, cause a de-
crease in the Baltic commerce, which on account of the Sound
Dues was a source of revenue to Denmark, create a nation
which would become a commercial rival, make France too
strong, and interfere with Danish trade in general.^^

17 Edvard Holm, Danmark-Norges Historie, 1766-1808, pp. 310.

i« Edvard Holm, "Danmarka Neutralitetaforhandlinger 1778-1780," Eia-
torisJc Tidsakrift, 3dje Rsekke Vol. V, p. 78.

18 Bemt von Schinkel, Minnen ur Sveriges Nyare Historia, Vol. I, p. 283;
Edvard Holm, Danmark-Norges Historie, 1766-1808, pp. 294-296. I have
been unable in any of the great collections of treaties to find the text
of this document. It is supposed to have been signed in December, 1778.

20 Aage Friis, Bemstorffske Tapvrer, Vol. Ill, p. 498.

21 For an expression of this sentiment by BemstorflP, see Appendix A.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 17

Within the Council of State, which had been reestablished
after the coup d'etat of 1772, there was a feeling, however,
that Bernstorff was too favorably inclined toward England.
The Prince Royal, a half brother of the demented king, who
was a member of the Council of State, addressed a letter to
his fellow members, which was clearly intended for Bernstorff,
asking point blank why Denmark was pursuing a pro-English
course. This letter was written March 9, 1780, a short time
after the American prizes had been returned to England.
"Can Denmark," he asked, "by becoming a special friend of
England afford to become the object of the suspicion of
Russia, of the dissatisfaction of Prussia, of the hate of Spain
and France, and of the hostility of North America? Are
we working for England or for Denmark, when at the present
time we are seeking to induce Russia to become favorable to
England ^2

Bernstorff felt that the letter had been written for his
benefit, and he was much annoyed by its contents, as it cast
a reflection on his foreign policy. He addressed an answer
to the Council, which, of course, was intended for the Prince
Royal, in which he defended his foreign policy in general but
especially his stand on the American situation. He stated
that he felt it was his duty to set forth the reasons why
he was opposed to American independence. Briefly they
were as follows: (1) Denmark would be unable to protect
her West Indies if they should be attacked by the Americans;
(2) the new nation would demand cash in payment for pro-
ducts; (3) the United States would become a dangerous rival
in the export of foodstuffs; and (4) the independence of the
colonies would reduce the Sound Dues.^^ Bernstorff 's anti-
American feeling was also shown when in 1780 the city of
Amsterdam made a treaty with the colonies. In a letter
he stated that the states of Holland ought to punish the mag-
istrates who had signed the treaty, or they ought to allow
England to take revenge on the city.^*

22 Edvard Holm, "Danmarks Neutralitetsforhandlinger 1778-1780," His-
torisk TidssTcrift, 3dje Rsekke, Vol. V, p. 73.

23 For an extract from the letter, see Appendix B.

24 Bernstorff to Beventlow, October 31, 1780. Aage Friis, Bernstorffske
Papirer, Vol. Ill, p. 633.

18 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

It is now clear why Bernstorff acted as he did in regard
to the Bergen prizes. It was unfortunate for the United
States that, when the Danish people and, it would seem, even
the Danish court were favorable to the colonies, such a
strong statesman as Count Bernstorff was hostile to our in-
dependence. On the other hand, he was not, fortunately, at
the head of a large powerful state.

Franklin had been informed that Baron de Blome, the
Danish minister to France, would be given instructions in
regard to the Bergen prize case. This gentleman stated that
an old treaty existed between England and Denmark, ac-
cording to which the Danish government was under obliga-
tion to deliver the prizes to the British. He did, however,
not show the treaty to Franklin nor was Franklin able to
discover such a treaty upon inquiry.^' Denmark consequently
claimed that being bound by a treaty to England she was
under no obligation to the United States. After Franklin's
letter to Bernstorff, the Danish government changed its at-
titude toward the American sailors at Bergen. By an order
from court their expenses for the winter were paid, and
food, clothing, and passage from Bergen to Dunkirk were
given them at the king's expense.''® When Congress was
informed of all the facts in the case, it instructed Franklin
to continue to press the claim on Denmark.^^ Although he
did so several times, he was unable to obtain any satisfaction.''*

3. Danish Counter-Claims.

While Franklin was pressing these claims two incidents
happened which gave Denmark an opportunity for counter-
claims. On February 6, 1782, he was informed that on
December 2, 1781, three American vessels had committed
outrages on two English merchantmen in Danish waters
near Flekeroe, Norway. The suggestion was made that it
was an act of piracy. A demand was made for the punish-
ment of the offenders and for indemnification for the vessels

25 Wharton, op. cit., Vol. Ill, p. 744.

26 Ihid., Vol. Ill, p. 744.

27 Secret Journals of Congress, Vol. II, p. 313; Ihid., Vol. Ill, p. 413.

28 Sparks, op. cit.. Vol. Ill, p. 201.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 19

and cargoes. Congress was informed of the complaint and
that body through its president, Robert Livingston, informed
Franklin that he should communicate to the Danish govern-
ment that the miscreants had been punished by a higher
hand as they had been lost at sea.^^

Shortly afterwards Franklin was informed in a dispatch
from the Danish minister at Paris that the ship Providentia
of Christiania, on her way from London to St. Thomas with
a cargo of merchandise, had been captured by the Amer-
ican privateer Henry under Captain Thomas Benton, and had
been taken to a port in New England under the pretense
that the cargo was English. Denmark demanded restitution
and payment of damages, and reminded the United States of
their privileges in the Danish West Indies. A hope was
expressed that friendship might continue to exist between
the two nations in their dealings with each other.

It does not appear that any attention was paid to this
representation until two years later. On May 16, 1784,
Congress passed a resolution to the effect ''that a copy of
the application of the Danish minister to Dr. Franklin, and
a paragraph of his letter to Congress, on the subject of the
capture of the Danish ship Providentia, be sent to the su-
preme executive of Massachusetts, who is requested to order
duplicates and authentic copies of the proceedings of their
court of admiralty, respecting the said ship and cargo, to be
sent to Congress."^" It does not appear that the governor
of Massachusetts ever reported on this case, nor have any
court records been found regarding it. As no further cor-
respondence concerning these counter-claims is on record,
the cases seem to have been dropped.

A rather interesting suggestion was made by Robert Liv-
ingston in connection with these claims. The Danish govern-
ment had not corresponded with Franklin directly but through
the French minister, Vergennes. This was done by Bem-
storff to avoid giving the appearance of recognizing the inde-
pendence of the colonies. Livingston wrote to Franklin on

28 Wharton, op. dt., Vol. V, pp. 148, 202, 426.

80 Ibid., Vol. V. p. 321; Journals of Congress, Vol. IV, p. 350.

20 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

May 30, 1782, that if the powers which had complaints against
us continued to consider us under England they should pre-
sent their claims through that nation, but if they considered
us as independent they should deal with us directly. Frank-
lin was ordered to act accordingly.*^ From the fact that we
find no more communications received through the French
foreign office the conclusion seems valid that Franklin made
the European powers accept that view.

Upon inquiry at London it was found that the value of
the three vessels we had lost amounted to 50,000 pounds
sterling, hence Franklin presented a claim to Denmark for
that amount.*'^ Bernstorff caused an offer of 10,000 pounds
sterling to be made to the United States, not as a payment of
the claim but as a means of closing the incident. He
claimed that if the cases had been carried into the Danish
courts the Americans would have lost all, as by Anglo-Danish
treaty the ships belonged to England. Franklin, however,
refused the offer.**

As this case continued to come up for nearly seventy years,
the discussion of international law, as it bears on this affair, is
left till a later chapter. But it may be well to have it clear
that Denmark gave two reasons for delivering the ships to
England. The first was the argument that she had not
recognized the independence of the United States, and the
second, that her treaty with England forced her to return
the prizes to the owners.

Although Franklin stated that he had been unable to
discover the treaty, as a matter of fact it did exist, and is
known as the Anglo-Danish treaty of 1660.** It would seem,
however, that the two governments were not quite satisfied
with the stipulations put forth in this document, for on July
4, 1780, a new treaty was made between Denmark and Eng-
land explaining more definitely Article III of a treaty of
1670. The new treaty provided that the two powers would

81 Wharton, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 462.

82 Secret Journals of Congress, "Vol. Ill, p. 413; Wharton, op. cit.,
Vol. VI, p. 743.

33 Ibid., Vol. VI, pp. 583-584.

8* For the part of the treaty of interest to thia work, see Appendix C.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 21

not assist the enemies, the one of the other, by giving shelter
to soldiers or vessels, and that they would punish those of
their subjects as infractors of peace who should act con-
trarily.^^

4. Early Treaty Negotiations.

When it became evident that the American colonies would
become independent, it was but natural that Denmark
should try to establish treaty relations. In December, 1782,
the Danish charge d'affaires at Madrid inquired of William
Carmichael, our representative in Spain, concerning the meth-
od Congress proposed for the interchange of ministers. It
does not appear whether or not this was done at the request
of the Danish government.

More definite steps were taken in February, 1783, when the
new Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron Rosencrone,
who had succeeded Count Bernstorff, instructed Baron de
Walterstorff, who was leaving Copenhagen to take up his
duties as Danish minister to France, to get in communica-
tion with Benjamin Franklin for the purpose of making a
treaty with the United States. Rosencrone was not in agree-
ment with the attitude of his predecessor, Bernstorff. He
pointed out the advantages of such a treaty to both nations,
and referred to the "glorious issue of this war to the United
States of America." He suggested that the treaty already
made between the United States and Holland be taken as a
basis on which to work, and that Franklin be asked to suggest
any changes or additions to the court of Denmark,^^

Walterstorff did not fail to carry out his instructions; and
in April, 1783, Franklin submitted a draft of a treaty
based, as suggested by Rosencrone, on our treaty with Hol-
land. He expressed the desire of the United States to enter
into treaty relations with Denmark, but did not forget to
suggest that to smooth the way for the negotiations Denmark
would do well to hasten to settle the affair of the Bergen
prizes.^^

35 DansTce Traotater, 1751-1800, p. 379.

36 Wharton, op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 186, 261.

3T Ibid., Vol. VI, pp. 372-373. For the text of the treaty with Holland,
see W. M. Malloy, Treaties, etc., 1779-1909, p. 1233.

22 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

In aswering Franklin's communication, Baron Rosencrone
called attention to the fact that Denmark had already made an
offer, which he hoped Congress would consider as a distinguished
proof of the friendship of the court of the King. He also
enclosed a counter-project of a treaty of amity and com-
merce. With the exception of a few points relating to the
Revolutionary War, the making of passports, and the gen-
eral arrangement of articles, this treaty was almost identical
with the one made with Holland.^®

Franklin was satisfied with the document and in July,
1783, sent it to Congress with the hope that it would be rat-
ified speedily.*^ Almost a year passed and nothing was done.
On April 2, 1784, a resolution was passed to the effect that
it would be advantageous to conclude a treaty with Denmark;
and the following June Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin
and John Adams were appointed to negotiate with the Dan-
ish government.*" In September they agreed to invite Baron
de Walterstorff to meet them at Passy to confer respecting
the mode of procedure in the negotiations. In February,
1785, when de Walterstorff was about to leave Copenhagen,
he asked the American ministers for such suggestion as in
their judgment might be useful to hasten the making of a
treaty. This request was made at the order of Count A. P.
Bernstorff, who through a cabinet crisis had returned to the
head of the ministry April 14, 1784.*^ The joint com-
mission made a draft similar to the one sent to Congress in
1783."

It is difiicult to understand why Congress did not ratify
the treaty of 1783 with Denmark. The records do not indicate
that it was ever taken up for discussion. At that time Rosen-
crone, a man favorable to the United States, was at the
head of Denmark's foreign office. Now Bernstorff, with whose
sentiments we are familiar, was back in power. It is

«8 Wharton, op. eit., Vol. pp. 519-527. This gives the text of the treaty.
8» Ihid., Vol. VI, pp. 585-586.

*o Ihid., Vol. VI, pp. 698, 721, 801, 805; Journals of Congress, Vol. Ill,
p. 456; Diplomatic Correspondence, 17SS-1789 Vol. II, pp. 193, 197.
*i John Steenstnip, et al., Danmarks Siges Historie, Vol. V, p. 435.
*2 Diplomatic Correspondence, 178S-1789, Vol. 11, pp. 259-260, 265.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 23

therefore not surprising that in May, 1786, Baron de Blome,
who was sent to Paris because he was a friend of the re-
instated chief, informed Jefferson that de Walterstorff would
not return to France. He was furthermore given the power
to state that the commerce of Denmark and the United
States might well be conducted under the conditions then pre-
vailing without resorting to a definite treaty. If on the con-
trary the United States were anxious to establish treaty re-
lations, Denmark would be willing to enter into further
negotiations.*^ There were apparently no further negotiations
on the subject at this time, a circumstance which may be
explained by the fact that Denmark became involved in war
with Sweden, and the United States went through that era of
uncertainty often called the ''Critical Period." In the
light of future events it is regrettable that a treaty was not
made as it might have saved the United States from a good
deal of trouble during the Napoleonic Wars.
5. Negotiations through John Paul Jones.
The fact that no treaty was made did not mean that we
gave up our claim based on the Bergen prizes. In Novem-
ber, 1783, Congress had empowered John Paul Jones to go
to Europe to solicit payment from Denmark under the di-
rection of Franklin.** Jones went to France but was un-
able to accomplish anything and consequently left the affair
in the care of his friend Dr. Bancroft in London, who was
to work through the Danish minister at the court of St.
James.*'^ Dr. Bancroft, however, was no more successful than
Franklin had been.

43 Ibid., Vol. Ill, p. 21; Vol. IV, p. 504. The original documents in
Danish, German, English and Freiich as well as the correspondence con-
nected with them are found in Rigsarkivet at Copenhagen. Several of the
letters are in cipher but are translated into Danish and French. The
material is found under the following heading: "Akter vedrorende For-
handlingeme om en Handelstraktat mellem Danmark og Nordamerika,
1783-1786". Dept. F. A. Nord-amerika I. a. The dispatches are tied
together and marked "Ffirste Pakke."

44 Ibid., Vol. VII, p. 291-293; Journals of Congress, Vol. Ill, pp. 311,
430, 796.

45 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1783-1789, Vol. VII, p. 293.

24 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Finally Jones decided to go to Denmark to present his
claim in person. After some delay he obtained permission
from Congress on the condition that the final settlement
should not be made without the approbation of our minister
to France. This was a fatal error, for it gave the slippery
Count Bernstorff a chance to shift the negotiation. Armed
with the authorization of Congress, copies of the documents
relative to the Bergen prizes, a letter from an insurer of
London stating that each of the prizes was worth 16,000 to
18,000 pounds sterling, a letter of introduction from Ver-
gennes to De La Houze, the French minister at Copen-
hagen, and finally a personal letter of introduction from
Thomas Jefferson to Count Andreas Peter Bernstorff, Jones ar-
rived in Denmark in March, 1788.*' He was very cordially re-
ceived and was presented to the King of Denmark, — who
did" not speak when anyone was presented, — *'' as well as to
the pleasant young crown prince.*^

Thus far Jones had been successful, but he had not come
for these civilities. Days and weeks passed, but the minister
avoided the subject of the Bergen prize claim. Finally Jones
grew tired of waiting and sent the following note to Bern-
storff: "Monsieur: Your silence on the subject of my
mission from the United States to this court, leaves me in
the most painful suspense; the more so as I have made your
Excellency acquainted with the promise I am under, to
proceed as soon as possible to St. Petersburg. Since this
is the ninth year since the three prizes were seized — it is
to be presumed that this court has long since taken an
ultimate resolution respecting the compensation demanded
by Congress." He continued by stating that while he was
appreciative of his favorable reception at the court, yet he
was much concerned because he had heard nothing of the
matter which was the object of his mission. He closed his
note by asking for a prompt reply.*® In due time Bernstorff

« Ibid., Vol. VII, pp. 340, 342, 355-62, 365; Secret Journals of Congress,

Vol. rv, p. 413.

*'' Jones probably did not know that the king of Denmark was demented.

48 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1785-1788, Vol. VII, pp. 365-368.

*8 Ibid., Vol. VII, pp. 371-372.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 25

replied that "a train of circumstances naturally brought on
through the necessity of allowing a new situation to be
developed of obtaining information concerning reciprocal
interests, and avoiding the inconvenience of a precipitate
and imperfect arrangement," had delayed the matter. He
also stated that the Danish King was anxious "to renew
the negotiations for a treaty of amity and commerce, and
that in the form already agreed on, as soon as the new
constitution (that admirable plan so becoming the wisdom
of the most enlightened men) shall be adopted by a state
which requires nothing but that to secure it perfect respect."
He further stated that, since Jones did not have the final
plenipotentiary power from Congress to settle the matter, it
would be unnatural to change the place of negotiations from
Paris to Copenhagen, especially since they had never been
broken off but only temporarily suspended. He concluded
by wishing that friendly relations might continue to exist
and that a treaty might be negotiated.^"

This letter terminated the mission of Jones in Copenhagen.
The wily Bernstorff had been able to defer the settlement of
the question again. Soon after this, Jones entered
the service of Czarina Catharina II as commander of
the Wolodimer. He inquired several times of Jefferson and
Baron De La Houze as to the status of the Bergen prize
claims; but not until March, 1790, did he obtain a reply that
conveyed anything definite. De La Houze wrote to him at that
time as follows: "As to the affair concerning which you
speak to me, and in which you have been witness to my
zeal, — it remains still at the same point where you left it on
your departure for St. Petersburg, the 15th of April 1788."
He went on to comfort him by saying that the fact that
Jefferson, who understood the case so well, had become
Secretary of State would be of great value in the future
negotiations. At the present time, however, the disturbed
conditions in Europe would be likely to make a settlement
difficult.^i

50 Ibid., Vol. VII, pp. 394-396.

51 Ibid., Vol. VII, pp. 399-401. By the "disturbed conditions" was

26 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Another year passed. By this time Jones had left the
Russian service and had come to Paris, from which place
he wrote to Jefferson on March 20, 1791: "But I must
further inform you, that a few days after my arrival from
Denmark at St. Petersburg, I received from the Danish
Minister at that court, a letter under the seal of Count de
Bernstorff, which, having opened, I found to be a patent
from the King of Denmark, in the following terms:

" 'Having reason to wish to give proof of our good will
to the Chevalier Paul Jones, Commodore of the navy of the
United States of America, and desiring, moreover, to prove
our esteem on account of the just regard which he has
borne to the Danish flag, while he commanded in the
Northern seas, we secure to him, from the present date,
during his life, annually, the sum of fifteen hundred crowns,
currency of Denmark to be paid in Copenhagen without any
deduction whatever.'

"The day before I left the Court of Copenhagen, the
Prince Royal had desired to speak with me in his apartment.
His Royal Highness was extremely polite, and after saying
many civil things, he said he hoped I was satisfied , with
the attention that had been shown to me, since my arrival
and that the King would wish to give me some mark of his
esteem.

" 'I had never had the honor of rendering any service to
his Majesty.'

*' *It matters not; a man like you should be an exception
to the ordinary rules; you have shown yourself delicate,
none could be more so with respect to our flag; everybody
loves you here.'

"I took leave without further explanation. I have felt
myself in an embarassing situation, on account of the King's
patent, and I have as yet made no use of it, although three
years are nearly elapsed since I received it. I wished
to consult you; but when I understood you would not
return to Europe, I consulted Mr. Short and Mr. G. Morris,
who both gave me as their opinion, that I might with

meant war, which had broken out between Sweden and Denmark, Russia
aiding the latter.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 27

propriety accept the advantage offered. I have, in con-
sequence, determined to draw the sum due; and I think you
will not disapprove of this step, as it can by no means
weaken the claims of the United States; but rather the
contrary. ' "^

From this letter it is clear that Bernstorff, who did not
wish to pay an indemnity for the Bergen prizes, now at
least wanted to be on friendly terms with our government.
The patent given to Paul Jones was evidently given for the
purpose of soothing his feelings and making him satisfied
so that he would not further press his claims. The indi-
viduals involved in the case being satisfied the government
of the United States would naturally drop the matter, and
the whole unfortunate affair would be forgotten. For some
time, at any rate, the matter was lost sight of, but we shall
meet the problem again at a future date.

6. Ordination of Episcopalian Ministers.

In 1783 an American gentleman, who had gone to London
to receive ordination as a clergyman in the Episcopalian
church, wrote to John Adams, our representative at The
Hague, stating that he had been refused ordination by the
Bishop of London and the Archbishop of Canterbury, be-
cause he would not take an oath of allegiance to the Eng-
lish crown as required of the clergy of the Church of Eng-
land. He was desirous of learning whether it would be
possible for a ministerial candidate to "have orders from
Protestant Bishops on the continent."

Soon afterwards when John Adams by chance met M.
de St. Saphorin, the Danish envoy to The Hague, he inquired
for the sake of curiosity what stand Denmark would take on
the matter. Although Mr. Adams only intended this to be
current conversation, the Danish envoy referred the matter
to his home government which took it up with the Faculty
of Theology of the University of Copenhagen. The decision
which was favorable, was transmitted by the Danish Privy
Councillor, Count Rosencrone, to John Adams through M.
de St. Saphorin in the form of regular diplomatic cor-

62 ihid., Vol. VII, pp. 408-413.

28 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

respondence for the Congress of the United States. It
stated that candidates for the Episcopalian ministry could
be ordained in Denmark according to Danish rites, and
without taking any oath of allegiance. The services would
be performed in Latin.'^ Adams reported the matter to the
president of Congress on April 22, 1784. In March, 1785,
this body sent a communication to Adams instructing him
to thank his Danish Majesty through M. de St. Saphorin
for the liberal decision rendered."^ It does not appear, how-
ever, that the Episcopalian clergy in America ever took
advantage of the offer.

68 Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 127-130.

6* Secret Journals of Congress, Vol. Ill, p. 550.

CHAPTER II

PROBLEMS OF THE NAPOLEONIC ERA, 1800-1815

1. Interchange of Representatives.

As early as 1785 it was realized by the United States that
it would be advantageous to have a regular representative
in Copenhagen. Congress proposed ''that at courts where
no ministers reside the charge d'affaires of the United States
be empowered to exercise the duties of consul general. That
consuls shall reside at Copenhagen." The proposal, how-
ever did not pass.^ Since the diplomatic posts at Madrid,
Berlin, and St. Petersburg were filled only occasionally, it
could not be expected that such small posts as that at Co-
penhagen should be taken care of.

Since Denmark discriminated against the trade of nations
which had no relations with her through treaties or represen-
tatives, American Merchants were very much at a disad-
vantage in Danish ports. During the latter half of Wash-
ington's first administration Thomas Jefferson, the Secretary
of State, proposed that we appoint a consul to be located
at Copenhagen. He suggested the name of Hans Rudolph
Saaby, a wealthy Danish merchant. Our custom had been
to make a foreigner only vice-consul; but as that would not
be in harmony with Danish custom, the higher rank was
proposed, and Mr. Saaby was appointed March 6, 1792.^

During the early days of our national existence state affairs
were negotiated between the United States and Denmark
through their ministers to France. Such negotiations were
later carried on in London. Thus in 1799 a question of an alien
inheritance tax was handled by Rufus King and Count Wedel
de Jarlsberg, the representatives at the court of St. James,

1 Secret Journals of Congress, Vol. Ill, pp. 593-595.

2 Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. V, pp. 421-422; J. D. Richardson,
Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. I, p. 117.

29

30 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

from the United States and Denmark respectively.' Den-
mark, however, realized that it would be of value to have a
representative in America; and on November 23, 1800, the
American government was informed through Rufus King that
Sir Blicher Olson would be sent to the United States as
Minister Resident and Consul General.*

2. The Case of the Brig Hendrick.

During the rupture of diplomatic relations between the
United States and France, following the X, Y, Z affair, sev-
eral cases arose which are of interest in the present narrative.
It appears that the brig Hendrick'^ under Captain Peter
Scheelt, of Altona — which at that time was under Danish
jurisdiction — sailed from Hamburg for Cape Francois in the
West Indies. On October 3, 1799, it was captured by a
French privateer, and on October 8 it was recaptured by
the American sloop of war Pickering under the command of
Benjamin Hillier and brought into the port of Basseterre,
in the British island of St. Christopher, also known as St.
Kitts, one of the Leeward Islands. Here the American cap-
tors brought it before the British court of Vice-Admiralty,
which ordered that in accordance with the laws of the United
States the ship should be sold and one-half of its value
awarded to the captors as salvage, while the other half, after
deducting court expenses, was to be given to the owners.

Denmark made demands on the United States for the
value of the ship and its cargo. The government investigated
the case and found that the British admiralty court had

8 Life and Correspondence of Sufus King, Vol. Ill, p. 161.
* rbid., Vol. Ill, pp. 334-35, 338-339. A gentleman by the name of
Campbell had presented himself to Jefferson as minister from Denmark
in 1790. He did not have any credentials and was most likely an ad-
venturer. Jefferson asked WUliam Short, charge d'affaires at Paris, to
inquire of Count de Blome concerning the man, but it does not appesur
that a reply was received. Writings of Thomas Jeferson, Vol. V, pp.
235-236.

6 We use the Danish form. J. B. Moore in his work Intematiorutl Arbi-
trations, p. 4553, evidently makes a mistake by stating that there was
a Henry and a Hendrick case. These are without doubt the English and
the Danish forms of the name of the same vessel. The forms Henrick
and Heinrich also appear in the documents.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 31

erred in its interpretation of the laws of the United States.
The rate of salvage awarded the Americans for recapturing
the brig from the French privateers had been adapted from
laws of the United States, which were applicable to recap-
tures of American property and of such as belonged to belliger-
ent powers in amity with the United States. It had no refer-
ence to recaptures of neutral property. It was found that in
certain peculiar cases of danger, a proportionate rate of
salvage had been allowed in the past in neutral cases, but
this case was different because the vessel was bound from a
neutral port to a French port. Having been captured by
a French vessel it would therefore not be in danger. The
Danish government gave proof that, for a year preceding
the capture of the Ilendrick, most vessels carried into the
French island Guadeloupe had been released, and in some
cases even damages had been paid. Besides Denmark claimed
that the rate of salvage in this case had been too high. It
was shown that the vessel and cargo were worth $44,500; but
after satisfying the decree of salvage and paying the court
expenses, not more than $8,374.41 was left for the owners.

In February, 1803, President Jefferson laid the case before
Congress and recommended that, since the Danish government
had observed a friendly attitude toward the United States and
since no remedy was now obtainable in the ordinary judicial
course, that body should take the matter under consideration
and vote an appropriation to the Danish government for the
loss sustained.*

In accordance with the President's recommendation to
Congress, the House very soon passed a bill to reimburse Den-
mark but it was defeated in the Senate.^ The matter was
taken up in the next Congress but with the same result.*
Denmark, however, did not drop the case. She claimed that
it was clearly the duty of the United States to pay for the
vessel since even the officers of the government had ac-

6 American State Papers, Foreign, Eelations, Vol. II, pp. 483-486, 609-612,
Vol. rv, pp. 629-632.

7 Annals of Congress, 7 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 264, 265, 268.

8 Ibid., 8 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 235, 236, 239, 252, 257, 261, 276, 552, 562,
787, 798, 881, 883, 887.

32 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

knowledged that a mistake had been made. The commander
of the Pickering had erred in taking the captured vessel be-
fore a British court, the sentence of which the United States
had no power to review. The American government did not
deny these facts but was impotent in the matter so long as
Congress failed to make an appropriation for the purpose.
The reason for the Senate's action became evident later.

In February, 1805, President Jefferson again laid the
matter before Congress with the additional documents and
arguments Denmark had produced. He stated that the
owners of the Hendrick were entitled to relief and that ac-
cording to the policy of the United States Congress should
make provision for payment.® As a result the following bill

was introduced in Congress: "Resolved: that the sum of

dollars ought to be appropriated, out of the monies in the
treasury, not otherwise appropriated, to enable the president
of the United States to make such restitution as shall appear
to be just and equitable, to the owners of the Danish brigan-
tine called Hendrick, and her cargo, which were recaptured
by an American armed vessel, in the year 1799, and sold by
order of the Vice Admiralty Court, in the British island of
St. Christopher: Provided; the Government of Denmark shall
make compensation for the seizure of certain prizes, captured
by the armed vessels of the United States, during the late
Revolutionary war with Great Britain and carried into the
port of Bergen in the year 1779, and which by order of the
Danish Government were, without a judicial trial, restored to
their original proprietors "^°

This bill like its two predecessors passed the House but
failed in the Senate. The action of the Senate seems hardly
fair as the bill proposed to give justice to Denmark only in
case she paid for the Bergen prizes. Congress was incident-
ally reminded of the latter just at this time. Peter Landais,
the French- American commander of the Alliance, which cap-
tured the three prizes, kept pressing his claim on Congress.

» J. D. Richardson, op. oit., Vol. I, p. .377. For the documents referred
to, see State Papers and Public Documents, 1789-1815, Vol. V, pp. 43-48.

10 Annals of Congress, 9 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 476.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 33

The very Congress in which the bill just quoted was presented
voted him $4,000.00 to be subtracted from his final award.^^

As long as the United States government continued of the
opinion that her claim on Denmark was fair, it is evident that
the Senate was unwilling to pay indemnity for the Hendrick
until a prior settlement was reached about the Bergen prizes.
Since the Danish government steadfastly refused to recognize
that claim, the Senate would not move. It evidently felt
that when the State Department should reach an agreement
with Denmark that was satisfactory to Congress, there would
be plenty of time to appropriate money, if indeed any were
needed.

While direct evidence is lacking, it is possible that an
additional reason why the Senate did not act favorably was
the fact that Denmark had recently imposed discriminating
duties highly favorable to her own carrying trade.^^ Each
nation, to be sure, is master of its own laws, but often selfish
laws produce friction, or at least prejudice, between other-
wise friendly powers.

3. Murray vs. Charming Betsy.

A case similar to the one just mentioned is that known as
Murray vs. Charming Betsy. An American-built vessel called
Jane sailed for the West Indies where its cargo was sold.
Later the ship itself was sold to Jared Shattuck, a naturalized
Danish subject in St. Thomas, who had been born in the state
of Connecticut. Under the new ownership, with the name
changed to Charming Betsy, it sailed for Guadeloupe in the
French West Indies and was seized by a French privateer.
Later it was recaptured by the United States warship
Constellation under Captain Murray and taken to St. Pierre
in Martinique. Its master was Thomas Wright, a Scot who
had also become a Danish citizen residing in the Danish West
Indies. In Martinique Captain Murray sold the cargo of the
Charming Betsy because he believed Shattuck was an Amer-

11 Ihid., For the bill, pp. 142, 143, 162, 164, 189, 191, 281, 476, 480,
510, 516. For the award, 435, 453, 516, 520, 779, 799, 824, 838. See
also Statutes at Large, Vol. VI, p. 61.

12 American State Papers, Commerce and Navigation, Vol. I, p. 504.

34 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

ican citizen carrying on an unlawful trade with the French.
After that he took the ship itself to Philadelphia.

Jared Shattuck claimed the vessel and sued to gain pos-
session of her as well as to secure damages for the loss of
her cargo. The case was tried in the Federal District Court
of Pennsylvania under Judge Peters, who awarded the ship
and damages to Shattuck on the ground that he was a
Danish citizen. This conclusion he had reached from the
fact that Shattuck was holding real estate in St. Thomas,
which according to Danish Law he could not do as a for-
eigner. The case was appealed to the Circuit Court and
finally to the Supreme Court of the United States where in
February, 1804, Chief Justice John Marshall handed down
a decree containing the following points:

(1) Jared Shattuck was before the law a Danish
citizen, hence the Charming Betsy was Danish prop-
erty;

(2) the American recaptors were not entitled to
salvage because the vessel, being captured on her
way to a French port by the French, was not in
imminent danger of condemnation;

(3) Captain Murray was not justified in breaking
up the voyage of the Charming Betsy, because no
American citizen has a right to interfere with the
property of Danish citizens when sailing under
neutral flag on the high seas; and

(4) Captain Mlirray, therefore, must release the
Charming Betsy to Jared Shattuck and pay dam-
ages.^^

This case arose under the same circumstances as the case of
the Hendrick. The reason the case was so easily settled was
because the sentence of the court was directed against a
private individual, who could not take advantage of the
Bergen prize claim. As Captain Murray was an officer in
the United States navy and as such had acted in good faith,
it was natural that Congress should reimburse his loss. In

18 Murray vs. Charming Betsy, 2 Crunch, pp. 64-125.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 35

1805 he was paid the original amount and interest by the
government.^*

4, Shattuck vs. Mtaley.

This ease was also connected with the name of Jared
Shattuck and took an even more prominent place in our
diplomatic relations that that of the Charming Betsy.
Through Richard Soderstrom, who was for a time in charge of
the consular affairs pertaining to Denmark, the facts of the
case were presented to our foreign department in June, 1801.
In 1800 the schooner Mercator, owned by Jared Shattuck,
laden with a cargo of merchandise and consigned to Toussaint
Lucas, the master of the vessel, sailed from St. Thomas for
Jacmel and Port Republican in the island of St. Domingo.
The cargo was valued at $13,920. On May 14 as the vessel
was entering the port of Jacmel, it was met by the
Experiment, an armed schooner of the United States navy
under the command of Lieutenant William Maley. The Amer-
ican commander took possession of the Mercator and put on
board of her a prize-master and four seamen who took the
vessel to some place not known to the owner. The ship was
never brought to legal adjudication in any court of the United
States to the knowledge of Jared Shattuck. In the petition
to the State Department Mr. Shattuck asked for redress of
grievances.

James Madison, our Secretary of State, informed Soder-
strom that the regular way to handle this case would be
through the courts of the United States. Soderstrom in re-
turn stated that in Europe, as well as in America, such
cases were often settled through the foreign department. In
this case, he added, the leading individual involved, Lieu-
tenant Maley, was insolvent and outside of the United States;
therefore it would be difficult to pursue the case to any ad-
vantage in the courts. To this Madison replied that it would
be best to follow the regular procedure and that suit should
be brought by the Minister Resident of Denmark, P. Blicher
Olson, as he was the only proper organ through whom

" Statutes at Large, Vol. VI, p. 56.

36 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Danish subjects could demand reclamation.^' Accordingly the
case was taken up in the Federal District Court of Pennsyl-
vania, appealed to the Circuit Court, and finally to the Supreme
Court of the United States. In his usual masterly style Chief
Justice John Marshall rendered the decision in 1806.^^

In the trial Maley claimed that the Mercator was an Amer-
ican vessel carrying on an illicit trade with the French West
Indies. When he met her she was on her way from Balti-
more to Port-au-Prince, a place in the possession of British
troops, although her papers declared she was proceeding from
St. Thomas to Jacmel. He also declared that the name of the
master of the Mercator indicated that he was a Frenchman or
perhaps an Italian, while his crew were largely Portuguese.
According to Danish law foreigners could not legally com-
mand and navigate a Danish vessel. He further declared
that Jared Shattuck was an American who had gone to St.
Thomas to carry on an illicit and clandestine commerce with
French ports. In order to make no mistake he had left
undisturbed the papers on board the vessel, and had sent her with
an officer and four seamen to Cape Francois to be delivered to
Silas Talbot, then commander of the public vessels of the United
States in those waters, with instructions that she should be de-
livered to her master if Commodore Talbot cleared her. About six
hours later the Mercator was captured by the British privateer
General Simcoe, commanded by Joseph Duval, who brought
her to Jamaica where she was libeled as French or Spanish
property in spite |of the denial of Jared Shattuck. She
was condemned as a lawful prize and confiscated to the cap-
tors. Maley therefore contended that since peace existed be-
tween the United States, Great Britain and Denmark, the
Mercator would have been cleared in the British court if she
had been Danish property.

Jared Shattuck presented proof that though born in Con-
necticut he was a Danish citizen, that Port-au-Prince, was not
held by the British but by General Toussaint L'OuverturC;
that all the papers were in good and regular order, that the

15 American State Papers, Foreign Relation, Vol. Ill, pp. 344-347.
i« Maley vs. Shattuck, 3 Cranoh, 458.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 37

master, though Italian by birth, was a Danish citizen, and
that Danish law did not require the crew of a vessel under
the flag of Denmark to be Danish citizens in time of peace.
The District Court had awarded the owner $41,658.67. This
was changed in the Circuit Court to $33,244.67, From this
decree Maley appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States which sustained the lower court.

While Shattuek had won his case in the courts he had not
yet obtained the money. As Maley was an officer of the Navy
and insolvent, the government was asked to pay the damage.
This in turn necessitated action by Congress. Here the same
difficulties were met as in the case of the Hendrick. In 1810
the Danish Minister Peder Pedersen requested that the award
of the court be paid. By a Senate resolution the President
was asked to lay before that body all the correspondence and
documents connected with the case. This was done but the
claim was not paid,^^ for other circumstances had now arisen,
which will be presented in a later connection.

5. Danish Aid in Tripoli.

While the cases mentioned above were pending, the United
States was involved in what is known as the Tripolitan War.
Several times Americans had been captured and imprisoned
in Tripoli. The consul of Denmark, Nicholas C. Nissen, re-
siding at Tripoli did all in his power to aid the Americans.
In 1802 Andrew Morris, captain of the brig Franklin wrote to
a friend: ''Through the interference of Mr. Nissen, his Danish
Majesty's consul here, I have the liberty of the town." When
in the year 1803 Captain William Bainbridge was captured
with the officers and crew of the ship Philadelphia and im-
prisoned under such conditions that it was impossible for
them to procure the necessary food and clothing. Mr. Nissen
took care of the American prisoners for more than nineteen
months, part of the time at his own expense.^^ In sending
a request to Commodore Samuel Barron for a person to come
ashore, Bainbridge suggested that it would be best for that

17 Senate Jouriial, 9-11 Cong., Vol. IV, p. 466; Annals of Congress,
(1810), 11 Cong., Pt. II, pp. 2158-2166.

18 American State Papers, Naval Affairs, Vol. 1, pp. 122-124, 150-151.

38 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

individual to come under the guaranty of the Danish consul
as he was "a man of unquestionable integrity" and was
"actuated by a desire to serve,^*

The negotiations between Tobias Lear, commander of the
United States frigate Constitution, and the Bashaw of Tripoli,
which led in 1805 to the final settlement of the Tripolitan
trouble "were also carried on through the Danish consul.^"
It was therefore natural that Congress should show its appre-
ciation by passing a joint resolution in 1806 thanking Nicholas
C. Nissen for his disinterested services.^^

6. Danish Spoliation of American Commerce.

The treaty of Tilsit in 1807 created a situation in which
England was forced to act quickly and effectively. Con-
sequently she demanded of Denmark that her navy should
be surrendered to the safe keeping and control of the
British fleet, but promised that it would be restored after
the war. As England probably expected, Denmark rejected
the proposition as it would make her a vassal of her pow-
erful neighbor to the west. Great Britain, however, was
confronted with a situation which had to be settled without
delay. As a result, on September 2, 1807, she bombarded
Copenhagen and forced the surrender of the Danish fleet,
consisting of twenty-two ships of the line, ten frigates, and
forty-two smaller vessels.^^

The natural outcome of this action was that Denmark
joined France in her war against England. A large num-
ber of privateers were fitted out for the express purpose of
preying on the English Baltic trade, which was being carried
on in spite of the fact that Alexander I of Russia had joined
Napoleon. By a royal order issued at Rendsborg on Sep-
tember 14, 1807, Danish privateers were instructed to bring
into port all English vessels and property of any kind.^'

19 State Papers and Public Documents, Vol. V. p. 412.

20 American State Papers, Foreign Affairs, Vol. II, pp. 717-718.

21 Annals of Congress, 9. Cong., 1 Sess., p. 1296.

22 Cambridge Modem History, Vol. IX, pp. 237-39, 243, 294-300, 344.

23 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. Ill, pp. 327-328; Law
of September 14, 1807. See Bibliography.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 39

This order made it very hazardous for English vessels to
ply through the Danish Sound and Belts.

England tried very hard to continue her trade, and a
large number of her merchantmen sailed under armed convoy.
The demands on the British navy, however, were so great
that it was impossible to protect her whole merchant marine;
consequently a large number of vessels found it necessary
to protect themselves by posing as neutrals. With false
papers and under the flag of the United States, the only
nation that was neutral, they attempted to deceive the
Danish privateers. As a result Denmark felt obliged to
take measures to capture all ships under false flag. This
course, of necessity, carried with it the danger of seizing
a large number of vessels that were truly neutral, and of
trying them under the smallest and flimsiest pretexts pos-
sible. To this danger was added the fact that the captains
and crews of privateers shared a great part of the booty
thus obtained, which made them greedy to capture vessels
and secure their condemnation no matter whether they were
enemy or neutral.

It was under these circumstances that in July, 1809,
forty-three American citizens in Christiansand, Norway, pe-
titioned the President of the United States for aid, since
they had been captured by Norwegian privateers, subject to
Denmark, while pursuing their lawful business. They ad-
mitted that many Americans had connived with England to
cheat Denmark, and that England was fitting out her vessels
to look like those of the United States; yet they felt that
they had not been treated fairly in the courts of Norway.
Hven though they had proved in court that their property
was neutral, their voyage legal, and their capture conse-
quently illegal, yet they had been forced to pay from 400
to 600 rixdollars to their captors. The American consul,
Mr. Saabye, of Copenhagen, had been unable to aid them.
They hoped for help from America as they were liable to
starve. They also recommended that the President make a
certain Peter Isaacsen, who had given them much aid,
American consul in Norway.^*

24 Ibid., Vol. Ill, pp. 328-333; State Papers arul Public Documents,
Vol. VII, pp. 314-330.

40 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Closely following upon this request came a communication
to the State Department from Peter Isaaesen himself, dated
August 11, 1809. In this he stated that there were twenty-
six American vessels held captive in Norway at that time.
Eighteen of these had been tried and eight were still await-
ing trial. Of the eighteen, eight had been cleared and ten
condemned. He explained that England had used every con-
ceivable means to deceive Denmark, so that navigation had
practically ceased to be considered an honest business. False,
falsified or double sets of papers were so common that the
strictest inquiry was absolutely necessary to ascertain the
true identity of a vessel. This was the cause of the hard-
ships experienced by American sailors in Norway. He
promised to watch over the interests of Americans as well
as circumstances would permit.^^

In October of the same year, the American consul at
Copenhagen sent a list of fifty-one ships, which were
claimed by Americans but which had been captured by
Danish privateers. Twenty-one of these had been condemned,
and the cases of all but two of these had been appealed
to a higher court. Twenty-two liad been cleared. Seven
had been cleared in the prize courts but the captors had
appealed the cases. One was still pending. About the
same time, also, seventy individuals and firms sent a com-
munication from Philadelphia in which they claimed loss
for damages sustained as a result of Danish privateering.
They requested the government to intervene in their behalf.^*

By this time Denmark had become aware that, though
her privateers were doing effective work in disturbing Brit-
ish trade in the Baltic, they were also shutting off the im-
portation of food supplies to Norway. On August 6, 1809,
Prince Christian August wrote to the King of Denmark that
the conditions in Norway were very serious and that he
believed a prohibition of privateering would be advantageous.
The king replied that he had already repealed the order of
September 14, 1807, until further notice.^^ It was hoped that

25 American State Papers, Foreign Belations, Vol. Ill, pp. 330-331.

26 Ibid., Vol. Ill, pp. 332-333.

27 J. V. Raeder, Danmarks Krigshistorie, 1807-1809. Vol. Ill, pp. 534-

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 41

the prohibition of privateering would cause England to al-
low ships to enter Norwegian harbors, but it had the op-
posite effect. The English war vessels that had been busy
fighting Danish privateers were now employed to blockade
the Norwegian ports. It was therefore of no use for the
Danish government to offer a bonus of two and one-half
rixdoUars for each ton of food shipped to Norway.^^

Denmark now made a very wise move. On December 10,
1809, she established peace with England's ally, Sweden, in
the treaty of Jonkjobing. This made it possible for Norway
to secure food through Sweden and immediately the Danish
privateers were sent out to harass English shipping,^^ This
explains President Madison's statement to Congress in his
annual message December 5, 1810, to the effect that: "The
commerce of the United States with the North of Europe,
hitherto much vexed by licentious cruisers, particularly
under the Danish flag, has lately been visited with fresh
and extensive depredations.^"

In view of these conditions in Europe, the American gov-
ernment soon realized that it was necessary to have a rep-
resentative in Copenhagen. It was therefore decided to send
George W. Erving as special envoy to the Danish govern-
ment. As soon as he arrived at his post he got in touch
with the Danish Premier, Baron Rosenkrantz, who also had
charge of foreign affairs. Erving requested that the action
of Danish prize courts be temporarily suspended in Amer-
ican cases in order that more definite knowledge might be
obtained concerning each case before them. This request
was made 'on June 6, 1811, shortly after he arrived in
Copenhagen. At the same, time he sent to Baron Rosen-
krantz two lists of captured American ships, the cases of-
which were pending before the Danish courts. The first
list containing the names of twelve ships, dealt with vessels,
concerning ten of which there was no question in regard to

536. Saabye in his report, mentioned in the text, stated that the order
was repealed August 1, 1809.

28 Ibid., pp. 570, 589.

29 Ibid., pp. 629-689, passim.

30 American State Papers, Foreign Belations, Vol. I, p. 77.

42 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

nationality. They had been captured under "clause 'D' of
the eleventh article of the royal instructions of March 10,
1810, declaring as a cause of condemnation, 'the making use
of English convoy.' " The second list was made up of
sixteen ships which had been captured because among their
papers were French certificates of origin, that were sup-
posed to be forgeries, as Denmark had been informed by
France that French consuls in America had been ordered
to discontinue issuing them."^

Erving did not wait to receive a reply to this letter, but
on the following day sent another note to Baron Rosen-
krantz in which he entered more fully into the problem of
the ships under English convoy, henceforth referred to as
the "convoy cases." Two of the twelve were laden with
goods for England and no contention was made for them.
The other ten, however, were on their way from Baltic
ports to America. They had passed the Sound and paid
the Sound Dues. When they entered the Cattegat they had
been arrested by a British naval force and "compelled to
join convoy." He contended that the Danish instructions
of March 10, 1810, were unfair and contrary to international
law in this instance because they did not take into con-
sideration the circumstances that had brought the ships
under the enemy convoy. He asked the Danish authorities
to cite "examples of the practice of nations" to support the
legality of the instructions. On the other hand he claimed
that even England had never gone so far as to condemn
a vessel on the mere ground that it had been captured
under enemy convoy. He called Denmark's attention to the
brave fight she herself had undertaken to maintain the rights
of neutrals in 1780 and 1800, and he closed the letter with
expressing the hope that justice might be done, which would
be so much easier in this case because the vessels had been
captured by national ships and not by privateers.'*

On June 28, 1811, Erving received a reply from Rosen-
krantz. After expressing his satisfaction because friendly
feeling had always existed between Denmark and the United

81 Ibid., Vol. Ill, pp. 522-523.

82 Ibid., Vol. ni, pp. 524-525.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 43

States, Rosenkrantz went on to explain the cases involved
in their correspondence. In regard to the "French certifi-
cates of origin" it was now clear that the cases rested on
a misunderstanding. On September 22, 1810, the French
government had informed Denmark that the consuls in
America had been instructed not to issue them. It now
appeared these orders had not reached the consuls in Amer-
ica until November 13. The Danish government had there-
fore ordered her judges of admiralty courts not to adjudge
French certificates as evidence against the ships, providing
they were issued prior to that date. In regard to the ** con-
voy cases" the Danish government felt that the rule laid
down in the instructions must be followed, as enemy convoy
destroyed their neutral character. He held that this prin-
ciple was just and would even be enforced if a Danish vessel
should use English convoy. He called Erving's attention to
the fact that at the time when all other European ports
were closed to American vessels those of Denmark were
open. This should convince the United States that Denmark
desired their friendship and was doing nothing from hostile
motives.^'

In answer to this communication Erving immediately re-
plied that he was thankful for the spirit expressed, which,
of course, he had expected knowing the general trend of
the Danish court. He was sorry, however, that the Danish
prize courts did not always follow the spirit of His Majesty,
and he mentioned the decision of the High Court on March
11th, 1811, in the Swift case in which a vessel had been con-
demned on the sole statements of the privateers, who, it had
been proved, had perjured themselves. American evidence was
not admitted in this trial. He was unable, however, to agree
with the arguments given in the "convoy cases." The United
States would not dispute the right of Denmark to enforce the
instructions of March 10, 1810, on her own citizens; but it
was quite a different matter when other nations were involved.
In fact it was inconceivable that a Danish ship, subject to
capture by the British, could be found under British convoy.

88 Ibid., Vol. Ill, pp. 525-527.

44 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Such a ship would be carrying enemy property and would
therefor be guilty of treason. It would merit the severest
punishment. He insisted that the words ''using convoy" in
the royal instructions must surely be construed to mean
"voluntary convoy," and could thus not cover the "convoy
cases." To condemn vessels under such unfortunate cir-
cumstances would not be a just course for any power to
pursue toward a friendly neutral.

In spite of this strong reasoning, Rosenkrantz declared in
his next communication that His Majesty could not make any
change in his instructions to his privateers. Any American
vessel under the convoy of British war vessels, if captured
in the future by Danish ships, would be considered a lawful
prize. No European power had called in question the justice
of this rule. In later correspondence Erving showed that
two of the "convoy cases" were ships that had been captured
by Denmark and released by the Danish courts because their
neutrality was fully established. It was thus clear that the
vessel had not voluntarily joined convoy. In the case of the
Hope, Captain Rhea, the British commander, Charles Dash-
wood of H. M. S. Pyramus, had boarded the vessel and entered
on the ship's papers that he had ordered her to join convoy
to prevent her going to an enemy's port with provisions and
to prevent her from being captured by England's enemies.**

In Erving 's report to the Secretary of State, he made a
summary of the arguments that he had put before the Danish
government in behalf of the Americans. The most flagrant
violations made by Denmark were those connected with the
"convoy eases." He enclosed tabulated reports of the sit-
uation of American claims which show the following status

on May 30, 1811:

Captures in 1809_-. 63

Captures in 1810 124

Total 187

Cleared 114

Condemned . ~ 31

Pending 14

»* Ibid., Vol. Ill, pp. 527-529; State Papers and Public Doauments,
1789-1816, Vol. VIII, pp. 307-308.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 45

Condemned cases of a desperate character. ^ 16

Cases transferred to Paris 2

Convoy cases pending . 10

Total 187

As privateering at this date was still going on, the number
swelled to much greater proportions.^^

Because many vessels had been condemned and sold by
Danish prize courts, and because it was impossible to re-
verse such action, Erving, finally on November 4, 1811, pre-
sented reclamation claims to the Danish government. His
communication was soon after answered by Baron Rosen-
krantz who sent a counter-claim to Mr. Erving for the
Hendrick and the Mercator cases, which have been described
above. Soon after this Rosenkrantz sent a direct reply to
Erving 's note of November 4, the gist of which was that as
Denmark had been fair in her prize decisions it would be
impossible to pay for the condemned vessels. Erving 's counter-
reply was clear and straightforward. He reminded the Danish
government that in the two cases mentioned the United States
had broken no international law, but that the cases had arisen
through error of officers, for which errors Denmark might yet
expect to receive redress. The action of Denmark, on the other
hand, was a direct violation of the laws of nations. If this
were not so, he had invited the Dainish Minister of Foreign
Affairs to discuss the principle upon which the reclamation
was founded. *'Can it be deemed to be a satisfactory answer
to such a reclamation that other nations have submitted to
similar decisions'? Can it be imagined that the term 'defini-
tive' as applied to such decisions is conclusive against the
United States? Can it be expected that they will acquiesce in
a decision as just, because it is termed 'definitive'?" He ex-
plained that the various governmental instruments, such as
courts, were created by the sovereign who was responsible for
their action. When a foreign nation was injured by a tribunal,
the sovereign could not refer it for justice to the instrument

35 Ibid., Vol. VII, pp. 314-342; Ibid., Vol. VIII, pp. 205-233, 305-323;
American State Papers, Foreign Belations, Vol. Ill, pp. 521-536, 557-567.
These references give the correspondence and the reports in full.

46 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

that caused the complaint. "What is this but to adopt the
injustice complained of?" Once the decisions of courts were
made the controversy was no longer between individuals, the
ship-owners and the privateers, hut between the American
government and the Danish king. As Denmark could rest
assured that America would pursue her reclamation claim, he
hoped that a plan might be adopted which would satisfy our
government.

In a very conciliatory note of May 8, 1812, Rosenkrantz
declared to Erving that, if it could be proven that American
subjects had just cause for complaints, his Danish majesty
would be very willing to redress their grievances. From this
statement it would appear that the Danish foreign minister
did not recognize that 'it had become a government affair
only."

The last communication from George W. Erving to Baron
Rosenkrantz was dated April 18, 1812. As stated, Rosenkrantz'
reply came May 8. Soon after this Erving left Copenhagen
for Paris and the United States consul at Hamburg, John M.
Forbes, was sent as charge d'affaires to take care of the few
cases that were still pending before the courts of Denmark.
As the War of 1812 started in June, the Danish situation nat-
urally became a minor affair compared with the task of fight-
ing England. At the same time it became impossible for
American merchantmen to sail the high seas. Consequently
Danish spoliation stopped for lack of material to capture.
For the time being our claims on Denmark lay dormant. In
a later chapter the adjudication of the spoliation claims will
be taken up.*^

8« state Papers and Public Documents. Vol. IX, pp. 90-119.

«» Erving 's correspondence concerning the Danish spoliation is also found
in Annals of Congress, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. II, pp. 1980-2016, and 12
Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 1201-1222.

CHAPTER III

THE NEGOTIATION OF TREATIES AND THE SETTLE-
MENT OF CLAIMS, 1815-1847

Although the international relations that have been traced
in the two preceding chapters covered a period of more than
forty years, during which time a large number of disagree-
ments had arisen, yet friendly relations continued to exist.
This state of affairs could hardly be expected to continue,
however, unless a settlement of the disputed points could be
reached. It is the solution of these problems that will be set
forth in this chapter.

1. Danish Claims against the United States.
Denmark's efforts to obtain satisfaction for the loss of the

Mercator and the Hendrick have already been set forth. In
1812 she renewed the claim in behalf of Jared Shattuck for
the loss of the Mercator. A bill was introduced in Congress by
the committee on claims, proposing that relief should be given.
This bill passed both houses; but as no further trace of it
appears anywhere, it is probable that it was handed to the
president for his signature at the close of the session and dis-
posed of by a ''pocket veto",^

In December, 1819, President Monroe laid before Congress
the case of the brig Hendrick, for which Denmark had re-
newed her claim, through her minister at Washington and
C. N. Buck, consul-general of Hamburg at Philadelphia. The
case was taken up in the Senate but reported unfavorably on
account of existing claims of the United States against Den-
mark.^

2. The Treaty of 1826.

It was a rule of Denmark to discriminate against nations

1 Annals of Congress, 12 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 54, 64, 65, 66, 67, 197, 844,
849.

2 American State Papers, Foreign Belations, Vol. IV, pp. 629-632; Annais
of Congress, 16 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 39, 801, 891, 1169, 2253-2259.

47

48 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

with which she had no treaty relations, by putting higher
duties on goods imported from them than was placed on im-
ports from countries with which treaties were established. It
was for this reason that Washington in 1792 placed a consul
at Copenhagen.^ This action, did not remove the discriminat-
ing duties.* Several times the United States government was
reminded by her consuls at that port that our merchants were
paying half again as high duties as those of Great Britain,
Holland, France and the other nations which had treaties with
Denmark.'

It seems probable that this situation caused the United
States to take active steps to bring about treaty relations. Just
how much preliminary correspondence passed between the two
governments before a treaty was finally made we cannot say,
for the dispatches in the archives at Copenhagen covering
the period 1821-1829 do not even mention that correspondence
had been carried on ; but on April 26, a " Convention of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation" was concluded between Peder
Pedersen, the Minister Resident of Denmark at Washington,
and Henry Clay, the American Secretary of State.

The treaty of 1826, which, with a few changes, is still in
force, consists of twelve articles touching on the most vital
points of international relations. In brief outline the contents
are as follows: Article I, contained the most favored nations
clause. Article II, provided that, the coasting trade excepted there
should be freedom of trade between the two countries. By
Article III, mutual privileges were established in regard to
importation, exportation, and re-exportation of all articles,
which might be lawfully handled in the respective countries.
The duties of one country upon vessels of the other should
not be higher than on native vessels. Article IV, provided
that duties and prohibitions should not be placed on imports
and exports between the two countries unless the same became
equally binding on other powers. Article V declared that, in

8 Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. V, p. 421.

* Ibid., Vol. VI, p. 476.

6 American State Papers, Commeroe and Navigation, Vol. I, p. 504;

Ibid., Vol. n, pp. 353, 367.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 49

regard to the duties in the Sound and Belts, the United
States should be on the same basis as the most favored nations.
Article VI stated that the convention should not pertain to
the northern possessions of Denmark nor to the direct trade
between Denmark and the Danish West Indies. According to
Article VII, taxation in either country, in case of removal
of the respective subjects of the other, should not be higher
than that paid by its own citizens. By Article VIII, mutual
exchange of consular representatives on the basis of the most
favored nations clause was to be established. It was provided
by Article IX that, exequatur having been granted, the repre-
sentatives of the two powers should be recognized by all authori-
ties and inhabitants in the district where they resided. Accord-
ing to Article X, consuls, and their foreign servants, should
be exempted from services and taxes, and the archives of the
consulate should be inviolable. Article XI declared that the
convention should be in force for ten years, and further until
the end of one year after either party gave notice to terminate
it. Under Article XII, ratifications were to be exchanged
within eight months.^

Before the Secretary of State was willing to affix his signa-
ture to this document, he sent a note to Chevalier Pedersen,
Minister Eesident from Denmark, to the effect that this treaty
should not be interpreted to mean that the United States
waived her claims for indemnities due to her citizens from the
Danish government. The minister was requested to transmit
the note to Denmark together with the text of the treaty. Upon
the acknowledgment of the receipt of this note by Pedersen,
Henry Clay signed the treaty.'^

Soon after the treaty was ratified Steen Bille took up the
work of Chevalier Pedersen as Danish representative at Wash-
ington. In November, 1826, Henry Clay inquired of him
whether he had received any information as to the interpreta-
tion that Denmark placed on Article VII of the treaty. It

e W. M, Malloy, Treaties, etc., Vol. I, pp. 373-377. American State Pa-
pers, Foreign Belations, Vol. V, pp. 905-907, Department of Foreign Af-
fairs. Philadelphia Beretninger 18X1-18Z9. Nordamerika II. Bapporter.
(American dispatches, package 2. Rigsarkivet, Copenhagen.)
7 American State Papers, Foreign Belations, Vol. V., p. 907.

50 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

had been rumored in the United States that American citizens
could not remove their property from the islands without
paying the tax known as "sixths" and "tenths." It was ex-
pressly for the benefit of these citizens that the clause had been
inserted. Steen Bille answered immediately that he had an-
ticipated such fears, and as soon as he arrived he informed
his government of the interpretation that might be made by
the authorities of the islands. He had received answer that the
Danish government well understood why the article was in-
cluded in the treaty. Americans could rest assured that noth-
ing would be done which would defeat the original intent.*

3. The Arbitration Treaty of 1830.

In pursuance of the intention to press our claims against
Denmark, the House of Representatives in May, 1826, requested
the Secretary of State to lay before it a full report of the
claims for indemnity due from that country. This report,
given in January, 1827, revealed that there were in all 167
claims amounting to $2,662,280.36.^ It was evident that if we
were ever to obtain payment for those losses we would have
to send a minister to Denmark. Consequently Henry Wheaton
was appointed to go to Copenhagen to negotiate a settlement.
In May, 1827, Henry Clay sent instructions to Wheaton and
stated that where his instructions were silent he should follow
international law and always keep in mind that we wanted a
friendly feeling to exist between the United States and Den-
mark. After reviewing the history of the spoliation cases,
which was based on the correspondence of George W. Er\'ing
and Baron Rosenkrantz, Clay proceeded to set forth the details
connected with the cases. He showed that the seizure and
condemnations had been made on the following grounds: (1)
possession of false papers making British property appear to
be American; (2) sailing under British convoy, hereby losing
the immunity our flag afforded; (3) possession of French con-
sular certificates of origin after the French consuls had been

e For the correspondence between Clay and Bille see Niles' Weekly
Register, (1826) Vol. XXXI, pp. 220-221.

» American State Papers, Foreign Eelations, Vol. VI, pp. 384-385, 504-
535. 614-624.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 51

prohibited from issuing them, except to vessels bound for
France.

In regard to the first of these grounds, Clay stated that the
principle followed by Denmark was entirely correct. We were
as anxious as any that those who sailed under our flag un-
lawfully should be punished. In these cases it was only a
question of establishing the facts proving whether the vessels
condemned were truly American or not. He further held that
in regard to the ''convoy cases" it was a question of whether
or not convoy had been joined voluntarily. Even in the case
of voluntary assumption of convoy it would depend on the
purpose for which it had been joined. If neutrals had not
joined convoy for an unlawful purpose, there would be no
reason why they should be captured and condemned by Den-
mark. Being unarmed they would not add to England's
strength. Indeed, they would weaken her power, as they ex-
panded her sphere of protection. If a friend's goods on an
enemy's vessel were not liable to condemnation, there would
be no reason why a friend's goods in a friend's vessel should
be liable to condemnation just because that vessel was under
enemy convoy. In an enemy's vessel the goods of a friend
would surely be more closely blended with that of the enemy
than in the case of convoy. The third ground for condemna-
tion, as alleged by Denmark, was void of basis of fact. French
consuls could legally issue certificates of origin to the date they
received orders to discontinue the practice, which was on
November 13, 1810. The vessels seized had received them
earlier than that date. Even if these certificates were not
genuine, that would not change the condition so far as Den-
mark was concerned. They might have warranted detention by
the French and possibly condemnation in a French court, but
to Denmark they were unimportant no matter whether they
were genuine or false.

Having set forth these general principles, Clay proceeded
to state that Wheaton should keep in mind that, after the
arrival of George W. Erving, Denmark had changed her atti-
tude, a fact shown by the restraint placed on her privateers
and courts. She had, however, not given redress for those
already wrongfully condemned, the reason given being that the

52 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

king could not reverse the sentences of his courts. We had
already made clear to Denmark through Erving, that we were
not now asking for a reversion of the sentences of the courts,
but for indemnity due as a result of those sentences. The
government would have to be responsible for the mistakes
made by the courts, because the courts received their instruc-
tions from the government. This was especially true in regard
to the "convoy cases," which were condemned by authority of
a special order.

Clay then related, in some detail, the subsequent negotiations
in the affair and closed his instructions by suggesting that a
board of commissioners should ascertain the amount due the
United States. The method, however, was not vital. To pro-
cure indemnity was the real object. If Denmark was finan-
cially unable to pay the full sum, we might be willing to accept
a compromise.^"

Henry Wheaton was somewhat delayed in presenting these
matters to the Danish officials for two reasons. The cases of
the Commerce and Hector were pending between the United
States and Russia. One of these cases involved the question
of reviewing a sentence pronounced by a prize court. This the
Russian government refused to do, but finally consented to
pay an indemnity. The point of reviewing a court decree was
precisely the one at issue between the United States and Den-
mark. Therefore Wheaton waited to see what would be the
outcome of the Russian case. The fact that Russia had paid
an indemnity in a similar case naturally gave added strength
to the arguments later presented by Wheaton. Further delay
took place because of a royal marriage which for, the time
being, completely engrossed the attention of the court.^^

In July, 1828, however, Wheaton was able to present the
matter to Count Schimmelman. He stated that he had full
plenipotentiary power to negotiate and terminate the whole
matter. He followed closely the instructions sent him by
Henry Clay, and stated that the United States would be very
willing to have a joint commission appointed to cover the

10 Executive Documents, 22 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. VI, Doc. 249, pp. 2-10.
" Ihid., pp. 10-11.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 53

whole field of spoliation claims, but that, if Denmark prefered
a settlement en hloc, that method would be satisfactory to the
United States. After a great deal of discussion, Wheaton was
at last able to report to his government on January 31, 1829,
that the king had appointed Count Schimmelman and the Min-
ister of Justice, Count de Steman, as a committee to treat
with him on the subject." In the spring of that year a change
of administration took place in the United States and the
new Secretary of State, Martin van Buren, sent Wheaton a
full copy of all the claims against Denmark, under the direc-
tion of John Connell, a Philadelphia lawyer who was the special
representative of many of the claimants interested in the
indemnity.^^ In August, 1829, a conference was held between
the Danish commissioners and our representative in which the
whole field of argumentation was gone over again. To close
the matter and avoid the consideration of individual cases,
Denmark finally made a verbal offer to pay us 500,000 marcs
banco of Hamburg, and to waive her claims to indemnity for
the M creator and the H end/rich. This offer was made on the
condition that all claims of the United States for captures by
Danish cruisers should be forever abandoned. Putting the
value of the marc banco of Hamburg at thirty-five cents and
the two Danish ships at $65,000, which was approximately
what Denmark claimed they were worth, the offer of the
commissioners would amount to about $230,000. This offer was
wholly inadequate to cover the claims presented, which, as
stated, amounted to $2,662,280.36. Wheaton so informed the
Danish commissioners and after a conference with John Con-
nell made a counter-proposition stating that we would accept
3,000,000 marcs banco of Hamburg, and Denmark should re-
nounce her claims for the Mercator and the Hendrick. If that
offer was accepted our indemnity would amount to about
$1,700,000.

In September a second conference was held. On this occa-
sion the Danish commissioners argued that the United States
could not support their claims on the mere assertion that they

12 Ibid., pp. 12-16.

13 Ibid., pp. 16, 18.

54 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

had sustained losses, because their vessels had been condemned.
They must prove that the evidence which was to establish their
neutral character was actually produced in court by those to
whom they had entrusted the property. It must also be proved
that the judges had pronounced arbitrary sentences and acted
contrary to the duties of their office. It was to avoid the
enormous work of going into details of each case that Denmark
had been willing to make a proposition for settlement."

This meeting adjourned without making a reply to the new
arguments. Later Wheaton showed that, according to the
principles of international law as exemplified in specific cases
connected with Russia, Prussia, England and the United States,
there was no legal way for Denmark to avoid paying the in-
demnity. Besides if the sentences of the Danish tribunals were
to be considered conclusive, it would mean that a belligerent
state was invested with legislative power over neutrals. It was
clear that the decision of an admiralty tribunal could only be
conclusive so far as the individuals were concerned; they
could not be binding on foreign nations. He also discussed the
three points upon which Denmark based her right to capture
and condemn foreign vessels, and dealt with them along the
lines laid down in his instructions.^^

When a report of the conferences and the Danish offer was
made to the American government, the Secretary of State sent
new instructions to Henry Wheaton in January, 1830. Martin
Van Buren, under the influence of his chief, Andrew Jackson,
expressed regret that Denmark was not more willing to make
a settlement. Wheaton was instructed that if nothing could be
done to complete a settlement he was to inform the govern-
ment of Denmark that "the present Executive would not be
wanting in all suitable exertions" to make good the declaration
that a just indemnity was wanted.^® In a friendly but firm
note the Danish commissioners were informed of the attitude
of the American govemment.^^

" Ibid., pp. 19-21.
15 Hid., pp. 22-29.
i« Ibid., pp. 39-40.
" Ibid., pp. 40-42.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 55

Without question the Danish authorities realized from this
communication, which was dated February 25, 1830, that
affairs were approaching a crisis. Denmark's trade with the
United States might in a comparatively short time suffer more
than the price of a settlement. Something must be done if
friendly relations with the United States were to continue.
At this point King Frederick VI of Denmark took matters into
his own hands and ordered his commissioners on March 23,
1830, to make an offer to Henry Wheaton to settle the case py
paying "650,000 Patagons. " Upon the condition that Den-
mark would relinquish her claims for the Mercator and Hen-
drick the offer was accepted and embodied in a treaty. This
document was signed at Copenhagen on March 28 and later rati-
fied by the Senate of the United States. Ratifications were ex-
changed in Washington on June 5, 1830.^^

The treaty is very brief, containing only six articles. The
'first of these provided for the relinquishment of the claims for
the Mercator and the Hendrick, and the payment of $650,000
by the Danish government to the United States. The second
and third described how the money should be paid and dis-
tributed. The fourth and fifth articles released Denmark from
any further payment of indemnity for spoliation claims. The
last article dealt with the manner of the ratification of the
treaty.^®

It had been a long and tedious procedure to secure this
settlement. The provisions, however, were promptly carried
out by the Danish government. In agreement with the terms

18 J, D. Richardson, op. cit., Vol. II. pp. 481-482. The minutes of the
conferences held between Henry Wheaton and the Danish commissioners
are found in Danish and French in the Department of Foreign Affairs,
Rigsarkivet, Copenhagen. The letter from King Frederick VI is in his
own handwriting. Dept. F. A. Nordamerika I, b, Akter vedrdrende
Konvcntionen af 1830, 28 Marts, 1825-1830. (American dispatches, pack-
age 3.)

19 For a full statement of all the claims, see House Executive Documents,
19 Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. IX, Doc. 68: For the diplomatic correspondence
connected with the treaty, see also American Annual Begister, (1831-32),
Vol. VII, Appendix, pp. 214-261. For text of the treaty, see W. M.
Malloy, Treaties, etc. 1776-1909. Vol. I, p. 377; also, Niles Begister,
Vol. XXXVIII, pp. 307-308.

56 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

of the treaty a necessary act was passed by Congress. To
provide for the distribution of the money among the claimants
a commission was appointed by President Jackson. It con-
sisted of George Winchester, Jesse Hoyt, William J. Duane,
and Robert Fulton. When its work was completed in March,
1833, the commission made a final report to the Secretary of
State.^° At the close of the year 1833 all the money had been
paid by Denmark and distributed by the commission.^^
4. Proposal of Reciprocity witln St. Croix.
The measure known as the "Tariff of Abominations," passed
in 1828, was very detrimental to the trade between the United
States and the Danish West Indies. To create a better situation
Denmark sent General P. von Scholten as a special envoy to
Washington in the fall of 1830 to arrange for a reciprocity
treaty, the operation of which should be limited in its scope.
General von Scholten, who was Governor-General of the Dan-
ish West Indies, reminded the American government that Den- '
mark reserved the whole trade of the islands to herself and
the United States. On account of proximity, the islands ob-
tained practically all their supplies from the United States
and we in turn imported the raw products of the islands.
Denmark felt that it was unfair for the United States to
place very high duties on her imports, thus leaving a very
small profit for the islands. If this condition continued it
would become necessary to levy a duty on goods imported from
the United States to the islands, thereby shifting the trade to
other countries. To avoid this he proposed an extension of
Article VI of the treaty of 1826, which would bring about a
state of reciprocity. He suggested the following amendments:
(1) only ships under the Danish and the American flags

20 For the text of this report, see J. B. Moore, International Arbitrations,
Vol. V, pp. 4569-4572.

21 Senate Journal, 21 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 218; House Journal, 21 Cong.,
2 Sess., p. 396; Statutes at Large, Vol. IV, p. 446. Soon after the treaty
was made several insurance companies presented claims to the United
States for the Hendrick on the plea that according to the treaty Den-
mark had now relensed her claim. The committee which had the matter
in charge made an unfavorable report. House Journal, 21 Cong., 2 Sess.,
p. 346.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 57

should be allowed to carry on trade in St. Croix; (2) corn
and corn meal should enter the island free of duty; (3) other
commodities should be arranged in a tariff schedule in such
a way that not more than five percent ad valorem could be
put on necessities of life and not more than ten percent ad
valorem on luxuries; and (4) in order to keep reciprocity in
amount as well as in rate, the islands of St. Thomas and St.
John should not be included in the treaty.^^

After due consideration Van Buren informed General von
Scholten that we were unable to make such a treaty because
of the most favored nations clause which was included in
almost all of our treaties. If we should give concessions to
Denmark, other nations could immediately claim the same
privileges. We hoped that whatever measures Denmark should
see fit to carry out, she would always be guided by principles
consistent with the existing treaty, and directed by motives
in harmony with the present friendly feeling between the two
nations.^^

The Danish envoy expressed his regret because of the
existing diplomatic situation. He requested, however, that the
whole matter be laid before Congress for its consideration.
Being assured of this by the Secretary of State, he left
the subject in the hands of the Danish charge d'affaires. Steen
Bille.^* The president laid the matter before Congress in
December 1830.^^ It was reported to the House by Mr. Cam-
breling, of the committee on commerce, in March of 1831.
The whole situation was explained in the report together with
General von Scholten 's proposals. It was shown that the
Danish West Indies were virtually a commercial appendage
of the United States. On account of the diplomatic difficulties
which would arise if the proposals were put into operation,
the report, when read, was laid on the table.^^ Denmark, how-

22 Senate Documents, 21 Cong., 2 Sess., Doc. 21, pp. 2-9.

23 lUd., pp. 9-11.

24 Ihid., pp. 11-15.

25 Richardson, op. dt.. Vol. II, pp. 531-532.

26 The total imports to the United States from the Danish "West Indies
for the year ending September 30, 1826 amounted to $2,067,900. The

58 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

ever, did not carry out the threat, made by von Scholten, of
laying duties on American goods. On the contrary, she passed
a law more liberal than any former one. President Jackson
in his message to Congress intimated that she had set a good
example in her colonial policy, which it would be well for
other nations to follow.^^

5. The Termination of the Jones Claims.

In March, 1806, Congress had paid $4000 to Peter Landais,
the French captain of the Alliance which had captured the
Union, the Betsy and the Charming Polly in 1779 and brought
them into Bergen.^* It is possible that other claims arising
from the Bergen affair were put before Congress prior to
1812; but as many governmental records were destroyed in
the burning of the capitol during the War of 1812, no definite
record remains of some things that had been transacted. From
records extant it appears that Secretary Monroe on December
14, 1812, sent a note to the Danish charge d'affaires at Wash-
ington, stating that a report was current that Denmark had
decided to pay the claims. If this report were true our
government was interested to learn how it would be executed.
A few days later an answer was received in which it was stated
that Denmark had never recognized the claim "as a fair and
legal one and it had for many years already considered it as
a superannuated and abandoned affair."^®

In January 1820 a claim, which the previous month, had
been presented to Congress by James Warren, a lieutenant on

export to the islands for the same i)eriod equalled $1,391,004. In that
same year our direct commerce with Denmark equalled $100,582. in ex-
ports and $49,246. in imports. Congressional Debates, 19 Cong., 2 Sess.,
Vol. m, Appendix a, folder.

27 Richardson, op. oil.. Vol. Ill, pp. 24-25; Senate Documents, 23 Cong.,
1 Sess., Doc. 1, p. 7. For the correspondence between General P. von
Scholten and Martin Van Buren, see Congressional Debates, (1830-31),
Vol. VEI, Appendix, pp. 159-166. For the report in the House of
Representatives, see ibid.. Vol. VII, pp. 846-847; Beports of Committees,
21 Cong., 2 Sess., Doc. 117; Hov^e Journal, 21 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 134, 405.

28 Senate Dooum,ents, 24 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. HI, Doc. 198, p. I; Beport
of Committees, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., Doc. 206, p. 6.

28 Annals of Congress, 16 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. I, pp. 256-258.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 59

board the Alliance, was acted upon unfavorably by that
body.^° From this time no claim seems to have been pre-
sented till December, 1836, when Janette Taylor, a niece of
John Paul Jones, who had become his legal heir, presented a
memorial, asking for the money due as a result of the Bergen
prizes. She called the attention of Congress to the fact that
in 1806 relief had been granted to Peter Landais, although at
that time he was a disgraced officer incapable of serving in
the United States navy, as the result of being court martialed
on January 6, 1781. Besides, Jones was his superior in rank.
She reminded Congress that it was Jones who had first dis-
played the flag of the United States on board the Alfred before
Philadelphia. On board the Ranger in Quiberon Bay, Febru-
ary 14, 1778, he had claimed and obtained from M'onsieur La
Motte Picquet the first salute received from a foreign power.
Papers were presented to prove that Jones had taken enough
British prisoners to redeem all our prisoners in Great Britain.
In spite of repeated requests for relief he had died without
receiving the money due him for the Bergen prizes. ^^

At about the same time, several other claims of a similar
nature were presented to the government of the United States.
William C. Parke claimed a share in the Bergen prizes on
behalf of his father Mathew Parke, who had been a captain
of marines on board the Alliance. Nathaniel Gunnison pre-
sented a claim in behalf of his father John G. Gunnison, who
had worked on board the same vessel as a carpenter. Still
another claim was advanced by Lucy Alexander, who likewise
held an interest in the prizes.^^ As a result, the president was
requested by Congress to present the matter to the govern-
ment of Denmark.^^ It seems, however, that nothing was
done at this time. Consequently the heirs of Jones again
called the attention of our government to the claims; and in

30 Ibid., pp. 33, 257, 277.

"1 For the legal documents connected with the Jones* claim, see Exeou-

tive Documents, 24 Cong., 2 Seas., Vol. I, Doc. 19, pp. 1-29.

»2 Eeport of Committees, 24 Cong., 2 Seas., Doe. 297. pp. 1-3; House

Journal, 25 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 49, 259-60, 305, 311.

S3 Senate Journal, 24 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 130, 385, 554.

60 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

1843 the House of Kepreseutatives asked for and obtained
from. President Tyler the correspondence connected with the
affair.**

From the material obtained by the House it appears that
an inquiry had been made to discover whether the indemnity
of $650,000 paid by Denmark in 1830 was supposed to cover
the Jones claim. John C. Calhoun, who was Secretary of State
at the time, had stated that he saw nothing in the treaty to
that effect. A letter was also sent to Henry Wheaton, Minis-
ter of the United States at Berlin, who had negotiated the
treaty with Denmark in 1830, asking for his opinion on the
matter. Henry Wheaton 's reply is very clear and throws
much light on the subject. Dealing with the question whether
the long time that had elapsed since the rise of the claims had
invalidated them, he stated that, if this case should be given
over to a third power for arbitration, the claim would most
likely not be held valid, because almost seventy years had
passed since it arose. He suggested therefore that, in order
not to harm the case, his opinion on this point ought to be
kept secret. He felt sure, however, that the claims were not
precluded by the indemnity treaty of 1830. Nothing was said
in that treaty about the Bergen prizes and it was expressly
stated that the $650,000 were paid for "the seizure and con-
fiscation of American vessels and property by the cruisers of
Denmark, or within the Danish territory during the war which
commenced between Great Britain and Denmark in 1807 and
was terminated by the peace of Kiel in 1814."^^

Touching the problem of international law involved in the
Bergen prize case he made several comments. When a group
of people form a revolution to shake off the government of the
"metropolitan country" and to establish an independent na-
tion, other nations may follow various courses while the
struggle is still going on. They may remain passive; they

8* J. D. Richardson, op. oit., "Vol. IV, p. 320; Executive Documents, 28

Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. II, Doc. 264.

85 The wording of Wheaton 's statement is faulty according to the text

of the treaty. See W. M. Malloy, Treaties, etc., 1776-1909, Vol. I, p.

377.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 61

may recognize the revolting portion formally and yet remain
neutral in the struggle; and finally, they may form an alliance
with one of the parties. With these facts in view, he asked,
what attitude ought Denmark to have adopted toward the
United States? A neutral state, without any doubt, had the
right to forbid belligerent vessels to bring their prizes into
her harbors, provided she acted impartially and let her inten-
tions be known. She might even grant the privileges of her
harbors to one of the belligerents and refuse it to the other
if it had been so ''stipulated by treaties existing previous to
the war." Denmark, not being an ally of Great Britain,
should as a neutral have shown hospitality to the vessels
brought in by the Americans, provided she had no previous
treaty with England which she was under obligation to ob-
serve. Neither could Denmark defend herself on the basis of
the right of postliminii or reversion of previous condition.
This does not exist except between subjects of the same state
or between allies. Again, as Denmark was not an ally of Great
Britain, she could not take advantage of that international
rule.^®

Denmark, he added, seemed to rest her ease largely on the
fact that she had not recognized the independence of the
United States. The question, however, was not whether she
had acknowledged our independence, but whether such a state
of war actually existed between the nations as made it the
duty of all nations to respect the rights of both. "Denmark
must either have considered the United States as lawful
belligerents, or as pirates, incapable of acquiring any of the
rights of just war. In the former case, she was bound to
perform towards them all the duties of impartial neutrality.
In the latter, her conduct, if its motive had been avowed,
might have provoked resentment, as an act of hostility, ac-
companied with insult. In either alternative her interference
to disturb the lawful possession of the captors would have
justified immediate reprisals; though prudence might have

36 Under jus postliminii property captured by an enemy, upon its recap-
ture by a friend, reverts to its owner. See also Monsieur de Vattel, Law
of Nations, Chitty's edition, Bk. Ill, ch. 14.

62 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

induced the American government to refrain from resorting
to this extremity." Wheaton felt however, that allowance
should be made for the circumstances under which the affair oc-
curred and for the ideas of the day. Denmark had not yet en-
tered the Armed Neutrality, and a colonial revolt was considered
a crime. Besides, England probably brought very powerful
pressure to bear on the rather weak Danish state. It was
clear from the correspondence connected with the case that
Denmark sought to "excuse and palliate" rather than to
justify her action.^^

Wheaton 's letter, sent by the State Department to William
W. Irvin, our representative in Copenhagen in 1843, formed
the basis of his communication to the Danish foreign office,
dated February 10, 1845. More than two years passed before
the Danish government replied. Finally, on June 4, 1847,
the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Reventlow-
Criminil, answered Irvin 's letter. In this communication
every argument that had come up in the whole controversy
was dealt with in detail. As Wheaton 's letter was a master-
ly exposition of the American side of the question, so this
letter was a close rival stating the Danish side. It is therefore
important to give a full review of it.

He expressed surprise because the United States at so late a
period should revive a claim which arose during an age when
the peace of the world was disturbed with a large number of
serious and complicated questions. The first question with
which he dealt was that of Denmark's obligations to the two
belligerent powers. He informed Irwin that the United States
was wrong in stating that Denmark was under no obligation
to comply with the demand of the British government for the
release of the Bergen prizes. On the contrary she was bound
by a treaty of 1660, then in force, to do just what England
demanded of her. No one could deny that the colonies were
in revolt against England and were carrying on a civil war.
As Denmark had not recognized the independence of the
United States, the three prizes could not be regarded by her

87 For the text of the letter from Henry Wheaton see Executive Docu-
ments, 28 (Jong., 1 Sees., Vol. II, Doc. 264.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 63

as anything but British property, which according to the treaty
mentioned must be restored.*® Under the existing circum-
stances, therefore, Bernstorff could not have entered into official
correspondence with Dr. Franklin without recognizing the inde-
pendence of the colonies. This, he stated, must have been
his reason for not producing the treaty in question. On the
other hand, the offer made by M. de Walterstorff was styled
a gratuitous donation, and was not to be regarded as an
acknowledgment by the Danish government of a wrong com-
mitted. On the basis of these arguments he held that the
claims of Commodore Paul Jones were without legal founda-
tion.

But, he maintained, there were further reasons why no claim
should be made at this time. Not only were the claims in
themselves invalid, but they were now both superannuated
and prescribed. The United States had only made one very
indefinite demand since 1788. That demand, if indeed it
might be considered as such, was in a letter from the Secre-
tary of State to the Danish charge d'affaires at Washington,
dated December 18, 1812. Mr. Pedersen had replied that
Denmark had never recognized the claim as fair and besides
that it was now superannuated. No further demands had been
presented and the matter was dropped. If the claims were
recognized by lack of action to be superannuated then, how
much more now thirty-five years later? If the United States
had still intended to put forth a claim it should have been
presented in 1830 when a treaty was made for the express
purpose of putting an end to all existing claims. Reventlow-
Criminil closed by saying that he was firmly convinced that
the arguments presented would "be sufficient to put an end
to the claims forever," and "to remove all subjects of discord
. . . between the government of the United States and that
of his august sovereign."*®

«* The treaty provided that the contracting parties would not harbor the
enemies or rebels, the one of the other, nor allow their subjects to do so.
In the same way the property of the one, being brought into the realms
of the other by enemies or rebels, should forthwith be restored. For the
text of Article V, see Appendix C.
3» For full text of the letter from Reventlow-Criminil to W. W. Irvin,

64 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

It is of interest to notice how well the arguments of Henry
Wheaton and those of Reventlow-Criminil agree on the main
points of international law. Both recognized statutes of limi-
tation, although our government in the past had not accepted
this principle.*" The two men were also agreed in regard to
obligations where a treaty existed. They did, however, not
agree on the question of the recognition of independence.
Wheaton took the stand that Denmark was under obligations
to the United States no matter whether or not she had recog-
nized their independence, while Reventlow-Criminil held that
on account of the existing treaty Denmark was under obliga-
tions to England at least until she had recognized the inde-
pendence of the colonies. Till that time she would have to
treat them as rebels and could not enter into diplomatic rela-
tions with them.

It seems quite clear that for two reasons Denmark was under
no obligation to pay the Jones claims in 1846. The first of
these is intrinsic in the case. When she gave back the Bergen
prizes to Great Britain she was performing a duty under a
treaty, hence could not be held culpable by a third party.
The second reason is found in the principle of prescription,
which operated in this case because of the lapse of time. On
the basis of this principle the rights of the United States must
have terminated, if not earlier, at least in 1830. Denmark,
however, committed what might be called a moral wrong by

see Beports of Cominittees, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., Doc. 9, pp. 54-56. The
diplomatic dispatches, connected with this affair, located in the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs, Eigsarkivet at Copenhagen are not released for
the use of the public.

*o Expressing the opinion of a former committee on foreign affairs, Mr.
Maclay, chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, on February 10,
1846, made the following statement in the House of Representatives in
regard to the Jones case. "It is not, as intimated by Mr. Pederson,
an abandoned affair, nor is it a superannuated one. Questions of
honor and right, as between sovereign states, are not to be summarily
disposed of like the debt of an individual, by a statute of limitations.
There is no lapse of time which discharges a nation of the right to
demand of another nation reparation for a palpable wrong.". Beport
of Committees, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., Doc. 206, p. 6.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 65

failing to set forth more fully and convincingly the facts of
the treaty of 1660 in the early stages of the negotiation.

It appears that the matter was dropped. The claims of
the heirs of Jones and others connected with the Bergen prize
affair were, however, still before Congress. To dispose of the
whole affair, as well as to honor the name of the great revolu-
tionary commodore. Congress passed an act on March 21, 1848,
for the relief of all concerned. Thus ended the history of
the Bergen prize case and of the Jones' claims — the first and
also the longest drawn out controversy between the United
States and Denmark.*^

*i For the documents in full connected with the Jones' claims, see
ibid., pp. 1-29; House Journal, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 429-432, 626;
Senate Journal, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 229; Beport of Committees, 30
Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. I, Doc. 9; Senate Beports, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. I,
Doc. 180; Senate Executive Documents, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. IV, Doc.
1; Status at Large, Vol. IX, p. 214.

CHAPTER IV

THE ABOLITION OF SOUND DUES AND OTHER PROB-
LEMS, 1841-1860

1. Abolition of the Sound Dues.

The Baltic Sea would be a mare clausum if it were not for
the three narrow straits, which, by their continuation through
the Cattegat and the Skagerak, connect it with the North Sea
and the Atlantic Ocean. The Little Belt between Jutland and
the island of Fyn (Fuenen) is too shallow to be of much use
to navigation. The Great Belt between Fyn and Sjceland
(Zealand) does not run in a favorable direction for ships
bound for the eastern Baltic ports. Consequently the Oresund,
or, as it is known in the English tongue, the Sound, between
Zealand and Sweden has always been the main entrance to the
Baltic. From time immemorial the dues collected for the priv-
ilege of passing through the Sound or Belts had constituted
a rich source of Danish revenue.

To understand why a difference should arise between the
United States and Denmark in regard to the collection of the
Sound Dues it is of importance to know approximately when
and how these dues originated. Because of their early origin
they were intrically interwoven with the political and economic
systems, not only of Denmark, but of Europe. On account of
their age Denmark insisted on her right to collect the dues,
the right being a part of the law of nations; while on the
very same ground the United States insisted on her right of ex-
emption from paying the dues, as she had never been the benefi-
ciary of the acts and movements through which the dues had
originated.

Students during the last fifty years have set forth the
theory that the Sound Dues originated between the years 1423
and 1429. Their contention is based on a statement in the
"Liibecker Tage" of July, 1423. where it is reported that the

66

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 67

king at Copenhagen levied a toll on the ships in the Sound.^
Their conclusion is somewhat strengthened by the fact that no
records exist in the Danish archives dated before the year
1497. From that date till 1660, actual records are extant of
the number of ships that passed the Sound, their nationality,
and the amount of dues collected, for one hundred and ten
years passim out of the one hundred and sixty three.^

It appears, however that the date 1423 is not, after all, the
year of the origin of the Sound Dues. The Danish historian,
Baden, has advanced the theory that the early Danish kings
had complete control over the Sound and Belts. They felt
it to be their duty to keep them cleared of pirates. When
strangers wanted to sail through, either for the sake of war,
for trade, or for obtaining herrings in the Sound, they had to
secure permission of the Danish king. This could only be
obtained through the payment of money. Thus the dues
originated because the king rendered a service.^ This theory,
although plausible, would not be of much value per se. Docu-
ments, however, are extant which show the existence of the
dues earlier than 1423. On April 4, 1436, the City of Danzig
sent an inquiry to the City of Liibeck asking what was their
understanding in regard to the status of the Sound Dues,
since the peace with King Erick.* Liibeck answered on April
21, 1436, that according to the treaty between them and the
King of Denmark (Erick of Pomerania) they were to enjoy
all the old privileges, and as freedom from the payment of
Sound Dues was one of those privileges they did not intend
to pay the dues.'' It seems clear, while not conclusive, that

1 This is the conclusion of the Danish historian, J. A. Fredericia, in
his article, "Fra hvilken Tid skriver Sundtolden sig?" Historisk
Tidsskrift, 4de Rsekke, Bind 5 (1875-1877), pp. 1-20. The same opinion
is held by the German historian, Dietrich Schafer, in his article, "Zur
Frage nach der Einfiihring dea Sundzolls, " Hansische Geschichtsbldtter
1875, pp. 31-43. For the basis of their statement see Appendix D.

2 These records have been published by Nina EUinger Bang, Tabeller
over Skihsfart og Varetransport gennem Oresund, 1479-1660.

3 Gustav L. Baden, A f handling er i Fcedrelandets Historic, Vol. II,
pp. 221-260.

* Hansereccesse, Abth, II, Vol. I, pp. 485-486.
5 Ibid., pp. 486-487.

68 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

the dues according to this statement must antedate the year
1423, or the term "old privileges" must have a peculiar mean-
ing in this place.

On February 6, 1386, a treaty was made between Denmark
and certain Prussian towns in which the latter were promised
free navigation of the Sound, providing they would not station
ships of war there, but trust to the Danish king to keep it
clear.* In 1328 King Christopher II granted exemption from
toll in the Great Belt to the monastery of Soro. It is self-
evident that dues must have been charged in the Sound as
early as they were in the Belts, otherwise there would have
been no traffic in th Belts at all. Hence we may infer that
the Sound Dues date back at least to 1328.''

From time to time Denmark's right to collect the Sound
Dues was recognized by treaty. It is not necessary to give
here a history of the treaties dealing with this subject. It will
suffice to state that the rate of dues was based on a schedule
incorporated in the treaty of Christianople in 1645, between
Denmark and Holland. Certain obscure portions in this
schedule were explained in a supplementary treaty with the
Dutch in 1701. Upon this basis dues were collected till 1841,
when a treaty was made between England and Denmark
establishing a new schedule. This treaty, with a few changes
established in an amendatory treaty of 1846, remained the
basis until the dues were abolished in 1857.®

The Sound Dues were not collected with equal regularity

« Begesta Diplomatica Hiatorice, p. 426. For the text of the
agreement, see Hanserecesse, Abth. I, Vol. II, pp. 372-373.

7 J. F. W. Schlegel, DanmarTcs og Eertugddmmemes Statsret, Chapter
VTI. Macgregor states: "The most ancient charter extant, referring
to toll payable in the Sound and Belts, is that granted by Erick Menved
in 1319 to the Town of Harderwieck in Holland stipulating the rate
of duty to be paid by Dutch ships at Nyborg, upon the conveyance
through the Belts of cloth destined for sale." John Macgregor, Com-
mercial Statistics, Vol. I. p. 165, Note. I have been unable to find
any other reference to this document.

8 M. Thomas Antoine de Marien, Tableu des Droits et Usages de Com-
merce jRelatifs au Passage du Sund; F. Hessenland, On Sound-Dues;
H. Sclierer, Der Sundzoll. These works give a good resume of the sub-
ject.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 69

and for the same purpose at all times. By a royal decree of
1532 King Christain III ordered dues to be collected,® an un-
necessary order if they were being collected. In 1633 Chris-
tian IV caused special dues to be levied so that a better harbor
might be built at Elsinore where the ships had to lay in to
pay the dues.^° In 1692 the dues were farmed out for the sum
of 160,000 rixdollars, which sum must have been too large, as
Eduart Krusse, the farmer of the revenue, complained he could
not pay it.^^ This condition was probably the cause of a
royal decree which ordered dues to be collected from Danish
vessels as well as foreign." The fact noted above that we
have records for only one hundred and ten years between
1497 and 1660 may perhaps be explained on the same basis.
During the seventeenth century much dissatisfaction arose on
account of these irregularities.^^ When, however, the dues of
every nation were put on the basis of the Dutch treaties of
1645 and 1701, the dissatisfaction disappeared. At least,
complaints appeared to cease during the eighteenth century.

The country that paid the greatest part of the Sound Dues
was naturally Great Britain. As stated, she had secured con-
siderable reduction by the treaties of 1841 and 1846. Because
of the most favored nations clause incorporated in nearly
every treaty, practically every country was benefited by the
Anglo-Danish treaties. So far every nation acquiesced, legally
at least, in their existence.

The first nation that refused to pay the dues was the United
States. The first popular discontent was expressed in the
Boston Monthly Magazine of January, 1826. Here Caleb Cush-
ing argued that it was not in harmony with our dignity to
pay tribute to any nation, especially where no quid pro quo
was received. Whether Denmark could justly claim the dues

» For the text of the decree, see C. F. Wegner, Bigsarkivets Aarsberet-
nvnger, Vol. Ill, p. 30.

10 For the text of the decree, see Appendix E.

11 "Diary of King Christian V." March 30, 1692. C. F. Wegener,
GeheimerarTcivets Aarsberetmnger, Vol. VI. p. 287.

12 Ibid., p. 274.

18 Ibid., Vol. Ill, pp. 97-98 Vol. VI, p. 315.

70 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

in the past was of little importance to us as there was now no
adequate reason why we should pay them."

In May 1841, Daniel Webster, the Secretary of State, called
the attention of the President to the fact that even though
we had comparatively little direct commerce with Denmark,
yet we paid a yearly sum of about $100,000 in Sound Dues,
Besides this, we paid port dues even though we did not enter
Danish ports except to pay the Sound Dues. He recommended
that our minister to Denmark enter into communication with
the Danish government to have this condition changed."

When in 1844 Calhoun became Secretary of State, he wrote
to Wm. W. Irvin for all the information he could get in
regard to the navigation in the Sound, but requested that the
matter be kept secret. Irvin sent this information and sug-
gested that, if the United States intended to terminate the
treaty of 1826 in order to bring the Sound Dues question to
a head, she had better not wait too long "as the wheels grind
slow in Denmark."^* It appears that nothing further was
done at this time. In 1848 the new minister, Robert P. Flenni-
ken, in a conversation with the Danish Minister of Foreign
Affairs broached the question of the abolition of the dues.
The Danish minister, according to Flenniken, acknowledged
that the dues were unfair and that he could not defend the
principle upon which they were being collected. A little later
the American Secretary of State, James Buchanan, in a letter
to Flenniken expressed his satisfaction with the acknowledg-
ment of the Danish minister. He suggested that, as the reciproc-
ity in navigation arranged for in the treaty of 1826 was
altogether one-sided in favor of Denmark, it was fair that
Denmark should abolish the Sound Dues on our vessels to
even up matters. Buchanan even suggested that Flenniken

" The article is reprinted from the Boston Monthly Magazine in the

North American Beview, April, 1826, Vol. XXII, pp. 456-459.

IS Executive Documents arul Beports of Committees, 27 Cong., 1 Sess.,

Doc. 1, pp. 26-28.

i« "Letters of John C. Calhoun "Annual Beport of the American

Historical Association, 1899, Vol. II, pp. 590-591; Executive Documents,

33 Cong., 1 Sess., Doc. 108, pp. 28-30.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 71

might offer Denmark $250,000 if such an arrangement could
be made permanent."

At the time that Flenniken laid Buchanan's offer before
Count A. V. Moltke, the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Denmark was engaged in the Three Years' War. Count Moltke
asked our minister to put his request and offer in written
form; which he did. The reasoning followed in this communi-
cation includes several points. It was pointed out that, accord-
ing to the treaty of 1826, America was not allowed to enter
all Danish ports, while Denmark was free to enter all of ours.
Other nations paid Sound Dues for services Denmark had
rendered to them in the past. Since we had never received
any of those benefits we ought not to pay the dues. The Baltic
being a free sea, the entrance to it ought to be free; this was
in accordance with the best authorities on international law.
The very fact that Denmark had to make treaties in regard
to the Sound Dues, was a proof that they were not sanctioned
by the law of nations. Before closing his communication he
made it clear to the Danish government that if Denmark was
unwilling to make a change the United States intended to
terminate the treaty of 1826.^*

It was quite clear, however, that while Denmark continued
at war with Germany nothing definite could be accomplished.
Besides, the Danish government had borrowed money in Eng-
land and her creditors had obtained a pledge that the Sound
Dues should be kept sacred for the payment of interest on the
loan. Added to this was the fact that Russia was favorable
to Denmark and used Elsinore as a projected naval police
station. It is evident, therefore, that those two countries
would back Denmark in upholding the payment of the dues.^^

At the close of the Three Years' War, Robert P. Flenniken,
who had become well acquainted with the facts pertaining to
the Sound Dues, was no longer our representative in Den-
mark. Two other men followed in quick succession.^" In 1854

17 Ibid., pp. 38-42.

18 Ibid., pp. 42-49.
i» Ibid., pp. 49-51.
20 See Appendix I.

72 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Henry Bedinger was appointed to the post at Copenhagen. At
this time William L. Marcy was Secretary of State under Presi-
dent Pierce. Marcy instructed Henry Bedinger to bring the
subject to the attention of the Danish government, as it must
be settled. He showed to our representative that it was to
England's advantage to keep up the Sound Dues because the
duty on raw products was higher than on manufactured goods;
thus she gained by importing raw products into England and
making it into manufactured goods which were shipped (to
Baltic ports. Bedinger was further informed that the United
States would not be willing to make any payments or give
any commercial privileges in lieu of the abolition of the
dues.^^

Henry Bedinger broached the matter to the Danish foreign
office, but was informed that Denmark could not abolish the
dues without remuneration. Later the Danish Minister of
Foreign Affairs expressed the hope that the United States
would not press the matter just at that time (April, 1854)
because of the political situation in Europe. Some day, so he
thought, there might be a possibility that Denmark, for a
compensation, would abandon the dues altogether. Being re-
minded that the United States government was unwilling to
give any compensation, he stated that he had strong reasons
to believe she would.*^^

In spite of the request not to urge the matter while the
Crimean War was in progress, Marcy endeavored to bring the
matter to a speedy conclusion. Denmark was informed that
the American government had decided to terminate the treaty
of 1826.*^ In ans\ver to this notification, the Danish govern-
ment through Torben Bille, its representative at Washington,
communicated to Secretary Marcy its views in regard to its
right to collect the Sound Dues. The United States had claimed
that the dues were not sanctioned by the law of nations, but
were based on special conventions made between Denmark and

21 Executive Documents, 33 Cong., 1 Seas., Doc. 108, pp. 54-58.

22 Ihid., pp. 59-61.

23 Executive Documents, 34 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. I, Doc. 1, p. 25.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 73

the various powers. It was this point that Torben Bille
especially sought to refute.

The Sound Dues, he claimed, were based on the law of
nations by immemorial prescription. The right to collect them
had existed long before any treaties were made regulating the
rate. If the right were based on treaties, it would mean that
the various strong powers in Europe had voluntarily made
a grant to Denmark. This was contrary to historical facts.
Neither was it reasonable to suppose that Denmark was able
to force her will upon the strong and powerful European
states. In that case they would certainly never have incor-
porated them voluntarily in their treaties with Denmark.
While the origin of the Sound Dues was shrouded in the
uncertainty of antiquity, yet it was clear that when inter-
national affairs began to be regulated by definite rules, the
right to collect the dues was so well established, that without
protest it was incorporated in treaties. Although the Danish
government would be willing to admit that, according to the
present interpretation of international law, the imposition of
similar duties now, for the first time, could not be sanctioned,
yet she would not admit that this should be a criterion by
which to judge rights that had been in existence since time
immemorial. He further pointed out that the treaty of
Vienna recognized the Sound Dues in the settlement of
European affairs, at a time when similar arrangements were
being remodeled. Under these circumstances, the abrogation
of the treaty of 1826 would not affect a right which existed
independently of the treaty. It would only leave the United
States shorn of the rights and benefits which she enjoyed as
a result of the treaty. Because of the existence of other
treaties, it would be impossible to exempt the United States
from the pajonent of the duties on their commerce, as every
other nation would claim the same advantage.^*

Marcy did not even deem it worth while to answer Bille 's
letter, but replied to the Danish government by instructing
Henry Bedinger to request, in a final appeal, that American
commerce be relieved of the burden. If this should prove

2* For text of the letter, see ibid., pp. 25-28,

74 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

unsuccessful, he was instructed to inform the Danish gov-
ernment that the treaty of 1826 was abrogated and to request
acknowledgment of the fact from the Danish foreign office.
Bedinger carried out his instructions.^'

It may be of interest at this point to learn what was the
general attitude of the leading powers towards the Sound Dues
situation. Of the German states, Prussia was very much op-
posed to the dues. The question was discussed in the Laiidtag
by von Sanger who was backed by that body in his opposi-
tion. Unfavorable articles appeared in the papers of K61n
and Hamburg, and a letter from Hamburg, containing the
same sentiment, appeared in the New York Tribune.'^^ A
vigorous pamphlet was published in Stettin in German, Eng-
lish, and French condemning the dues as unjust and con-
trary to international law.^^

In England, on the other hand, the sentiment in general
does not appear to have been much opposed to the dues. We
have found only one unfavorable expression, before the mat-
ter was taken up in Parliament. It runs as follows: "When
the ten year treaty between Great Britain and Denmark made
in 1841 comes to a close, some means ought to be found for
the perpetual redemption of the Sound Dues."^* In 1856
Palmerston expressed his opinion to Count Persigny and
Count Walewski, the French and the Russian Ministers at
London, as being against the abrogation of the dues.^® Similar
opinions were offered at this time in Parliament. Bramley-
Moore, sitting for Maiden, felt that to abrogate the dues by
a money payment was to use public money for the benefit
of a few traders. Besides, it would be unfair because the
Sound Dues had been hypothecated in London for a loan to

«8 Ibid., pp. 28-32.

26 De Bow's Beview, (1855), Vol. XVIII, pp. 760-763; Executive Do<y
wnents, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., Doc. 108, pp. 26-28, 31-32; New York Tribune,
September 2, 1856.

2T F. Hessenland, Le Droit du Sund, passim.

88 Edinburgh Beview, (1845), Vol. LXXXII, p. 212.

2» "Aflfisning af Sund og. Belttolden," Historisk Tidsskrift, 1858-1859,

3dje Eeekke, Vol. I, pp. 486-488.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 75

Denmark,^" In spite of these voices, however, England
finally took a stand in favor of capitalization, as we shall see
later.

In February, 1854, Henry Bedinger wrote to Secretary
Marey that Russia was backing Denmark ''by requiring her
ports to refuse to receive the cargo of any vessel which has
not paid the dues. ' '^^ According to a statement made by Gen-
eral D'Oxholm, the Danish representative at the court of St.
James, to James Buchanan, our ambassador at the same
court, Bedinger 's report was hardly correct, as it was not
through an act of the central government, but by municipal
regulations that the ports had acted. ^^ Russia, however,
had made it clear to the Danish government that she would
stand by Denmark in her demands.^^

The question naturally arises, why was Russia in favor
of letting Denmark continue to collect the Sound Dues? There
certainly were economic reasons why she should be in favor
of their abolition. It seems very probable that her attitude
was based on dynastic grounds. During the fifties it was
evident that King Frederick VII would not leave any legal
heirs. This caused the rise of the very unfortunate Danish
succession problem. There were three sets of pretenders to
Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein. The nearest heir to the
Danish throne was Princess Louisa, of the House of Olden-
burg, who was married to Duke Christian of Gliicksburg, a
gentleman who himself had a close claim to the duchies and
a remote claim to Denmark. While Louisa could inherit Den-
mark and Schleswig the Lex regia was against her in Holstein,
as it did not recognize female succession. The second pre-
tender really had no true claim, as his father had sold his
right for 3,000,000 rixdoUars which had been paid by Den-
mark. This claimant, of the House of Augustenburg, held
that, as he was of age when his father sold the claim, his right

80 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. CXLIV, pp. 2400-2404.

SI Executive Documents, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., Doe. 108, p. 60.

32 Buchanan to Marcy, April 20, 1855. J. B. Moore, WorTcs of James

Buchanan, Vol. IX, pp. 345-346.

83 Letter from Berlin, dated September 15, 1855, New York Tribune,

October 5, 1855.

76 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

was not included.'* The third pretender was Czar Nicholas
I of Russia, a descendent of Czarina Catharina II, who
belonged to the House of Gottorp in Holstein. In
order to secure a legal title to the Baltic provinces which
Peter the Great had secured for Russia in the treaty of
Nystad, she had made a treaty with Denmark on April 22,
1767 in which that country gave up all her claims to the
provinces while Cathrina II renounced her right to the duchy
of Schleswig.^' "While this treaty had referred only to Schles-
wig, there was a historic indissoluble union between the
duchies. It was further understood that whoever ruled in
Schleswig would also rule in Denmark, so that the three ter-
ritories were tied together in a personal union,'* When the
question of succession arose in Denmark Czar Nicholas began
to hope that he might revive his claim, and thus secure for
hdmself or some member of the Romanoff family the three
Danish realms. It was his good fortune that he was able to
make a treaty with Denmark on June 5, 1851, in which the
provisions of 1767 in regard to the succession were changed in
his favor.''^ With such prospects before him he would not
want Denmark to give up anything that might become very
valuable to him in the future. While the Protocol of London,
1852, settled the succession on Christian of Glticksburg, ''Russia
.... never lost the possibility of the succession out of view.**
When it became clear that the Sound Dues must be abol-
ished, Russia became the leader in protecting the rights of
Denmark.

Even in the United States, where the movement for the
final abolition took form, all were not in favor of the at-
titude of the State Department. Thomas H. Benton in the
Senate held that we should not do anything to abrogate the

8* G. Ft. de Martens, Beoueil, Vol. XVII, Pt. II, p. 332; Joh. Steenstnip,
op. oit., Vol. VI, Pt I, p. 341; Camb. Mod. Hist., Vol. XI, p. 226.

»» DansJce Tractater, 1751-1800, p. 232.

86 Camh. Mod. Hist., Vol. XI, p. 224; Joh. Steenstrup, op. oit., Vol. VI,
Pt. I, paswm.

87 Danske Tractater, 1800-186S, pp. 220-223.

88 Camh., Mod. Hist., Vol. XI, p. 224; See also letter from Karl Marx
from London in New York Triburie, May 6, 1853.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 77

Sound Dues, but that we should by friendly negotiations
always be sure that we were treated on an equality with
the most favored nations. Having given the exact figures
for the year 1850, he showed that our commerce in the Sound
compared with that of Europe at the ratio of one to two
hundred. ''These figures show the small comparative inter-
est of the United States in the reduction, or abolition of the
dues — large enough to make the United States desirous of
reduction or abolition — entirely too small to induce her to
become the champion of Europe against Denmark; and,
taken in connection with our geographical position, and our
policy to avoid European entanglements, should be sufficient
to stamp as Quixotic, and to qualify as mad, any such at-
tempt."'"

One of the members of the House, Hugh F. McDermott,
published a series of articles in the New York Times from
June 1 to November 6, 1855. These were later published in
pamphlet form. The letters argued that we should not
disturb the Sound Dues as such action would be injurious
to Denmark, a friendly nation, and would not benefit the
United States. The Sound Dues were a part of the Baltic
tariffs. All the dues paid by the Prussian cities were re-
funded by the Prussian government to encourage eastern
trade, hence our action would be a great aid to the Prussian
treasury. It might be argued that we would be benefited
by lower prices on Baltic products shipped to America. As a
matter of fact this would not be so as all the Baltic countries
levied an export duty as high as the trade would bear. The
removal of the Sound Dues would give them a chance to
raise the export duties and we would have gained nothing.
He also showed that according to international law Denmark
had a well established right to collect the dues. ''To suppose
that Denmark would quietly submit to having its ancient
right treated as a wrong, merely because the Cabinet at
Washington declares it to be such — would be an insult to
that small but respectable nation. "^°

39 Thomas H. Benton, Thirty Years View, Vol. II, p. 365.

*o Hugh F. McDermott, Letters on the Sound-Dues-Question, by Pax,

passim.

78 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Perhaps a more significant statement in regard to this
subject was made by Secretary Upshur, when in 1843 he
suggested that Denmark "renders no service in consideration
of that tax and has not even such right as the power to
enforce it would give.*^

When Denmark was informed by Henry Bedinger that
we had decided to terminate the treaty of 1826, she realized
that she would have to take definite action. In October,
1855, she sent a circular note to the powers inviting them
to send delegates to a congress to meet in Copenhagen the
following month, for the purpose of discussing the problem
of the Sound Dues. The note stated that the time was un-
favorable for a settlement of the question, but on account of
the action taken by the United States, it was necessary for
the powers to come to some agreement on the subject.
Denmark wished to submit a proposition the plan of which
she hoped would be favored by the various nations inter-
ested, and especially by the United States.*^

Bedinger wrote to Marcy for instruction in the matter.
Marcy put the matter before the President and it was de-
cided — and Bedinger so informed — not to take part in the
proposed congress for the following reasons: First, based
on the hypothesis that Denmark had the right to collect the
Sound Dues, the congress would assemble to arrange for
their capitalization. The United States were unwilling to take
part in such an arrangement, because they denied the basic
hypothesis. Second, the American government wished to
vindicate the principle that the sea was free to all. If Den-
mark could collect dues at the Sound, so could others at
Gibraltar, Messina, the Dardanelles, and other places. Third,
the United States did not wish to become a party to the
settlement of the balance of power in Europe. The govern-
ment understood from the invitation that the Sound Dues
would be discussed from that angle. Finally, the question
would not be "considered as one of commerce or money,
but as a political one. This would be in accordance with

« F. Hessenland, Le Droit du Sund, p. 5.

*2 Executive Documents, 34 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. I, Doc. 1, pp. 33-38;

New York Tribune, November 16, 1855.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 79

the history of the Sound Dues, and with the part which they
have performed in the politics of the north of Euroi>e." The
American government insisted that our international rights
should not be restricted by or sacrificed to European ex-
pediency. The United States, however, would not be un-
'willing to pay her share of the expenses in the upkeep of
lights, improvements and protection of the Sounds and, in
fact, would be very liberal in compensating Denmark for
such outlays. America would, on the other hand, absolutely
refuse to pay anything for the use of the free waters of the
Sound.*3

Although the United States refused to take part, the
proposed congress met in Copenhagen.** Because of the short
time which had been given to prepare for the sending of
delegates, the congress did not meet, as originally in-
tended, in November 1855. The first session was held on
January 4, 1856. It was called to order by Count Bluhme,
formerly Minister of Foreign Affairs but now Director of
the Bureau of Sound Dues. He was assisted by Count
Sponneck, Director-General of Tariff. Representatives were
present from Austria, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Hol-
land, Oldenburg, Prussia, Russia, Spain and Sweden. It was
shown in this session that the dues naturally fell into two
classes: first, those levied on merchandise according to the
tariff schedules of 1841 and 1846 ; second, those levied on
shipping. The second class was again divided into "light
dues" and "expedition dues." The first of these were used
for the upkeep of lighthouses and buoys, the second to de-
fray the expenses of the custom-house. The Danish govern-
ment did not claim any compensation for the "expedition
dues," as the custom-house would not be needed if the dues
were abolished.

The Danish commissioner placed before the conference
tables compiled from the books of the custom-house, showing

<3 Executive Dooum^nts, 34 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. I, Doc. pp. 38-41.
44 For the report of the British Ambassador, Andrew Buchanan to his
government, see G. Fr. de Martens, op. dt., Vol. XVI, Pt. II, pp 331-
337, For the Danish report, see "Aflfisning af Sund og Belttolden,"
Historisk Tidsskrift, 1858-1859, 3dje Esekke, Vol. I, pp. 455-559.

80 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

that according to the income from the dues in the years
1851, 1852, 1853, Denmark should receive 60,913,225 rixdollars,
basing the redemption "at 4 per cent, or 25 years' purchase."
When some of the delegates ventured to state that this
amount was exorbitant, the commissioners explained that,
in putting those figures before the conference, they were
not making a proposal but merely stating facts, which might
be used as a basis of negotiation.

The next meeting of the conference was held on February
2, 1856. On this occasion Count Bluhme presented figures
to show that the average annual receipts on merchandise
during the years 1842 to 1847 and 1851 to 1853, inclusive,
amounted to 2,098,561 rixdollars. The years 1848 to 1850
were omitted as the figures for those years were inaccurate
on account of the war with Prussia. The amounts collected
annually during those same years on shipping as "light
dues" averaged 150,018 rixdollars. This sum if redeemed at
4 per cent, or 25 years' purchase, would amount to 56,214,-
475 rixdollars. The Danish government, having given the
question careful consideration, had authorized its repre-
sentative to state that it would be willing to accept the STim
of 35,000,000 rixdollars as a compensation for the total
abolition of the Sound Dues.

The quota to be paid by each nation was worked out in
the following manner. The amount of dues collected from
each nation on its ships passing the Sound for Baltic ports,
during the years mentioned in Bluhme 's reports, was aver-
aged with the amount collected from the same nation on
ships going in the opposite direction. The annual sum was
then multiplied by twenty-five. This as stated above equaled
56,214,475 rixdollars. As Denmark offered to settle for
35,000,000 rixdollars the amount to be paid would be equal
to 62.27 per cent of the original sum demanded. The following
table is worked out from the final treaty, Buchanan's re-
port, and the Danish government's report.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 81

Payments by the Leasing Nations foe the Abolition of the
Sound Dues

Nations

o in
o3 08 S

> S a

<n

03 CO

M Q^ V

(3 03 eu

. *^

l-H <» "S

OS . .S

o a a 'S

--3 .2 o '3

CO +i • ri &
S 03 ta

ft

® fe o
« P o

o^ in

Austria

Belgium

Bremen „

France

Great Britain

Hamburg

Hanover ._

Holland

Liibeck

Mecklenburg

Norway

Oldenburg

Prussia

Eussia

Sweden

Nations which did
not take part in the
congress but later
paid their share
The Baltic in General.

Spain _

United States

Denmark's own share.

1,890

19,367

14,043

78,315

650,601

6,875

7,927

90,461

6,617

24,006

42,866

1,807

285,250

625,747

102,182

14,899
65,531
46,105
72,088

47,262

484,175

351,075

1,957,875

16,265,025

171,875

198,175

2,261,525

165,425

600,150

1,071,650

45,175

7,131,250

15,643,675

2,554,550

372,475
1,638,275
1,152,628
1,802,200

29,434

301,455

218,585

1,219,003

10,126,855

107,012

123,387

1,408,060

102,996

373,663

667,225

28,127

4,440,027

9,739,993

1,590,503

231,909
1,020,016

717,829
1,122,078

0.09
0.86
0.62
3.48
28.93
0.31
0.35
4.02
0.29
1.07
1.91
0.08
12.62
27.83
4.55

0.66
2,91
2.05
3.21

This amounted to almost 96 per cent of the whole. The rest was paid
by smaller nations, but it appears that no reports were published of
what each of these paid.

Russia, Oldenburg and Sweden were the first to notify
Denmark of their intention to accept their quotas as a fair
and equitable settlement. Their representatives signed an
agreement recording their acceptance, subject to the con-
dition that the same terms should be accepted by the other
powers.

Two new problems now appeared. The question arose
** whether the transit dues on routes between the North-Sea
or the Elbe and the Baltic ought not to be reduced or
abolished simultaneously with the Sound dues," as these
were also under the control of Denmark. The other prob-

82 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

lem arose in England where the government was of the
opinion that Parliament would object to pay money out of
the treasury to relieve burdens of a special trade/" After
further consideration England expressed her willingness to
pay a stipulated sum once for all, provided Denmark in the
future would abolish all dues for the upkeep of the sound and
reduce the transit dues in the duchies. Denmark agreed to
this.

While the negotiations were going on between Great
Britain and Denmark during the summer of 1856, Prussia
and France agreed that so important a question as that of
opening the Baltic to the world ought not to be handled
by separate treaties but should be embodied in a general
treaty to be signed by Denmark and the majority of the
nations interested. As England showed herself in harmony
with this idea, a draft of a treaty was prepared. Before
presenting this to Denmark a conference of the delegates
was held and the draft submitted to discussion. At this
conference representatives from Hanover, Mecklenburg and
the Hansa Towns, besides those of states formerly men-
tioned, were present. The treaty was then presented to the
Danish government on February 3, 1857. After making a
few changes, suggested by Denmark, the treaty was signed
by the members of the congress on March 14, 1857.*®

The treaty consists of eight articles. The first article con-
tains the agreement on the part of Denmark to cease collecting
Sound and Belt Dues of any kind, but the Danish gov-
ernment retains the right to make suitable arrangements
with powers that have not taken part in the present
convention. In Article II, Denmark promises to keep up
the light-houses, buoys and other improvements for facili-
tating the navigation in the Sounds, the Belts, and the
Cattegat. Foreign vessels shall not be forced to use Danish
pilots in those waters, but in case they desire to use

*5 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. CXLI, pp. 180-181; Ibid.,

Vol. CXLIV, pp. 2400-2404; New York Tribune, August 12, 1856. For

an explanation of the money used, see Appendix F.

*• For full text of the treaty, see Martens, op. cit., Vol. XVI, Pt. II, pp.

345-358.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 83

them, the fees shall be the same as those paid by Dan-
ish vessels. The transit dues between the North Sea and
the Baltic shall be limited to 16 skilling, Danish currency,
for each 500 pounds, Danish weight. According to Article
III, the treaty was to take effect April 1, 1857. Under
Article IV, the contracting parties agreed to pay to Dan-
mark the sum of 30,476,325 rixdollars, each party being re-
sponsible for its own share.*^ Article V provided that the
specified amounts should be paid in forty semi-annual pay-
ments. Article VI authorized Denmark to make a special
treaty with each nation for the mode of payment, the rate
of exchange, and the place of payment. According to Article
VII, the treaty is subject to ratification in accordance with
the rules and formalities established in the various states
of the contracting parties. By Article VIII, the exchange
of ratifications should take place at Copenhagen April 1, 1857,
or as soon as possible after that date.

In accordance with this treaty, Denmark made treaties
with the various nations interested in the navigation of the
Sound.*** It is evident from the amount received by the
Danish government that she was paid not only for the up-
keep of improvement in the Sound and Belts, but also for
the surrender of her right to collect dues. The dues paid
for lights, buoys, etc., known as droits de fanal, constituted
less than six per cent of the annual amounts paid.*® Denmark
has used the money she received from the various powers to
establish a fund, the proceeds of which is used for the upkeep
of improvements in the Sound and Belts. This made the
powers more willing to pay as they did not and could not
expect a small nation at her own expense to keep the straits
improved for the benefit of the wealthy commercial interests
of other countries. At the same time it was a wise act for
Denmark to remove the problem entirely by accepting a cash

*7 For the share of each of the contracting parties, see the table
given above.

48 For the text of these treaties, see Martens, op. cit.. Vol. XVI, Pt. I

and Vol. XVII, Pt. II, passim.

*9 Martens, op. oit., Vol. XVI, Pt. II, p. 344.

84 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

payment. Sooner or later she might have lost the Sound Dues
without any reimbursement.'"

"When it became evident that the European powers were
willing to pay large sums to Denmark to abolish the Sound
Dues, the United States decided to pay her share. On April
15, 1857, a treaty was concluded between Lewis Cass, Sec-
retary of State under James Buchanan, and Torben Bille, the
Danish representative at Washington. We do not know the
nature of the negotiations that preceded this treaty, as this
diplomatic correspondence has not been published. Marcy, as
stated above, had declared that the United States would not
pay any money to Denmark for ceasing to collect the dues.
Perhaps the fact that a new man was at the head of our
foreign affairs made it easier for Torben Bille to negotiate
the treaty.

The treaty is very short, and agrees in general with the
treaty of March 14, 1857, between Denmark and the powers
represented at the Copenhagen congress. It contains the fol-
lowing points : Article I : the abolition of Sound Dues on
American vessels was recognized by the Danish government;
.'^rticle II: Denmark agreed to keep up the improvements of
the Sound and Belts as in the past, and if the increasing
traffic in the Sound should require additional improvements,
Denmark agreed to make them without cost to the United
States; Article III: the United States agreed to pay $393,011
or 717,829 rixdoUars, to Denmark on the day when the con-
vention went into effect; Article IV: the United States was
restored to her status of most favored nation; Article V: the
treaty of 1826, which was abrogated by the United States on
April 15, 1856, became binding again between the two nations,
Article V dealing with the Sound Dues excepted; Article VT:
the convention should take effect as soon as possible but not
later than twelve months from the date of signing; and Article
VII: exchange of ratification should take place in Washington
within ten months.'*

80 John Steenstrup, op. oit., Vol. VT, Pt. II, pp. 183-184.

51 For text of the treaty, see W. M, Malloy, Treaties, etc., Vol. I,

pp. 383; Senate Documents, 35 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. VII, Doc. 28.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 85

The treaty was proclaimed in effect by the President of the
United States on January 13, 1858.^^ tj^^ original amount
and interest equaling a total of $408,731.44 was paid to Den-
mark according to agreement in 1858.^^

2. The Maintenance of American Neutrality.

Soon after the exchange of the last note connected with the
Jones claims, a war broke out between Denmark and the
German Bund. This is known in Danish history as the ' ' Three
Years' War," or the "First Schleswig-Holstein War," 1848-
1850. The problem involved in the conflict is of no importance
to this work, and will therefore not be discussed. In advance
of the outbreak of the war, Germans had been sent to the
United States to study naval plans; and American offijcers
were offered positions in the new navy of the Bund.^* When
the war broke out this state of affairs could not well continue,
and the American Secretary of the Navy, William B. Preston,
wrote on March 19, 1849, to Commodore M. C. Perry that,
on account of the war existing between Germany and Den-
mark, he must "abstain from any further participation,
either by advising or otherwise, in the preparation and equip-
ment of the Steamship United States, now at New York, re
cently purchased for the use of the German empire.""*

Meanwhile the building of this war vessel had come to the
notice of the Danish representative, Steen Bille, at Washing-
ton. He appealed to Secretary of State John M. Clayton in
behalf of the Danish government, asking that work on the
ship be stopped, as the intention was to use the vessel against
Denmark. Clayton immediately advised Baron von Roenne,
the German Minister to the United States, that according to
the law of April 20, 1818, there was a heavy penalty for
fitting out a vessel in the United States, if it were to be used
against a power friendly to us. If the vessel United States

62 Ihid.

53 Miscellaneous Doomnents, 35 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. I, Doc. 50;
Statutes at Large, Vol. XI, p. 261. For the whole subject of the aboli-
tion of the Sound Dues, see Markus Eubin, * ' Sundtoldens Aflfisning,"
Historisk TidssTcrift. 7de Rsekke, 6te Bind; pp. 172-311.

54 Senate Documents, 31 Cong., Vol. I, Doc. 1, pp. 21-22.

55 Ibid., p. 28.

86 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

were to be used against Denmark, we were determined to act
vigorously in the ease. Roenne's word of honor that the
ship would not be used would, however, be sufficient for us,
as we wanted the friendship of Germany as well as of Den-
mark.'^

In his answer Baron von Roenne stated that he was much
surprised to learn from the Secretary of State that the vessel
was ''really" to be used against Denmark. He himself was
in possession of no such information. So far as he knew, the
vessel would proceed from New York harbor to Bremerhaven
and there receive further orders. Besides, he was well aware
of the existence of the act of 1818 and in order to avoid
doing anything contrary to law he had consulted a dis-
tinguished member of the New York bar on the subject. This
gentleman had informed him that, so far as he had the facts
in hand, he did not feel that the German government was doing
anything contrary to law.^'

Secretary Clayton, however, was not disposed to waste time
in quibbling and thus give time for the ship to escape. He
informed Roenne that he was sorry he had not received an
answer to his request for a formal declaration that the vessel
would not be used against a power friendly to the United
States. He also informed the German minister that he had
secured an opinion from the Attorney-General on the sub-
ject, which held that, since war existed between Germany and
Denmark and since the vessel was being fitted out as a war
vessel, a ship "so armed and fitted, when upon the high
seas, in a state of war, is false to its flag and honor, if it
does not "commit hostilities" upon an enemy whenever and
wherever it meets one." Mr. Clayton therefore hoped that
Baron von Roenne would give the assurance solicited."*

After several exchanges of notes, in which the German
minister tried to avoid the real issue and explain away the
purpose of the vessel, the Secretary of State finally took the
stand that, since Roenne avoided making a full and free

8« Ibid., pp. 49, 32-33. For the Act of 1818, see Statutes at Large,
Vol. Ill, pp. 447-450.

" Senate Documents, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. I, Doc. 1, pp. 34-38.
88 Ibid., pp. 38-40,

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 87

promise that the United States would not be used against
Denmark, Germany would have to subscribe to the pro-
visions of the law of April 20, 1818, and give a bond amount-
ing to twice the value of the vessel, its armament and cargo.
Before clearing, the vessel would have to be registered as a
vessel of the German empire.'^^

Germany tried to avoid the obligations of the bond by
changing the name of the vessel to the Horsa, by taking ad-
vantage of an armistice, and by misconstruing the Act of April
20, 1818; but to no avail. The United States government — ^to the
great satisfaction of the Danish authorities — held Germany rig-
idly to the obligations of the bond. The United States ar-
rived at Liverpool as a peaceful vessel, but it does not appear
that she ever took part in the war. Our Minister Niles at
Turin later stated to the Secretary of State that European
statesmen with whom he had conversed expressed their appro-
bation of the stand our government had taken in the case
of the United States, and that the strict observation of the
principles of international morality would do much to raise
the character of the American government in the eyes of
Europe.®"

3. The Rise of the Butterfield Claims.

While the United States and Denmark were negotiating
concerning the Sound Dues, a very interesting case arose,
known in our diplomatic correspondence as the Butterfield
Claims. The negotiations concerning these claims extended
over a period of nearly forty years and the matter was finally
settled by arbitration.

In September, 1854, the Benjamin Franklin, a steamship
of 850 tons burden, and the bark Catharine Augusta cleared
from New York harbor for the island of St. Thomas, one of
the Danish West Indies. Both vessels were equipped for war
and the Catharine Augusta carried a cargo of uniforms, mus-
kets, ammunition and other material of war. It was not fully
known to whom these ships belonged, but they were in charge
of a certain John N. Olcott, who executed a letter of at-

59 Ibid., pp. 48-49.
80 Ibid., pp. 64-68.

88 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

tomey which authorized Mr. Jos^ Gener of the City of Mex-
ico to negotiate a sale for them.®^

Before the vessels left New York, the Venezuelan consul
at that port informed the United States government that the
vessels were being fitted out to assist a rebellion in Venezuela,
which was being conducted by General Jose A. Paez. An
affidavit having been sworn out to that effect by the Venezue-
lan minister, R. Azpurua, the vessels were detained, and a
suit of libel instituted in the Southern District of New York.
The prosecutor, however, was unable to sustain its charge;
hence an order was issued discharging the vessels from custody
and the libel was dismissed.®^

Toward the close of September, 1854, the vessels arrived at
St. Thomas. The Catharine Augusta had suffered so much
from rough weather that it was necessary for her to make
repairs before she could go further. It was found that re-
pairs could not be made without unloading the cargo.

Meanwhile Charles Eames, our representative to Venezuela,
informed Charles J. Hebn, our consul at St. Thomas, of the
suspicion of the Venezuelan government. Our acting com-
mercial agent, John E. Ruhl, answered Eames, as Helm was
absent for the time being. He stated that the vessels had
already been examined at New York, and that if they had ever
been intended for an expedition against Venezuela he was
sure that that intention had now been abandoned. He added
that the Danish government was aware of the suspicion and
had refused to allow one of the ships to unload her cargo
in order to undergo repairs, but he felt that, according to
existing treaty relations, Denmark could not persist in her
refusal although she might attach conditions to her permis-
sion."

When Helm returned, the Danish authorities finally gave
permission to allow the Catharine Augusta to be unloaded.
Pour conditions, however, were attached to the permission.

61 Executive Documents, 45 Cong., 3 Sess., Vol. X"VT, Doc. 33, pp. 1, 2.
«2 Ibid., p. 3; New York Tribune, August 4, 8, 15, September 5, 15, 1854.
«3 Executive Documents, 45 Cong., 3 Sess., Vol. XVI, Doc. 33, pp.
3-4; New York Tribune, October 20, 1854; November 21, 1854; De-
cember 1, 1854.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 89

First, the unloading must be done under Helm's personal
supervision. Second, the material unloaded should remain
in storage until H. H. Berg, the governor of the island, and
Helm were both satisfied that it had a legitimate destination.
Third, no breach of the laws of nations or treaty stipulations
should be permitted. And fourth, a bond of $20,000 was re-
quired to secure faithful performance of duty. This was
entered into voluntarily by the people controlling the vessels.**

While the Catherine Augusta was being repaired, the Ben-
jamin Franklin was idle in the port. As the British steamer,
Parana from Southampton was late in arriving at St. Thomas
and the various windward and leeward bound mail steamers
had left, J. B. Cameron, the agent for the British Royal Mail
Steam Packet Co., chartered the Benjamin Franklin to carry
the newly arrived passengers and mail to the Windward Is-
lands and Barbadoes. The vessels of the Royal Mail Steam
Packet Co. had the privilege at any time to enter or leave the
St. Thomas harbor without notification. When the Benjamin
Franklin had cleared, it sailed out of the harbor after sunset
on December 21, 1854. As it passed Fort Frederick, the
commander of the fort, Major Castonier, fired on the vessel.
He claimed later that he had no official notice that the vessel
was to be allowed to leave. According to his orders therefore,
he fired a blank shot fore and aft. As the vessel did not
stop he lodged a shot in the hulk. Fortunately no one was
harmed. The vessel did not turn till the fourth shot was
fired.««

This affair created quite a stir. The shot which was lodged
in the hulk of the vessel came very near harming several
individuals. From the correspondence it seems that Major
Castonier knew that the Benjamin Franklin was to leave but
he had been informed that the vessel would "be cleared as
usual by the consignees." The fact that he knew of the sus-
picion attached to the vessel, and that the clearance was not
reported to him by the captain of the vessel nor by the
company officials, made him think that she was sneaking out
of the harbor unlawfully. According to report, the sequel

8* Executive Documents, 45 Cong., 3 Sess., Vol. XVI, Doc. 33, p. 5.
«5 Ibid., pp. 7-9, 24, 29.

90 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

was that JMajor Castonier was court-martialed, reduced in rank
and transferred to St. Croix, The truth is that the commander
and Governor Berg did not agree very well, and this was
the cause of his transfer. The Benjamin Franklin proceeded
on her journey as soon as she was repaired.®'

Meanwhile the repairs of the Catharine Augusta were com-
pleted and Jose Gener succeeded in selling the two vessels
and the cargo to the Mexican government through the firm
Cammet and Co. The vessels were to be delivered to any
port in the Gulf of Mexico demanded by the buyers; and
the price was fixed at $500,000 cash. "When, however, the
Mexican government learned of the suspicion in regard to
the original destination of the vessels, the offer was withdrawn
in order to avoid complications with Venezuela.®^ Somewhat
later Jose Gener succeeded in selling the vessels directly to
the Mexican government but at a very reduced price.^*

On May 7, 1855, J. T. Pickett, our consul at Vera Cruz,
having received authority from John N. Olcott, asked the
Danish authorities at St. Thomas for the delivery of the cargo.
Governor Berg replied that the papers presented were alto-
gether too general in their nature to prove that the pro-
visions under which the cargo had been unloaded would be
fulfilled. Besides, the bond for $20,000 given by Moron and
Company would still be binding until the cargo arrived at
San Bias, Mexico,*® which was its final destination as stated
by Pickett. Indeed, the Danish government would demand
proof of the arrival of the cargo at the said port before the
bond could be released. Taking advantage of a clause in the
bond which stated that duty would be paid on the cargo "in
the event of its being exported for the account of others but
the original owners," the authorities claimed that, since the
Mexican government was now the owner of the cargo, duty
should be paid. The owners, on the contrary, claimed that
the Mexican government would not become the owner until

«« rbid., pp. 25, 27; New York Tribune, January 12, 1855; May 1,

1855.

«7 Executive Documents, 45 Cong., 3 Sess., Vol. XVI, Doc. 33, pp. 13-14.

«8 Hid., p. 16, 53-54.

•» San Bias is on the Pacific coast in the district of Tepic.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 91

the cargo was delivered at San Bias. After some delay the
proper documents were produced. It appears that the author-
ities waived the claim for duty.

Clearance was given to the two ships on May 26, 1855.^° The
Benjamin Franklin, it was claimed, was so badly damaged by
the shot fired at her that she had to be taken to Norfolk,
•Va., for partial repairs and later to Baltimore where the
repairs were completed. From this place the vessel was
cleared for Vera Cruz where she arrived in January, 1856.
The contract of sale had been changed to allow this. The
CatJiarine Augusta started on her long journey around Cape
Horn for San Bias. Being badly worm-eaten because of her
stay at St. Thomas and encountering bad weather and rough
seas, she was forced to lay in at Pernambuco, Brazil, for
repairs. The contract of sale having been changed in her
case also, she arrived at Vera Cruz in June, 1856,'^^

The owners of the vessels felt that their property had
been damaged by reason of the action of the Danish author-
ities in St. Thomas. They held Denmark responsible for their
losses for the following reasons: the firing of the shot at the
Benjamin Franklin; the unsuccessful transaction through
Cammet & Co., caused by the suspicion of the Danish author-
ities; the loss on their capital by the delay in releasing the
cargo of the Catharine Augusta; and the worm-eaten condi-
tion of the same ship caused by its detention. In October,
1857, a claim was prepared including the following items:

Value of the two vessels and the cargo $500,000

Actually received in cash - ^ $315,000

Loss through reduced sale price and de-
preciated Mexican certificates — — . $185,000

Interest at 12 per cent on $185,000 Sept. 1,

1855 to September 1, 1857 44,400

Repairs, interest, traveling expenses, translation
fees, documents, etc., having their origin in
the acts of the Danish authorities 72,814.08

Total _ 301,814.08

TO Ibid., pp. 63-64.
Ti Ibid., p. 64.

92 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Interest on this amount from September 1, 1857, to the date
of final pajTnent of the claim was to be added to this sum/''
On June 20, 1860, this bill with claim for payment was
laid before Mr. Hall, the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs,
by James M. Buchanan, our representative at Copenhagen.
Two months later a reply was received in which the Danish
government claimed it was not liable for damages because
the authorities at St. Thomas in delaying the vessels had
done nothing more than their duty.^^ As the settlement of
this case will be treated in a later chapter. Hall's reply will
be treated there.

72 Ibid., pp. 53-54, 64. The bill is abreviated from the original.
18 Ibid., pp. 56-59.

CHAPTER V.

DANISH AMERICAN RELATIONS RESULTING FROM
THE CIVIL WAR, 1860-1872

Most of the incidents treated in this chapter had their origin
either directly or indirectly in the Civil War. It is pleasant
to relate that during the trying days of this war Denmark
stood as a firm and never swerving friend of the Union gov-
ernment. The Danish government was one of the few which
did not want to see the United States di\'ided.

1. Negotiations Concerning the Confederacy.

In her diplomatic relations with foreign powers, the United
States had two definite problems that sprang directly from
secession. The more prominent of these was the need to pre-
vent the Confederacy from obtaining aid in European coun-
tries. The other problem was to forestall the recognition of
the independence of the Confederacy.

It was natural that the South should attempt to secure aid
from foreign powers. This was foreseen at Washington.
Even before the first battle of Bull Run, Secretary of State
Seward wrote to Bradford R. Wood, our representative at
Copenhagen, warning him to cambat any movement that
might be made by the Confederacy to obtain aid from Den-
mark. As a result. Wood sounded the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, M. Hall, concerning his attitude towards the re-
bellion. Hall's answer was definite and clear. He was decid-
edly in favor of the Union in its struggle against the rebellion.
He even went a step further and despatched a man-of-war
to the Danish West Indies for the purpose of preventing
privateering and illicit trade and of preserving neutrality.'

From time to time Confederate emissaries visited Copen-
hagen for the purpose of obtaining aid and recognition, but
the Danish authorities refused to receive them as govern-
mental representatives. Dudley Mann, who was sent to Copen-
hagen by the Confederacy, finally succeeded in getting a pri-

1 Foreign delations of the United States, 1861-1862, Pt. I, pp. 311-314.

98

94 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

vate interview with Hall. He attempted to prove that the
Union strength was giving way, as was shown by the fact
that gold was much higher in the North than in the South.
He hoped that Denmark would not be the last nation to
recognize the independence of his government. Hall replied
that other sources of information convinced him that the
success of the Confederacy was by no means sure. In regard
to the question of recognizing the independence of the South
he stated, "that though Denmark might not be the last to do
this, she certainly would not be the first.'"*

In spite of this attitude, rumor reached the United States
that Denmark had recognized the independence of the Con-
federacy. Wood was instructed to request the Danish officials
to revise the decree in which this action had been taken.'' Upon
investigation it was learned that the rumor was untrue. In
1865 when Bluhme became Minister of Foreign Affairs in
Denmark he stated to Wood "that the government of the
King has never recognized the so-called Confederate States as
a belligerent party."*

When the Second Schleswig-Holstein War broke out in
1863, the United States showed its good will towards Den-
mark by strictly enforcing her neutrality laws, so that the
German powers received no aid from America. The war,
however, threatened the traffic between New York and the
ports of northwestern Germany, especially Bremen and Ham-
burg. Seward requested Denmark to allow this traffic to
continue as it was very valuable to us, "more so now than
heretofore, owing to the embarrassment of our commerce."
He wanted Denmark clearly to understand that it was not
a demand but that, if the Danish government would make
the concession and allow the steamers to continue to ply be-
tween the two points, we would consider it "as a gratifying
evidence of the friendship and good will of Denmark."'^ From
the later correspondence it does not appear directly what

2 Foreign Belations of the United States, 1862, p. 780.

8 Ibid., p. 778.

* Foreign Belations of the United States, 1865-1866, Pt. Ill, p. 179.

8 Ibid., 1864-1865, Pt. IV, pp. 342-343.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 95

answer was given to this request; but it seems that Wood
must have made satisfactory arrangements, for Seward in one
of his dispatches included the following sentence: "Your pro-
ceedings in regard to the Bremen steamers are approved."*

It was the practice of Captain Charles Wilkes, made famous
by the \Tr&nt affair, to sail into neutral ports and watch
neutral vessels. If he suspected that a vessel was carrying on
illicit trade, he would follow her and capture her as soon as
she was out of territorial waters. This occurred most fre-
quently at St. Thomas. In June, 1863, Denmark com-
plained that Wilkes misused her friendly hospitality and asked
that the practice be stopped. As a result an order was is-
sued to the Navy Department in July by President Lincoln,
and since complaints ceased thereafter, it may be concluded
that the order was obeyed.^

2. The Case of the Jiirgen Lorentzen.

The friendly attitude of the two powers towards each other
during the Civil War period was well exemplified in two
maritime cases which arose. The first of these was connected
with the bark Jiirgen Lorentzen of Aabenraa. On December
26, 1861, this vessel with a cargo of coffee and under the
command of Captain T. W. Eeimer was on its way from Rio
de Janeiro to Havana, Cuba, where it was to receive further
orders. At eleven o'clock in the forenoon she met the United
States warship Morning Light in 7° N. Lat. 38° 30' W. Long,
a location almost due north of Ceara, Brazil. Lieutenant
H. T. Moore, who commanded the American vessel, demanded
the papers of the Jiirgen Lorentzen. As these stated that she

« Ibid., p. 344. The friendly relations that existed between the two
nations was perhaps augmented by President Lincoln, when in the fall
of 1862 he sent a pair of Colt's pistols to the Danish King. ' His
Majesty was very much pleased and expressed freely his hope that the
Union would be preserved. Eef erring to this gift B. E. Wood stated:
"I think the Danish officials appreciate vpry highly this kindness on
the part of the President; for, whatever may be their opinion as to
the possibility of preserving the Union, they, unlike some others, do
not wish its destruction." Foreign Belations of the United States,
1863, Pt. II, pp. 1188-1189.

7 The Diary of Gideon Welles, 1861-1869, Vol. I, pp. 322, 325, 451-452.

96 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

might go to New Orleans or to New York and as he did not
examine the ship's register nor the papers proving her na-
tionality, he took it for granted that she was on an unlawful
journey to a Southern city. He put Lieutenant P. Giraud
and several other Americans on board the vessel and ordered
them to take the ship to New York. He put seven of the
Danish crew on board his own vessel and forced them to serve
as a part of his crew. Captain Reimer claimed he was badly
treated by the captors.

The Danish representative at Washington, General W. R.
Raasloff, brought the matter to the attention of our govern-
ment and asked for an investigation. The Secretaries, Wil-
liam H. Seward and Gideon Welles, did all in their power
to uncover the facts and found that the allegations were
largely true. Lieutenants Giraud and Moore excused them-
selves by stating that some of the complaints were not well
founded, and that others, though well founded, were the
result of inexperience and zeal to serve their country. Mt>ore
requested that, if his explanation were not satisfactory, he
might be ordered to go to Washington for a full investigation.

The American authorities, however, did not wish to prolong
the discussions. Seeing that Denmark should not be made
to suffer for the inexperience of our men, they offered to
settle the matter by arbitration. As the case was largely
a question in regard to facts and involved no vital point
of international law or honor. General Raasloff accepted the
offer in behalf of the injured party. A commission of two
men was to be appointed and both sides agreed to abide by
its decision. William H. Seward appointed Moses Taylor of
New York and General Raasloff appointed H. Dollner, the
Danish consul at New York. After a thorough investigation
they agreed on a statement of damages covering eleven
points and amounting to $1,850. The original amount claimed
was $2,646.57. The master of the Jurgen Lorentzen waived
all claims for damages on his own part.* On March 14, 1862,
President Lincoln transmitted to Congress a copy of the
correspondence and the findings of the commission. He

8 Bouse Executive Documenta, 37 Cong., 2 Sesa., Vol. V, Pt. n, Doc
78, pp. 1-9.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 97

recommended that an appropriation be made for the amount
awarded by the referees.® Congress followed the President's
advice and the case was thus settled without bad feelings.^"

3. The Case of the Stonewall.

The second maritime case that arose during the Civil War
concerned a Confederate cruiser. In the latter part of the
year 1864 it came to the notice of our representatives in
Denmark, Consul George P. Hansen at Elsinore and Minister
Bradford R. Wood at Copenhagen, that an ''iron-clad, brig-
rigged, steam ram" had come to Copenhagen from Bordeaux,
France, where it had been built by the firm Arman. The ship
bore the name Stcerkodder, and it had arrived under the
French flag without guns. The armament arrived later in a
British vessel. Soon after the vessel's arrival her French
crew Avas discharged, and the vessel remained in the harbor
till January, 1865. At this time either De Reviere, the agent
of Arman, or Puggard, a Danish merchant to whom she was
consigned, applied for permission to secure a Danish crew
to sail her back to Bordeaux under the Danish flag.

Since the Danish government, which had originally or-
dered the ship built, had refused to accept the vessel on the
ground of non-compliance with construction regulations, this
permission was given. She sailed into the Cattegat, but re-
turned soon after for some cause or other and landed De
Reviere. She later put into Christiansand, Norway, to take
in coal, the money for which had been furnished by De
Reviere. She proceeded to the coast of Holland, where she took
on board De Reviere and ''another man" and sailed for
Quiberon Bay where she anchored in French waters. The
Danish captain and crew were now informed that the ship
had been sold, after which they departed taking the Danish
flag with them. The vessel, which at various times was known
as the Sphinx, the Stcerkodder, the Olinde, and the Stonewall,
received coal from a French collier, and ammunition and a
crew from an English vessel. She then unfurled the Con-

J. D. Richardson, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 70.

10 House Journal, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 459, 498, 524, 525, 568, 600,
606, 618, 635; Senate Journal, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 339, 357, 419,
421, 429; Statutes at Large, Vol. XII, pp. 902.

98 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

federate flag. The crew which came on board was the old
crew of the Florida}^ Captain V. P. Page became her master.^*
As it looked on the surface, Denmark had been guilty of
selling a vessel to the Confederate States. The general opinion
was that she had ordered the vessel while her war with
Prussia and Austria was going on; being poverty stricken at
the end of the disastrous conflict, she had taken the opportun-
ity to sell a piece of property worthless to her. In that case
she was guilty of a very unfriendly act and ought to be
held responsible for the results.^^ The Danish government,
however, put up a very strong case for its innocence in the
matter. In a communication from Minister Bluhme to B. R.
Wood in March, 1865, the following facts were set forth to
justify Denmark's conduct in the case: First, the vessel,
which was already in the process of building, had been con-
tracted for by the Danish government in March, 1864, on
the condition that she should be finished by June 10. The
work of completing her was to be under the control of a
Danish naval officer and according to certain specifications.
Second, Schonheyder, who was the officer appointed to super-
vise the work, refused to accept the vessel because she was
not constructed according to contract. Third, Arman, hoping
that the Danish government might accept the vessel in spite
of Shonheyder's action, sent the vessel from Bordeaux to
Copenhagen at his own risk. For the sake of saving expense
the French captain and crew had been dismissed immediately
upon arrival. Fourth, the Danish naval authorities having
inspected the vessel refused to accept her, and consequently
the contract was annulled. Fifth, since the vessel must now
be returned to Bordeaux, permission was given to allow Arman
to secure a Danish captain and crew." In view of all these

11 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1865-1866, Pt. II, p. 220;
Pt. Ill, pp. 166-173.

12 Ibid., Pt. II, p. 216.

13 For this view, see J. T. Scharf, History of the Confederate States
Navy, pp. 804-806; David D. Porter, The Naval History of the Civil
War, pp. 823-827.

!•» French law prohibited a vessel from sailing under French flag, unless

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 99

circumstances, the Danish government was "entirely un-
connected" with the transfer of the vessel as she had never
been Danish property.^^

In a later communication from Bluhme it was declared
•that, if any Danish citizen should in any way break the laws
of neutrality, very heavy punishment would be meted out to
him upon his conviction. While several investigations were
held, it does not appear that anyone was punished.^®

It is well established that, during the early part of the
Civil War, Napoleon III of France did not object to the
building of Confederate cruisers in French ports. Conse-
quently the Confederates ordered six very powerful ships
to be built by French firms. One of these was the Sphinx.
Together with its sister ship Cheops it was being built at
Bordeaux by Arman. A little later, while these ships were
being constructed, Napoleon realized that it was bad for his
Mexican policy to allow such action; hence he ordered the
discontinuance of further building. It was therefore neces-
sary for the firm Arman to sell them to some neutral power.
As a result of this the Sphinx was sold to Denmark. This
agrees with Bluhme 's statement that when the Danish gov-
ernment ordered the vessel to be built it was already under
construction.

What happened at this juncture it is difficult to learn.
Denmark certainly wanted the ship in the early part of 1864
as she was then at war. Perhaps Arman found that the time
was too short and so hurried the work too much. This may
have resulted in poor construction, which was the pretext
for Denmark's refusal to accept the vessel. Another prob-
ability exists. The Confederate agents may have bribed the
firm to deviate from the specifications of the Danish contract
so that the vessel would not be acceptable to that govern-
ment. At any rate Arman had been informed by Shonheyder
that the Danish government would not accept the vessel. The

at least two-thirds of the crew were French. Foreign Belations of the

United States, 1865-1866, Pt. Ill, p. 168.

15 For text of the letter, see ibid., pp. 173-174.

18 Ibid., pp. 174, 175, 176, 178.

100 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

trip to Copenhagen was without any doubt planned to evade
the French laws and get the vessel away from Bordeaux.
This is proved by the fact that the Stcerkodder had 180 tons
of coal on board when she left Bordeaux, an amount about
twice as great as was needed for a trip to Copenhagen and
return. Besides, she put in at Cherbourg on her way north
and took on more coal. If Arman honestly hoped to get the
Danish government to accept the ram, why should he have been
so anxious to fill her bunkers with coal?^^

It seems clear that the responsibility for the escape of the
Stonewall rests with the firm Arman. His agent, Amous de la
Reviere was a contract broker for the Confederate govern-
ment. This gentleman was angry with the Union government
because when he offered to make guns for the United States
he had been refused.^ He had no right to clear the vessel
at Copenhagen for Bordeaux and fail to complete the voyage.
It would devolve on the French government to punish the
perpetrators if the Stonewall should commit any act detri-
mental to the United States. France would be responsible to
the United States for whatever might happen, as England was
forced to be for the acts of the Alabama and others.

The Stonewall proceeded into Spanish waters and later
crossed the Atlantic. When the war ended the Confederacy
surrendered her to the Spanish government of Cuba, which
delivered her to the United States. Later she was sold to
Japan. As she never succeeded in doing any harm it does
not appear that Arman or his agent was punished.^®

4. The Question of Allegiance.

One of the great measures passed by Congress during the
Civil War was the law popularly known as the Homestead
Act. The fact that a man could secure a large tract of land
simply by settling on it caught the fancy of thousands of

IT Ibid., Pt. n, pp. 213-219. John Bigelow, who was United States
Minister to France in 1865, has given a very fine account of this
aflFair in his book France and the Confederate Navy, pp. 57-103. He
ezonorates Denmark,

" Foreign Belations ot the United States, 1865-1866, Pt. H, pp. 211-212;
Pt. m, p. 166.

i» John Bigelow, op. eft., pp. 81-108.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 101

people in Denmark. The man who in that country labored a
life time and through hard toil and prudent management was
able to become the possessor of a few acres had reasons
for feeling proud at the end of his life's journey. Wliat a
contrast to the American conditions under which 160 acres
might be had almost for the asking! The Dane is proverbially
a farmer, but before the Civil War comparatively few Danes
had migrated to the United States. The opening up of the
Mississippi valley, coupled with the fact that title to land
could be secured easily, caused the Danish population in the
United States to increase from 9,962 to 35,431 between 1860
and 1870.20

The Danes in America did not forget to inform their rel-
atives in the old country of the wonderful opportunities
that existed h^re. In a circular letter sent by a Danish
Baptist church in Wisconsin, June 10, 1862, to the Baptist
churches in Denmark is found the following extract. "As
far as our earthly conditions are concerned we must say that
they are very good. The land is rich and produces an
abundance of all things, so that the cost of living is low ....
The government is also very good and has recently passed
a law by which each man can get 160 acres of land if
he will settle on it. This law will be a great boon to a large
number of our younger men, who have decided to go out
together and each get a piece of land, if the Lord wills it."^^
The influence of letters of this type is shown abundantly in
the large Danish settlements in the Mississippi valley.

The increased number of immigrants raised the problem of
naturalization and allegiance. It is a well-known fact that
England did not recognize expatriation, but she was not the
only nation which took that stand. Our diplomats abroad
were constantly appealed to by American citizens of foreign
birth because, when they returned to the mother countrv for

20 statistics of the United States, Census 1850, p. XXXVII; Eighth
Census of the United States, 1860, p. liii; Ninth Census of the United
States, 1870, p. 338.

21 The original of this letter was found in Denmark by Rev. August
Broholm. It is preserved in the archives of the Danish Baptists in
America, located at Clarke's Grove, Minn.

102 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

a visit, they were pressed into the military service,^* Aroused
by the situation in Denmark and Germany, George H. Yea-
man, our representative in Denmark, wrote an extensive
article in 1867 on the subject: "Allegiance and Citizenship."
This was sent to Secretary Seward. Yeaman held that there
were only three reasons why a foreign power might seize a
man on his return: first, unpaid debt; second, crimes; third,
escape from military service. The two first were self-evident
and fair; the third was only fair provided he had left his
home country to escape the service. If, however he went
away to establish a home in a foreign country and returned
only for a short visit, he should be protected by the country
of his new allegiance.

General Raasloff, who had been the Danish representative
at Washington for many years and was now Minister of
War in Denmark, read Yeaman 's article and agreed with
it in the main. He suggested, however, that the state de-
partment of each country should keep a record of each case
of naturalization, and should notify the foreign office of the
country from which the subject came whenever naturalization
was completed. Said Raasloff: "He naturalizes in the United
States; goes elsewhere and ge^s into trouble; is dealt with
as an American but claims to be a Dane. The Danish govern-
ment desiring to discharge its duties of protection would
yet not wish to be imposed upon. It has no evidence here
of citizenship,^^ and the man is still prima facie a citizen.""

General Raasloff 's idea was reported by Yeaman to Seward.
Seward, however, showed that, while the plan might work in
Europe it would ,be absolutely impracticable in the United
States where 250,000 people immigrated every year. He held
it would not be long before the European countries would
have to recognize the principle of expatriation. A man had
**a natural right" to choose his home wherever he pleased.
The sooner the European states accepted that theory the
better it would be for everybody concerned.^'

22 House Executive Documents, 40 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 663-678.

23 He most likely means naturaliiation.
** Ibid., p. 683.

28 Tbid., p. 685.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 103

During the late sixties the question of allegiance, natural-
ization, and expatriation took a prominent place in politics.
The Fenian movement had done its share to bring it before
the people. In 1868 many of the state party platforms,
and both of the chief national party platforms contained planks
on the subject.^^

This may serve as the background for the treaty between
Denmark and the United States which was concluded on July
20, 1872. This treaty, which was only one out of many ne-
gotiated by the United States with other countries about the
same time, covered the whole field of naturalization, re-
admission to former status, and renunciation of acquired
status of citizens. It was negotiated by Michael J. Cramer,
our representative at Copenhagen, and Baron 0. D. Rosenohrn-
Lehn, the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs.^^

5. The First Attempt to Purchase the Danish West Indies.

The three islands known as the Danish West Indies were
discovered by Columbus on his second voyage in 1493. They
form the most important part of the group now known as the
Virgin Islands, and have a total area of 138 square miles.
The inhabitants are largely negroes and mulattoes, but some
whites live in the islands, having migrated from Denmark,
England and the United States. Although the islands be-
longed to Denmark for a long time, yet the language of the
inhabitants is English. During the Danish possession, however,
the official language was Danish. It has already been shown
that most of the trade of the islands was carried on wifh
the United States. From the commercial standpoint, there-
fore, it was not necessary to buy them, as Denmark would
not allow any other foreign nation to trade there. Most of

26 Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia, 1868, pp. 545, 548-550, 745, 748.

27 For the text of the treaty, see "W. M. Malloy, Treaties, etc., Vol. I, pp.
384-386. For treaties with other countries on the same subject, see
Ibid., pp. 434, 533, 691, 1132, 1758. Although Art. I of the treaty of
1872 expressly declared that United States citizens naturalized in Den-
mark should by that act be recognized by our government as citizens
of Denmark, yet Denmark continued to refuse to naturalize any Ameri-
can citizen until a certificate of expatriation was received from the
foreign office at Washington. For this subject, see Foreign Belaiions
of the United States, 1888, Pt. I, pp. 488-489.

104 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

the trade with the islands was carried on through the harbor
of St. Thomas, the largest of the group. Its harbor at Char-
lotte Amalie is one of the finest in the world.^*

As the Civil War had demonstrated the value of this har-
bor, the administration became anxious to secure it. In
January, 1865, when the various foreign representatives made
their New Year's call at the Executive Mansion, President
Lincoln paid special attention to General Raasloff, the Dan-
ish Minister. This gentleman was especially well liked at
Washington because of his outspoken sympathy with the Union
eause.^® On January 7, 1865, a dinner party was held at
the residence of M. de Geoffroy, charge d'affaires of France.
It happened that William H. Seward and General Raasloff
arrived about half an hour early and found themselves in a
drawing-room almost alone. The Secretary of State seized the
opportunity and broached the subject of purchasing the
Danish islands. The General was personally unfavorable to
such action and declared that the islanders were content under
their present sovereignty. He promised, however, to report
the matter to his government.^" On April 12, he reported to
Seward that he had heard from Copenhagen in regard to the
subject of the Danish West Indies and it was his duty to
inform the American government that Denmark did not care
"much" to sell the islands.^^

The assassination of President Lincoln and the attempt on
Seward's life delayed further consideration of the subject for
some time. On December 29, 1865, General Raasloff informed
Seward that Denmark was now more favorable toward the
subject of selling the islands and he was instructed to find out
what the United States would be willing to pay for them.
The financial embarrassment in which Denmark found herself
after the Prussian attack and the loss of the duchies in 1864
tempted her to sell her West India possessions.^^

28 Congressional Record, 64 Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. LIV, Pt. IV, pp. 3647-
3651.

29 James Parton, The Danish Islands, p. 7.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid., p. 10.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 105

Seward was somewhat taken, with surprise and was unable
to say just how much the United States would pay for the
islands; but after a cruise to the West Indies in the spring
of 1866 during which time he visited and inspected the islands,
he made an offer of $5,000,000 to General Raasloff. This offer
was made on July 17, 1866. Denmark refused and informed
our government that it might not even be possible to sell one
of the islands, St. Croix, as France might object on the
ground that the treaty by which she ceded the island to Den-
mark in 1733 had stipulated that Denmark should not sell
it to another country. Thus the matter was undecided till
January, 1867, when Seward pressed the matter, through our
representative in Copenhagen, for a final conclusion. Finally,
in May of that year. Count Frijs, the Danish Minister of
Foreign Affairs, made a counter-proposition in which he offered
the three islands, St. Thomas, St. John, and St. Croix, to the
United States for $15,000,000. This offer, however, was subject
to ratification by the Danish Rigsdag and to the consent of the
inhabitants of the islands expressed by a plebiscite.

Seward answered by offering $7,500,000, but he objected to
the plebiscite, stating that it was unnecessary. If any of the
inhabitants were dissatisfied they would be given the oppor-
tunity to leave the islands within two years. This offer was
refused; and Denmark made a new offer of $11,250,000 or
20,000,000 Danish rixdollars for the three islands, or $7,500,000
for St. Thomas and St. John. Denmark would thus re-
tain the largest and most valuable of the islands from the
standpoint of production, but the United States would get
St. Thomas, the most valuable from the standpoint of naviga-
tion. Whichever of the two offers the United States should
accept, the Danish government would insist on a plebiscite and
no treaty would be accepted if this condition were not in-
cluded. For some time the question hung fire. In the latter
part of the summer of 1867 Senator Doolittle was sent to
Copenhagen to aid Yeaman in the negotiations. Admiral Farra-
gut made a visit to Copenhagen for the same purpose, but
to no avail. Denmark continued to insist on the plebiscite.
Finally, the United States gave in, and a treaty was concluded
on October 24, 1867, by Count Frijs and Yeaman, by the

106 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

terms of which the United States were to secure the two islands
for $7,500,000.»»

The day after the treaty was concluded, the Danish king
caused a royal proclamation to be made to the inhabitants of
the two islands. In this he stated that the treaty had been
made subject to their ratification. He therefore hoped that
they would show their wishes in regard to the cession by a
free and extensive vote. He concluded by saying: "With
sincere sorrow do we look forward to the severing of those
ties which for many years have united You to Us, and never
forgetting those many demonstration of loyalty and affection
We have received from you, We trust that nothing has been
neglected on our side to secure the future welfare of Our
beloved and faithful Subjects, and that a mighty impulse,
both moral and material, will be given to the happy develop-
ment of the Islands under the new Sovereignty."^*

Denmark sent a commissioner to the islands to supervise
the election. To work in harmony with this gentleman Seward
sent the Reverend Charles Hawley of Auburn, New York.
Later Admiral Palmer with the Susquehanndh and Commodore
Bissel with the Monongahela were sent to the islands to be
of any service that the authorities might call for. The Mo-
nongahela was placed! at the disposal of the authorities for
transportation purposes.^® Their work was somewhat interrup-
ted on November 18, 1867, by a very severe earthquake which
caused much damage. There seemed to be only one serious
objection to the transfer in the eyes of the islanders. Under
Denmark the St. Thomas harbor had been a free port, and the
St. Thomas merchants feared that this condition would be
changed if the United States secured the islands. The Danish
commissioner. Chamberlain Carstensen, and the Reverend
Charles Hawley were sent to Washington to learn what would
be the attitude of our government on that point. Seward

83 Ibid., pp. 25-31; Congressional Becord, 64 Cong., 2 Seas., Vol. LIV,
Pt. VI, p. 694.

34 For the text of the proclamation translated from the Danish as it
appeared in the St. Thomas Tidende, see De Booy and Faris, The Virgin
Islands, pp. 18-19.

«» James Parton, op. cit., pp. 31-33.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 107

informed them that in case of transfer the port would not be
free. In spite of this information, the sentiment of the
islanders was overwhelmingly in favor of annexation. On
January 9, 1868, the election was held. The vote in St.
Thomas stood 1039 in favor and 22 against the transfer; in
St, John 205 in favor and none against,^® The Danish Rigsdag
ratified the treaty soon after, and on January 31, 1868, it
was signed by the king.^^

When the treaty was presented to the United States Senate,
that body was in the midst of the great fight of Reconstruction,
and the day of the impeachment and trial of President Johnson
was close at hand. It soon became evident that the question
of ratification of the treaty would be handled as a partisan
measure. It was feared that the purchase of the islands would
enhance the prestige of the administration, hence the work of
ratification was purposely delayed. As the day drew near for
the expiration of the time limit stipulated in the treaty for
ratification, Seward negotiated a supplementary treaty extend-
ing the time limit.^* Action being delayed again, the time was
extended to April 14, 1870, Through the influence of Charles
Sumner, who was chairman of the committee on foreign rela-
tions, the treaty was kept in committee until March 24, 1870.
At that time it was reported adversely and the Senate sus-
tained the report.^*

When the Danish government was notified of the action of
the Senate, King Christian IX promulgated another royal
proclamation to the people of the islands. He explained that
the heavy debt caused by the disastrous war a few years
earlier had been the cause of Denmark's decision to sell the
islands. The action on the part of the United States Senate
spared both the home country and the colonies the pain of
separation. He hoped that by united efforts the interests of
the islands might be promoted.^"

86 Ibid., pp. 34-39,

87 Congressional Becord, 64 Cong,, 2 Sess., Vol, LIV, Pt. VI, p, 694.
38 J. D, Richardson, op. dt., Vol, VI, pp, 688, 693.

36 Congressional Becord, 64 Cong., 2 Sess,, Vol, LIV, Pt. IV, p. 3648.
*o De Boy and Fairs, op. oit., pp. 20-22.

108 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

It is hardly possible to believe that the sale of the islands
would have caused any tears either in Denmark or the West
Indies. The plebiscite of January 9, 1868, abundantly sub-
stantiates this view so far as the islanders are concerned. The
Danish West Indies were not colonized from Denmark, conse-
quently the ties of consanguinity, which tied England to her
colonies, were found not to exist among the Danish people.

When George H. Yeaman on February 1, 1868 telegraphed
to Washington that the treaty had been ratified by the Rigsdag
and signed by the King, he added in cipher, "Several Euro-
pean powers hope it will fail in Congress."" These powers —
England was one of them — had their wish granted by the
action of our Senate.

The Senators who took part in the action did not admit that
domestic politics was the cause of the defeat of the treaty.
In personal letters from Senators Cameron of Pennsylvania,
Patterson of New Hampshire and Harlan of Iowa to Edward
L. Pierce in 1889, it was brought out that the reason the
Senate defeated the treaty was because the committee on
foreign relations felt the price was too high. These gentlemen
were members of this committee. It was also contended that
Denmark was not mistreated because the House of Represen-
tatives had given warning in November, 1867, that it would
not support the purchase of any more territory.*^

It will not be amiss to state the attitude of the Danish
people on the subject. On April 24, 1869, an article appeared
in Daghladet, a Copenhagen newspaper, which stated that Den-
mark was well aware that the United States Senate had the
right to reject the treaty. As a country with a constitutional
government she had given the same power to her Rigsdag, and
she was as anxious as any nation to see that such a right
was maintained. But it was an unfair and a very unfriendly
act for the Senate to exercise that right in the form of a
delay. The United States had taken the initiative in the

*i James Parton, op. cit., p. 42.

*2 Edward L. Pierce, A Diplomatic Fiasco. This is a pamphlet of 18
pages published in 1889. It argues against the purchase. For the
House Resolution of November 25, 1867, see Congressional Globe, Appen-
dix, 40 Cong., 1 Sess, pp. 792-793.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 109

purchase of the islands. If the Senate did not agree with the
administration it was its duty to be frank about it and not
keep the Danish government and more especially the people
in the islands in suspense. The word "No" was honorable
and justifiable but it was not courteous to let the matter go
by default. Such action did not show "international good
breeding. ' '*^

The islanders were very much disappointed. As we shall
see later, they showed their dissatisfaction from time to time
until the purchase by the United States was finally consum-
ated.**

*3 "The St. Thomas Treaty," Editorial in Daghladet, Copenhagen, April
24, 1869. The article in translation is found in the Library of Congress.
** A few minor events took place during the sixties which were not
connected with the Civil War. In 1861 a consular convention of two
articles was added to the treaty of 1826. See W. M. Malloy, Treaties,
etc., Vol. I, p. 383. In 1864 the Missionary Society of the Methodist
Episcopal Church sought aid from the State Department to secure per-
mission to operate in Denmark. This was granted by the Danish
government. Foreign Belations of the United States, 1864-1865, Pt. IV,
p. 344; Ibid., 1865-1866, Pt. m, pp. 180-181. After the assassination of
President Lincoln letters of condolence were received by our government
from the Danish foreign office and from the Governor of the Danish
West Indies. Foreign Belations of the United States, Appendix, 1865,
pp. 43-45.

CHAPTER VI

MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS OF THE LATTER PART
OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, 1868-1900

During the period between 1870 and the end on the nine-
teenth century, a number of events took place which bulked
large in the diplomatic relations between the United States
and Denmark. They are too varied in their nature to be
followed in their chronological order. Each problem will
therefore be treated separately.

1. Danish Exportation of Criminals.

Early in 1868 our government was informed by Consul
George P. Hansen at Elsinore that it was the practice of the
Danish authorities to send convicts to the United States. Re-
cently Ole Sorenson, a notorious criminal, had been promised
his freedom if he would leave the country. The man was a
vagrant, a thief, and under suspicion for murder. The consul
learned through the newspapers that the police at Copen-
hagen had sent him to the United States, as they thought it
was cheaper to ship him out of the country than to keep him.
Upon communicating with V. C. Crone, the director of police
at Copenhagen, he had received no reply. He had, however,
succeeded in getting a lithograph of the criminal and had sent
it to the chief of police in New York and had told him to
be on the lookout for the man.^

When this information reached the United States govern-
ment. Secretary Seward immediately instructed George H.
Yeaman to remonstrate with the Danish government against
the practice.'^ President Andrew Johnson sent a message to
Congress stating the facts and recommending that a law be

1 Senate Documents, 40 Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. II, Doc. 71, pp. 1-2. Our
gOTemment was informed of a similar practice going on very extensively
in the provinces of Westphalia and Bavaria in Germany. Foreign Bela-
tions of the United States, 1868-1869, Pt. II, pp. 42-43.

2 Senate Documents, 40 Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. II, Doc. 71, p. 3.

110

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 111

passed "making it a penal offense to bring such persons to
the United States."^ That body, however, true to its policy
of '^opposition to the administration must have preferred to
have the criminals come than to humor the president. No
law was passed on the subject tiU. the year 1875."*

In 1874 another case arose. In the spring of that year
the Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, wrote to the American
representative in Copenhagen, Michael J .Cramer, that the
S. S. Washington had recently brought six convicts from
Denmark. Each had a draft for $7.60 drawn on the Amer-
ican Emigrant Co. All but one would be prevented from
landing and would be returned to Copenhagen. He in-
structed Cramer to make a rigid inquiry into the case. He
declared that the United States would consider it as an "un-
friendly act" if the King's government should participate
in the practice of sending criminals to America. Although
the Danish representative at Washington, J. Hegerman Lin-
dencrone, had excused the government of Denmark on the
plea that the men had served out their terms and were
therefore like other immigrants, it should be made plain to
Denmark that we were unwilling to have such people come
here.''

Henry B. Ryder, our charge d'affaires, ad interim, reported
another case in 1882. In a letter to the Secretary of State,
F. F. Frelinghuysen, he stated that a certain Mads Jensen,
alias Jorgensen, a criminal from Oldrup, Jutland, was about
to be sent to the United States by the police at Copenhagen.
As there was no time to work through the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, he had written a letter to the chief of police
at Copenhagen, which had prevented the criminal from leav-
ing for America. Later he had presented the matter to the
foreign office, as a result of which this individual case
was ended.

The minister, however, had asked him for an interpreta-

8 J. D. Richardson, op. cit., "Vol. VI, p. 637.

4 Statutes at Large, Vol. XVIII, Pt. Ill, p. 477.

5 Foreign Belations of the United States, 1874-1875, pp. 368-369.

112 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

tion of Section 5 of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1875.*
He had replied that it was not within his province to interpret
or construe acts of Congress as that power belonged to the
courts. In the event of a Danish convict migrating to the
United States, the courts would interpret it in each particular
case. However, the United States would appreciate very
much if the Danish government would prevent convicts from
immigrating to America even if they had served out their
term.^ John Davis, the acting Secretary of State, ans-
wered Ryder's communication and praised him for his dis-
cretion in the Jensen case. He further stated that it was
the duty of every representative abroad to prevent such per-
sons, as well as paupers, from entering the United States,
and that the government would deprecate very much to learn
that any government would aid an undesirable class of its
population to migrate to America.^

Another convict case arose in 1887. Acting Secretary of
State, James D, Porter, wrote in September of that year to
Rasmus B. Anderson, United States Minister Resident at
Copenhagen, that Denmark was still sending ex-convicts to
the United States as soon as they had served their term. He
was informed that they were aided financially by the Danish
government in various ways. Minister Anderson was in-
structed to get all the information he could on the subject."

A month later Anderson replied that the information ob-

« The immigration act of March 3, 1875. "Sec. 5. That it shall be
unlawful for aliens of the following classes to immigrate into the United
States, namely, persons who are undergoing a sentence for conviction
in their own country of felonous crimes other than political or growing
out of or the result of such political offenses, or whose sentence has been
remitted on condition of their emigration, and women 'imported for the
purpose of prostitution.' . . . And for all violations of this act, the
vessel, by the acts, omissions, or connivance of the owners, masters, or
other custodian, or the consignees of which the same are committed,
shall be liable to forfeiture, and may be proceeded against as in cases
of frauds against the revenue laws, for which forfeiture is prescribed
by existing law." Statutes at Large, Vol. XVm, Pt. m, p. 477.
» Foreign Belations of the United States, 188S, p. 251.
8 Tbid., p. 252.
» Ihid., 1888, Pt. I, p. 473.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 113

tained by the foreign office at Washington had probably come
as the result of an article which appeared in the Danish
paper Morgenhladet. From this it appeared that two notorious
swindlers had been released from prison on the condition that
they go to the United States. So far as Anderson was able
to learn the following were the facts in the case. Two men,
Salomansen and Riemenschneider, were engaged in the bus-
iness of book publishing. Being hard pressed for cash,
Riemenschneider, who was an expert engraver, had made
several Danish 1000 kroner notes. The fraud was detected
and both men convicted of counterfeiting and sentenced to
serve a term in the penitentiary. Some time before the ex-
piration of their terms both had been offered their freedom
on the condition that they leave the country forever. Saloman-
sen declined the offer, and was still serving his term, while
Riemenschneider accepted and went to the United States. It
was impossible to tell which way he had gone. Some rumors
had it that he had been sent by one of the Thingvalla steam-
ers while others claimed that he had left by way of Hamburg
or England. At any rate it was quite certain that he had
gone to the United States, probably under an assumed name.

Anderson also stated that during the previous winter he
had heard of paupers being shipped out of the country. Some
of the poor-house boards seemed to think that that was the
cheapest way to get rid of some of their paupers. He added
that it was the custom in many European countries to par-
don convicts on the condition that they leave the country,
but it was left to the convict where he would go. Although
this was a reprehensible practice, it seemed that, if the gov-
ernments would not desist, the United States would have to
be more rigid in her immigrant inspection.^"

There can be no question but that Anderson was right in
charging that other European governments aided their con-
victs to go to the United States. We have already seen that
this was so in Germany. The same thing was true in re-
gard to France.^ ^ and it is clear from the correspondence

10 Jhid, pp. 476-477.

n Ibid., 1887, p. '650 -,1888, Pt. I, pp. 506-507.

114 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

between Secretary of State T. F. Bayard and Rufus Magee,
our representative at Stockholm in 1886, that the same prac-
tice existed in the kingdoms of Sweden and Norway." The
assistance was given, as shown by the German, Danish and
Swedish correspondence, by organizations formed for that
purpose. While the central governments in these countries
were declaring that they were not aware of the practice and
were anxious to assist in preventing it, yet it seems clear
that the work of those organizations, as well as the action of
poor-house boards and prison officials, could not have gone
on without the knowledge of the higher government officials.
France was more honest than the rest. She acknowl-
edged that the practice had been carried on, and when the
United States remonstrated with her, she gave orders to stop
it."

2. The Problem of Extradition.

While the United States insisted that she did not want
Danish convicts, nor those of any other foreign nation, she
also insisted on taking care of her own criminals. In 1878
Secretary of State Evarts wrote to M. J. Cramer at Copen-
hagen that we had extradition treaties with all the European
nations eixcept five, and that Denmark was one of these.
Her peculiar location with her excellent shipping facilities
made it especially desirable that treaty relations should exist
on that subject, as she might otherwise become a rendezvous
for American criminals. Cramer was instructed to sound the
Danish government on the subject and to find out her at-
titude in regard to the matter. He enclosed copies of two
treaties recently made with other governments, which might
be used as models. If Cramer should find that Denmark's
attitude was favorable, the necessary power and instructions
would be sent to him for negotiating the treaty.^"*

Upon inquiry the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs was
found to be favorably inclined towards the proposal. He
stated that he had an "o priori willingness.^' Having been

" Ibid., 1886, pp. 840-844.

" Ibid., 1888, Pt. I, pp. 506-507.

" Tbid., 1879, p. 306.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLO^IACY, 1776-1920 115

given the two models the minister took up the matter with
the other members of the cabinet. He later reportd to
Cramer that Denmark would be willing to make a treaty
with the United States on the subject of extradition but it
would have to differ from the models in three respects:

"First. An increase in the list of crimes, especially under
the head of forgery, but without specifying any particular
crimes;

"Second. To have criminals provisionally arrested by
telegraphic orders to the consuls at the ports where such
fugitives may be supposed to land; and

"Third. The curtailment of expense connected with the
arrest and delivery of fugitives."

Our government suggested to Cramer that he work out a
treaty following the models of Denmark's treaty with Great
Britain and our treaty with Spain of 1877 on the same sub-
ject." When he and the Danish officials had come to an
agreement, he would be given power to sign it.^® The two
parties, however, were unable to agree on the terms. The
President reported to Congress in 1880, "The attempt to
negotiate a treaty of extradition with Denmark failed on ac-
count of the objection of the Danish Government to the usual
clause providing that each nation should pay the expense of
the arrest of the person whose extradition it asks."^'^

Some years later an incident happened which made clear
to both nations the value of a treaty of extradition. In the
fall of 1887 two men, known as John D. Pomeroy and Wil-
liam B. Franks arrived at Copenhagen. Pomeroy stated that
his home was in Montreal while Franks claimed Victoria,
British Columbia, as his place of residence. They made
people believe that they were cattle buyers who had come to
Denmark for pleasure. As the two men did not act like
cattle men, the police became suspicious. Later two scrap-
books were found in their possession which contained a large
number of clippings relating to a "Benson" case. This was

15 For text of the treaty with Spain, see W. M. Malloy, Treaties, etc..
Vol. II, p. 1665.

16 Foreign Belaiions of the United States, 1879, p. 310.

17 J, D. Richardson, op. eit., Vol. VII, p. 609

116 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

brought to the notice of the American minister, R. B. Ander-
son. Upon further investigation, after the two men were ar-
rested, it was found that John D. Pomeroy was really John
A. Benson, a contractor from California, who was under in-
dictment for conspiracy and fraud. He had forged govern-
ment documents to secure extensive land grants. William B.
Franks was a brother of Benson who had accompanied him
as a companion. Personally he was not a criminal except
as an accessory after the fact. Minister Anderson immediately
inquired of the United States government whether Benson
was wanted, stating that Denmark was willing to extradite
him even in the absence of a treaty. The answer of our
government was in the affirmative, but to the message was
added: "Department assumes that Denmark extradites with-
out treaty. It should be understood that under our system
the United States can only extradite when there is a treaty.""
Later, when Secretary Bayard sent the documents needed
for extradition to Anderson, he stated that the extradition
was to be asked as a courtesy of the Danish government,
which on account of existing laws we could not reciprocate.^'
As no indictment existed against the brother of Benson,
he was soon released and sent to the United States on the
S. S. Thingvalla. United States Marshal J. C. Franks of
San Francisco was sent to Denmark to take John A. Benson
and all the papers found in his possession into custody. He
left with his prisoner by way of Bremen on January 30, 1888,
on the S. S. Lahn. Before leaving Copenhagen Franks asked
the Danish authorities to allow a Danish police officer to ac-
company him to Bremen. This request was not granted as
Denmark feared complications with Germany, the laws of
which country prohibited a foreign nation from transporting
a prisoner through its territory without first obtaining per-
mission. An officer, however, was detailed to accompany
him to the German border. The American consul Loening
at Bremen was notified to assist Marshal Franks on German
soil.''"

18 Foreign Belations of the United States, 1888, Pt. I, pp. 479-480.

19 Ihid., p. 481.

20 For the facts of the Benson case, see i^id., pp. 479-483.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 117

It is hardly possible to say that this case caused the two
powers finally to agree on the terms of an extradition treaty.
It may, however, have had its influence. But even if this case
had not come up, it would have been clear to both powers
that such a treaty should exist. During the early part of
Roosevelt's first administration, Secretary John Hay suc-
ceeded in concluding a treaty with Constantin Brun, the
Danish Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at
Washington. This was proclaimed in force on April 17, 1902.
It is very much like the treaty with Spain of 1877 formerly
mentioned. The rock upon which treaty negotiations of 1879-
1880 split was here eliminated by including in Article XI
a provision to the effect that the expenses of extradition
should be borne by the state asking the extradition. "Pro-
vided, that the demanding government shall not be com-
pelled to bear any expense for the services of such public
ofiicers ... as receive a fixed salary; and Provided, that
the charge for services of such public ofiicers as receive only
fees or perquisites shall not exceed their customary fees for
the acts or services performed by them had such acts or ser-
vices been performed in ordinary criminal proceedings under
the law of the country of which they are officers. "^^

In 1905 a supplement was made to this treaty, in which
it was provided that, in case the fugitive should be found
in the island possessions of the contracting parties, located
in America, the extradition papers might be executed by the
chief executive of the islands. In case the fugitive should
be found in island possessions not in America, the applica-
tion for extradition should be made through the diplomatic
channels. The list of crimes for which extradition might be
demanded was also enlarged.^^

21 For the text of the treaty, see W. M. Malloy, Treaties, etc., Vol. I,
pp. 390-394; Statutes at Large, Vol. XXXII, Pt. II, 1906-1913. This is
bi-lingual.

22 For the text of the supplementary treaty, signed by Elihu Eoot and
Constantin Brun, see W. M. Malloy, Treaties, etc.. Vol. I, pp. 395-396.
For a bi-lingual copy, see Statutes at Large, Vol. XXXIV, Pt. Ill, pp.
2887-2889.

118 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

3. The Negotiation of Minor Treaties.

For the sake of facilitating the passage of mail between
the United States and Denmark a postal convention was
negotiated between the nations in 1871.^^ When in 1873 Den-
mark changed her coinage to the present decimal system, a
new schedule of postal rates was worked out, which went
into effect in 1874.^* That same year Denmark and the
United States were both signatories to the "General Postal
Union" treaty signed at Berne, Switzerland, on October 9,
1874.^' The following year a weights and measures conven-
tion was negotiated by the United States with several nations,
Denmark being one of these.^® A mutual and reciprocal
agreement for the exemption of vessels from readmeasure-
ments was made in February 1886.^^ Each nation agreed to
recognize the tonnage stated in the certificate of registry of
vessels entering its ports under the flag of the other nation.
The purpose of this arrangement was to save a great deal of
unnecessary labor in measuring each vessel as it entered, the
result of which would usually be found to be the same as
stated in the registry.

On account of the favorable reputation of American goods
in Denmark, many countries sold their goods to Danish mer-
chants who in turn resold them to the public as American
goods. This was reported by Michael J. Cramer as early
as J.879. He proposed that the United States should have
conventions with other nations to protect American trade-
marks. On the other hand, the United States sold large
quantities of butter to Denmark; and Danish buttermakers
would "rework" and "repack" this butter and sell it to
England. Because of the great reputation of Danish butter
the Danish merchants would receive twice the price they had
paid for it. This practice could not be stopped because
American trade-marks were not protected in Denmark.^® As

»s statutes at Large, Vol. XVH, pp. 903-916.

2* Ibid., Vol. XVin, Pt. ni, p. 832.

28 Ibid., Vol. XIX, pp. 577, 589.

26 Ibid., Vol. XX, p. 709.

27 W. M. Malloy, Treaties, etc., Vol. I, pp. 386-387.

28 Foreign Belations of the United States, 1879, pp. 303-308.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 119

the Danish buttermakers were the masters of the world in
their trade, our representatives in Denmark urged the United
States to secure Danish buttermakers to teach the Americans
how to make better butter.^®

The disregard of American trade-marks in Denmark finally
brought our government to realize that a treaty should be
made to protect our goods. Such a treaty was concluded by
Clark E. Carr and the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Reedtz-Thott, on June 15, 1892. It provided for the reciprocal
protection of trade-marks and trade-labels. The conditions
were that the extent of time on these should be the same
as in the country of their origin, and that the formalities for
filing should be the same as the law provided for domestic
trade-marks.^"' Thus if an American manufacturer wanted to
protect an article under his trade-mark, he would file the
trade-mark with the Danish government in the same fashion
as a Danish manufacturer.

By an act of Congress of March 3, 1891, the President
of the United States was authorized to extend the benefits of
our copyright laws to foreign publications, provided, the
nation of the author gave substantially the same protection
to American publications. As Denmark extended such priv-
ileges to the productions of American authors, reciprocity in
copyrights was proclaimed in May, 1893, by President Cleve-
land."

4. Diplomacy Concerning Trade.

a. The Interpretation of "the Most Favored Nations"
Clause.

By a law of Congress of June 26, 1884, Section XIV, a
tonnage duty of six cents per ton, not to exceed thirty cents
per ton for any one year, was levied on vessels entering
the United States from foreign ports. By the same sec-
tion provision was made that vessels which entered our ports
from Central America, the West India Islands, Bermuda, New-

2» Ibid., 1877, Appendix, pp. 33-36.

80 Wm. M. Malloy, Treaties, etc., Vol. I, p. 389.

81 J. D. Richardson, op. dt., Vol. IX, pp. 395, 443; Statutes at Large,
Vol. XXVIII, p. 1219.

120 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

foundland, and a few other places should only pay a tonnage
of three cents per ton, not to exceed fifteen cents for any
year. By the most favored nations clause in Article 1 of the
Danish American treaty of 1826 it was agreed that neither
nation should grant any favors to a third power which should
not immediately become common to the other party.^^

On the basis of these facts, P. Lovenorn of the Royal
Danish Legation wrote Secretary Bayard in August, 1885,
that Denmark claimed the right of having tonnage duties
on her vessels entering United States ports reduced from six
to three cents. *^ After some delay an answer was received
from the Secretary of State stating that, since several other
nations had made similar claims, the matter had been re-
ferred to the Attorney-General, who had made the ruling that
the law was geographical in its character. Its benefits might
became operative on any vessel of any nation plying between
the privileged regions and the United States. The treaty and
the act of Congress would not warrant a reduction of tonnage
dues on vessels clearing from ports in Denmark for the
United States, but Danish vessels taking part in the trade men-
tioned in the Act of June 26, 1884, woidd be benefited by its
provisions.'* As no further correspondence ensued on the
subject it is probable that the Danish government acquiesced
in the position of the Attorney-General.

Upon inquiry by Secretary Bayard through the Amer-
ican minister at Copenhagen, R. B. Anderson, in regard to
the treatment of American vessels in the Danish ports, it was
learned in a reply from Baron Rosen6rn-Lehn in February,
1888, that United States vessels were treated exactly like
Danish vessels. Denmark would even be willing to open
the coasting trade to the United States on the basis of
reciprocity, the trade with Greenland excepted since all
trade with this Danish colony was reserved exclusively to the
crown.*' It was thus evident that Denmark was extending

32 For the Act of Congress of June 26, 1884, see Statutes at Large, Vol.
XXIII, pp. 53-60, 841-843.

33 Foreign Belations of the United States, 1885, pp. 362-363.

34 Ihid., p. 363.

35 Hid., 1888, Pt. I, pp. 484-485.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 121

the advantages of the most favored nations clause to citizens
of the United States.

In a treaty between the United States and Hawaii of Jan-
uary 30, 1875,^^ it was arranged that sugar from the Hawaiian
islands should be allowed to enter the United States free of
duty. A suit based on this clause was decided in the United
States Supreme Court in 1887. The court in this case, known
as Bartram vs. Robertson, decided that, since Hawaii ex-
tended favors to the United States in the treaty of 1875,
the situation was in reality one of reciprocity. The favor to
Hawaii was thus extended for a compensation. When similar
compensation should be made by Denmark, Danish sugar
from St. Croix might enter free of duty.^'^

By a law of August 3, 1882, Congress levied a tax of fifty
cents on each immigrant "who shall come by steam or sail
vessel from a foreign port within the United States." From
the wording quoted it is evident that the tax did not apply
to anyone coming across the border from Canada or Mexico.
This constituted a privilege to those two countries, according
to the Thingvalla Steamship Line. On the basis of the most
favored nations clause this firm claimed exemption from
the tax and brought suit to recover money that had been
paid as head tax on passengers on the S. S. Geyser. The
ease came up in the Court of Claims. In the opinion de-
livered by Justice Richardson no denial was made in regard
to the claim made by the Danish firm that by the law a
privilege was extended to Canada and Mexico. He claimed,
however, that Denmark could not obtain redress because the
act of 1882 was later than the treaty with Denmark. If Con-
gress saw fit to enact a law the provisions of which were
contrary to an existing treaty that was its privilege and
the act must prevail in the courts of the country.^*

38 W. M. Malloy, Treaties, etc., Vol. I, pp. 915-917.

37 Bartram vs. Robertson, 122 United States, 116-121. For another de-
cision following the same reasoning, see Whitney vs. Eobertaon, 124
United States, 190.

38 For the Immigration Act of 1882, see Statutes at Large, "Vol. XXII,
pp. 214-215; for the decision, see Thingvalla Line vs. United States, 24
Court of Claims, 255-264.

122 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

It seems unfair that, when a treaty haa been made between
two nations, thus forming a contract, one of the nations should
annul a portion of the contract by passing a municipal law.
The most favored nations clause as it appears in most of the
United States treaties is based on reciprocity. This is at
any rate true of the treaty of 1826 with Denmark. When
Congress passes a law which conflicts with the provisions of
existing treaties she thereby abrogates part of the treaty. Yet
this is the practice that our government is following. Says
J. P. Hall of the University of Wisconsin: "Where an act
of the Congress of the United States conflicts with a prior
treaty provision, the courts will give preference to the act
of Congress, for it is not for courts to interfere if the gov-
ernment sees fit to ignore the treaty into which it has
entered."^® This is in agreement with other writers on inter-
national law*" and in harmony with the action of the Supreme
Court."

b. The Problem of American Pork and Meat.

As early as 1883 the German empire tried to persuade
the Danish government to stop the importation of American
pork. Grermany objected to the Danish American pork trade,
as it seems, because a great part of the more than five million
dollars worth of pork exported to Germany was not the prod-
uct of Danish grain-fed, but of American corn-fed, hogs.
The American product was shipped to Denmark where it was
treated by experts, repacked and shipped to Germany as
Danish pork. This was before the trade-mark and trade-label
convention had been concluded between the United States and
Denmark. Germany threatened to cut off all trade in pork
with Denmark if she did not stop buying the American
product.**

This anti-American movement was renewed in 1887 with
much vigor. Germany claimed that several cases of trichinosis
discovered in Hamburg had been caused by eating pork im-

«» James P. Hall, Constitutional Law, pp. 62-63.

*o Charles H. Butler, The Treaty-Making Power in the United States,

Vol. I, pp. 400-401, note.

*i Bottiller vs. DominiEniez, 130 United States, 238.

*a Foreign BeUOions of the United States, 1883, p. 252.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 123

ported from Denmark and claimed to have been an Ameri-
can article. This claim, seems, however, to have been poorly
founded as no case of trichinosis had appeared in Denmark
for two and a half years. Minister Anderson claimed that
the reason the Germans contracted the disease was because
they ate the pork raw while the Danes cooked it thoroughly
before eating.*^

Germany continued to press the issue with the Danish
government. Although the Director General for the Danish
foreign office had stated that Denmark would not exclude
American pork, yet Anderson felt she might have to do so
in order to retain her excellent German market.** Unfortu-
nately at this time the "pork plague" (probably the hog
cholera, or the hoof and mouth disease) started to rage in
Denmark and other European countries. The Germans were
busy spreading the report that the epidemic had come from
America. The theory used "most vigorously" in explaining
how the disease had been conveyed to Europe was to the
effect that the wooden containers in which the American pork
products were shipped contained the germs. Later, when this
lumber was used for building purposes, the European hogs
had been exposed to the contagion. However absurd this
theory may be, it found a large number of adherents.*'

This condition and the German influence finally caused
the Danish Government on March 10, 1888, to issue an order
prohibiting the importation of raw hog products from the
United States until further notice.*" This order remained
in force till 1891 when our minister, Clark E. Carr, suc-
ceeded in getting the Danish government to revoke it, by
promising that a rigid inspection of all meat products from
America would be carried on.*^

For some time following this arrangement Denmark al-
lowed the importation of meat products from America. In

43 Ibid., 1888, Pt. I, pp. 475-476.

« Ibid., pp. 478-479.

*5 Ibid., pp. 478, 480-481, 483.

*6 Ibid., p. 486.

*7 Ibid., 1891, pp. 487-488.

124 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

August, 1894, the Wilson-Gorman tariif was passed, which
provided for a duty of forty per cent ad vol. on sugar imported
into the United States and an additional tariff of
one-eighth and one-tenth of one per cent per pound on sugar
imported from countries where a bonus was paid, either di-
rectly or indirectly, for the exportation of the article.*® It
seems that "in the nature of a retaliation for the tariff im-
posed on her sugar," Germany in November of that year
prohibited the importation of American cattle and meat. As
has been shown before, Germany would be liable to get these
products through Denmark, unless the importation to that
country could also be stopped. Just what pressure she brought
to bear on her small neighbor to the north we cannot say,
but judging from her earlier action and the statements made
later by our representative in Denmark, it was a case of
threat."

Shortly after Germany's action, the Danish minister of
the interior published an order in the official government
newspaper, Berlinske Tidende, prohibiting the importation of
live cattle (Kvceg) and fresh meat from America. The order
stated that the reason for the prohibition was to avoid the
spread of the "Texas fever, now prevailing in America."
When this matter was called to the attention of the Danish
foreign office, Vedel, the Director-General, acknowledged that
he was not aware that such a condition existed in America,
but stated that matters of that kind were left to the Minisfer
of the Interior. The fact that Vedel admitted that he did
not know of the existence of the "Texas fever" in America
lends further weight to the suspicion that the order was
originally "made in Germany."'**

Our representative at Copenhagen, John E. Risley, called
the attention of the Danish government to the fact that the
order used the word Kvceg, which in the Danish language
means not only horned cattle but also hogs and sheep. The

*8 statutes at Large, Vol. XXVIII, p. 521. For the whole act. ibid.,

pp. 509-570.

49 Foreign Belations of the United States, 1894, pp. 205-206; ibid., 1895,

Pt. I, p. 212.

80 Ibid.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 125

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Reedtz-Thott, explained that,
while it was true that the word Kvceg was used in the order,
the Minister of the Interior had promised him that it would
be interpreted as if the word Hornkvceg had been used; thus
the products of hog and sheep might be freely imported, as
well as hermetically sealed canned meats. In October, 1895,
Risley handed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs a copy of the
law of March 2, 1895, which dealt with the handling and in-
spection of cattle and meat, as well as a copy of the rules
and regulations of the Department of Agriculture, and re-
quested that the restrictions be removed entirely. He pointed
out that the American system of inspection was so weU or-
ganized and carried into effect that there was no reason for
Denmark to fear that unfit products would be shipped out.
When Reedtz-Thott had conferred with the Minister of the
Interior on the subject, he reported to Risley that, so long
as Germany retained her present attitude on the subject, it
would be impossible for Denmark to revoke the prohibitive
order. At the end of the century the order was still in
force.^^

c. American Aid to Danish Interests in China.

In 1874 J. Hegerman-Lindencrone, the Danish Minister at
Washington, appealed to Hamilton Fish in behalf of the
Great Northern Telegraph Company of Copenhagen. This
firm had obtained permission from the Chinese government
to built a telegraph line from Woosung to Shanghai. The
local magistrates objected to the existence of the line and
caused considerable trouble. Denmark therefore asked the
United States to use her influence with China so that the
work might be completed.

Secretary Fish promised that he would have our repre-
sentative to China look into the matter and make a report.
Fish also used the opportunity to remind the Danish repre-
sentative that in 1869 the United States had proposed a
telegraphic convention to Denmark^^ but had never received

81 Hid., 1895, pp. 210-213. For the law of March 2, 1895, see Statutes
at Large, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 727-738.

82 The communication is not published.

126 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

a reply. The Danish government later replied to this that
she had sent an answer in May, 1870;" but the communica-
tion, it would seem, failed to reach the American govern-
ment.

Our representative to China, S. Wells Williams, took up
the matter of the Danish telegraph line with the Chinese gov-
ernment. It appears that the Chinese merchants were anxious
to have the line built but the government officials of the
province were prejudiced against it. They finally acquiesced
and the line was completed. Said Williams in reporting to
the State Department: "A good thing is always its own best
argument and vindicator." The Danish government extend-
ed due thanks for the service rendered."*

d. The Petroleum Test Bill.

As the result of a lecture given before the Insurance Com-
panies' Union at Copenhagen, the Danish ministry of justice
caused the Polytechnic Institute to make various experiments
with kerosene. Based on these experiments, this institution
recommended that petroleum which gave off ignitible vapors at
a temperature lower that 23° Celsius under a barometric
pressure of 760 m. m. should not be sold to the public unless
marked as explosives. The current standard was 40° Celsius
under the pressure mentioned. This recommendation was em-
bodied in a bill and laid before the Danish Rigsdag in 1887.
If the bill should pass, it would be a severe blow to Amer-
ican petroleum and a move very favorable to the Russian
product.

The State Department instructed R. B. Anderson to do what
he could through diplomacy to prevent "unfriendly dis-
crimination against our commerce." On account of political
troubles in Denmark, peculiar to her government at that
time, the petroleum bill hung fire for a long time, and finally
was amended in a way more favorable to the United States.
It failed to become a law in the session of the 1887-1888
Rigsdag. From the fact that we hear nothing more about

«» It does not appear what the answer was.

8* Foreign Belations of the United States, 1874, pp. 378-383. For our

correspondence with China about this matter, see ibid., pp. 246-249.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 127

it in the diplomatic correspondence, it is likely that nothing
further was done about the matter.^'

e. The Sugar Tariff.

The Wilson-Gorman tariff act of 1894, as noted above,
levied an extra duty on all sugar imported from countries
where bounties were paid for exportation. Denmark taxed
the manufacture of beet sugar, but in case the sugar was
later exported the tax was refunded. Because of this the
United. States put her on the list with those which gave
bounties for exportation. Count F. Reventlow, the Danish
representative at Washington, remonstrated against this and
explained that the Danish system was not the giving of
bounties but simply exemption from a domestic tax. There
was only one exception to this, namely, on sugar darker than
the Amsterdam standard No. 19. On this kind of sugar there
was a manufacturer's tax of 2.25 ore per pound. One hun-
dred pounds of this sugar would through the refining pro-
cess produce eightly pounds of granulated sugar {melis), ten
pounds of brown sugar (farin), and. seven pounds of molasses
(sirup), while three pounds were lost through evaporation,
in case these products were exported, the government re-
funded 2 kroner and 40 ore on the eighty pounds of melis,
22% ore on the ten pounds of farin, and 7 6re on the seven
pounds of sirup, a total of 2 kroner and 69% ore. Deducting
the tax of 2 kroner and 25 ore, there would remain a bounty
of 44% ore for each one hundred pounds, or 0.556 ore each per
pound of melis. Even this bounty, as a matter of fact, did
not enter into the sugar trade between Denmark and the
United States, because nearly all the sugar sold direct
from Denmark was unrefined. During the years 1889-1893,
no refined sugar had been exported for American consump-
tion, although 2,660 pounds had been shipped for consump-
tion on board of the vessels in which it was shipped. In the
Danish West Indies no bounty system of any kind existed
as there were no refineries there. Under those circumstances.
Count Reventlow asked in behalf of the Danish government

85 Ibid., 1888, Pt. I, pp. 472-475, 486, 487.

128 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

that Denmark be struck off the list of countries offering ex-
port bounties on sugar."®

Secretary of State, W. Q. Gresham, answered Count
Reventlow by stating that a bill was before Congress provid-
ing for the repeal of the differential duty. As soon as more
definite rules were made on the subject he would communicate
them to him. Shortly after, Acting Secretary, Edwin F.
Uhl, informed Reventlow that the Secretary of the Treasury
had ruled that, in view of the explanation of the Danish
bounty system, the collectors of the department had been
given orders to tax only those sugars from Denmark proper
upon which bounties were actually paid when they were ex-
ported.''^

5. Arbitration of the Butterfield Claims.

The leading facts connected with the origin of this case
have been stated in Chapter IV. The claim for $301,814.08,
with accruing interest till the date of payment, was laid
before the Danish government in June, 1860. Hall, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, registered the objections of his
government in a note of August 10, 1860. He argued that,
since there had been a delay of nearly six years in pre-
senting the claims, it would now be very difficult to sub-
stantiate the facts in the case. He also called attention to
the letter of Hebn, dated October 19, 1854, in which he ap-
proved the action of Governor H. H. Berg in requiring a
bond as guarantee that no hostile act would be committed,
and especially to the remark in the same letter that what-
ever may have been the destination of the vessel at the
outset, he was able to give assurance ''that there is now
no hostile intention on the part of the owners or agents of
these vessels towards any government or nation whatever.'"*
This remark by Hebn recognized Governor Berg's motive as
fair, which was to discharge his duty and prevent a hostile

B« Foreign Selations of the United States, 1895, Pt. I, pp. 205-206.

67 Ibid., pp. 206-207. For the Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act, see Statutes

at Large, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 509-570. For the tariff on sugar, Schedule

E, p. 521.

*« For the text of Helm's letter, see Executive Documents, 45 Cong., 3

Sess., Vol. XVI, Doc. 33, pp. 21-22.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 129

expedition from being aided in Danish territory when it was
directed against a friendly state. In regard to the firing on
the Benjamin Franklin, he needed only to say that the Sec-
retary of State, Wm. L. Marcy, had by his action recognized
that the incident had ''arisen out of negligence on the part
of the captain of the vessel." Since therefore all the mea-
sures the Danish government had taken were legal and neces-
sary', the government of the United States could not hold
her responsible for damages.

On account of the outbreak of the Civil War the case was
allowed to be temporarily forgotten. When the war was ended,
William H. Seward in May, 1866, urged the claim on the
Danish government and offered an explanation in regard to
the delay. The first delay had been occasioned by Pickett
and the later delay by Soule, both men being somewhat slow
in getting the necessary documents together. There was, how-
ever, less than four years between the date of ascertaining the
final amount of the damages and the date the claim on which
was put before the Danish foreign office.^''

The argument in favor of the claims was presented to the
American representative in Denmark through Seward by
Lewis and Cox, the attorneys for the claimants. When George
H. Yeaman put the facts before the Danish government he
pointed out that there was no statute of limitation between
nations as between individuals. Said Yeaman: "It will not
be overlooked by His INCajesty's Government that it once,
after a lapse of more than twenty years from the commission
of the acts complained of, made honorable satisfaction of
claims preferred by the Government of the United States in
behalf of citizens injured by those acts."^° The fact that
William L. Marcy had said nothing more about the case,
after he had presented the matter to Torben Bille and re-
ceived his reply in 1856, did not mean that the case was
dropped, so far as the claims for damages was concerned, for
no claims had been presented to Bille. In regard to Helm's
statement, mentioned by Hall, he observed that it should

59 Ibid., pp. 60-65.
80 Ibid., p. 67.

130 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

not be construed to mean that the United States recognized
the vessels as having had an original criminal intent. On the
contrary, an investigation had been held which cleared them of
such suspicion. If Helm's statement was taken to prove that the
vessels had been under suspicion, it must also be taken to
prove that such suspicion no longer existed. In international
affairs a suspicion did not constitute ground for action. Re-
cently a great European power had not deemed it sufficient
reason to detain a vessel even after much proof had been
presented that the vessel was being built for a purpose hostile
to the United States. As Denmark was a nation especially
interested in the just observance of international maritime
law, it was hoped that she would not disregard the justice
of this claim.'*

The Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count E. Juelwind
Frijs, to whom Teaman's letter was addressed, returned a
vigorous answer four months later, declaring that the claim
was outlawed "by the sole fact that it had not been in-
sisted upon in due time {qu'on omis de la faire valoir en
temps utUe).'' But whatever might be said in regard to the
statute of limitation he affirmed that there was another fact
of greater importance: Denmark was unwilling to recognize
the justice of the claims. She had had a duty to perform
towards Venezuela as well as towards the United States. The
vessels were suspected not only by Venezuela and the author-
ities of the Danish West Indies, but also by the United
States government, a fact proved by the inquiry which had
been held before the Catharine Augusta left New York. The fact
that the American government had "discharged the seques-
tration" was no reason why the authorities at St. Thomas
should hold them innocent, for each state was responsible for
its own action and must therefore take its own precaution.
Referring to Teaman's allusion to England's attitude toward
the building of Confederate cruisers, Count Frijs used a
pleasant but effective wit, when he observed: "that the un-
favorable reception which that tolerance of the Government of
Her Brittanic Majesty has found in the Northern States and

81 Ihid., pp. 66-71.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 131

the steps taken by the government of the United Sates to
prevent England from proceeding in a similar manner in the
future, seem to indicate that the Cabinet at Washington have
not been very well satisfied with the great liberty allowed
to the above mentioned ships." In closing he expressed the
hope that the United States might understand the unfairness
of the claims presented and hence pursue the matter no fur-
ther.'^

In the summer of 1869 the United States took up the case
again. The new Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, com-
municated with the Danish charge d'affaires at Washington,
F. de Bille, stating that, since the matter had been pre-
sented twice to the Danish government and each time re-
jected, the matter had taken such form that either one of
the nations would have to give in or else the matter should
be submitted to arbitration. He therefore proposed that the
matter be referred to the British or Russian minister at Wash-
ington and that his decision should be deemed binding.^^

De Bille promised to put the proposition before his govern-
ment but it appears that no answer was received. In April
1874, J. C, B. Davis, Acting Secretary of State, instructed
Michael J. Cramer to put the matter before the Danish gov
emment again.®* When these instructions were carried out,
the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rosenorn-Lehn, stated
that he was very sorry that the United States had pre-
sented the matter again, and that he hoped the proposal for
arbitration might be withdrawn. Through J. Hegermann-
Lindencrone, the Danish representative at Washington, a
formal request was made of the government for the with-
drawal of the proposal for arbitration. Four reasons were
given. First, too long a time had elapsed since the occurrence
of events which had given rise to the claims. Second, many
of the men connected with the events were now dead, for
example, Feddersen, Berg, Castonier and others. Those who
were still living could no longer remember the details. Third,
the American officials, and especially Helm, had agreed that

62 Ihid., pp. 72-74.

63 Ibid., p. 75.

64 Ibid., pp. 75-76.

132 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

the laws of neutrality should be guarded to the satisfaction of
the Danish authorities; and as soon as satisfactory proof had
been presented that the cargo of the Catharine Augusta had
a lawful destination, it was released. Secretary Marcy had
admitted that the shot fired at the Benjamin Franklin was
occasioned by the negligence of the captain. No disrespect
had been shown at the time to the American flag because the
Benjamin Franklin was flying the British colors. Fourth,
every time the Danish government in the past had presented
the whole case in its true light, it had been dropped for a
while; it was not fair to continue to revive the case. It was
contended that as long as there was no true claim there was
nothing to arbitrate. De Bille pointed out that Venezuela
was in the same situation in which the United States gov-
ernment found itself a few years later. A rebellion had
broken out within her borders and her representatives urged
upon the Danish government at St. Thomas, as the United
States did upon England, not to give aid to the rebels. Since
the United States government had successfully demanded dam-
ages from England on account of the Alabama, it was unfair
to hold that the Danish government should have taken the
same stand towards Venezuela that England did to the United
States.^"

Hamilton Fish answered the Danish government through
Michael J. Cramer in a memorandum forwarded soon after
the receipt of Hegermann-Lindencrone 's communication. The
note which was brief and pointed contained the following
arguments in favor of the claims. First, the question of time
was not pertinent as a statute of limitation did not obtain be-
tween nations. Second, the periodic presentation of the
claims was caused by circumstances and could therefore not
be held to invalidate them. Third, the facts in the case were well
established, so that it was of no consequence that witnesses
could not be called. Fourth, admissions by any American
officials could not alter the facts in the case. Fifth, as a
belligerent could not capture arms and ammunition from an
enemy in a neutral port, he could not ask a neutral to do it

65 Ibid., pp. 80-84.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 133

for him.** Cramer sent the memorandum of Hamilton Fish
to Baron 0. D. de Rosenorn- Lehn on August 15, 1874,*^ but
it does not appear that a reply was ever received from the
Danish government.

Several years passed during which no mention was made
of the Butterfield Claims. On May 25, 1878, the House of
Representatives passed a resolution requesting the Secretary
of State to furnish it with a statement and the documents
concerning the claims.*® These were transmitted by the Pres-
ident in January, 1879.*® It does not appear, however, that
anything was done at that time, and for nearly a decade the
case was forgotten.

What occurred to bring up the case again cannot be re-
lated here as the documents have not been published; but
in 1888 the question of arbitrating the Butterfield claims was
taken up in Copenhagen by Rasmus B. Anderson, Minister
Resident of the United States. He succeeded in getting Den-
mark to agree to arbitration. A convention, concluded De-
cember 6, 1888, was ratified by our Senate the next year
in May. It provided in its first article that the claims should
be referred to Sir Edmund Monson, the British representa-
tive at Athens, as sole arbitrator. The second article pro-
vided that duly certified copies of all documents connected
with the case should be furnished by each government to the
arbitrator and that duplicates of the copies presented to him
should be presented to the other government. The time for
filing the documents with the arbitrator should be limited
to seventy days from the day the government received noti-
fication of his acceptance. The expenses, according to the
third article, should be shared equally by the two govern-
ments. The fourth article provided that the two govern-
ments should abide by the decision of the arbitrator and
perform his decree without delay. The fifth and last article
provided for the ratification of the convention.^"

66 Ibid., pp. 85-86.

67 Ibid., p. 87.

«8 Congressional Eecord, 45 Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. VII, Pt. IV, p. 3792.

«» J. D. Richardson, op. cit.. Vol. VII, p. 510.

70 For text of the treaty, see W. M. Malloy, Treaties, etc., Vol. I, pp.

387-388.

134 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Sir Edmund Monson accepted the position as arbitrator/*
On January 22, 1890, he rendered his award, a copy of which
was sent to the Secretary of State, James 6. Blaine. The
arbitrator held that there were no substantial difference in
the representation of facts by the two governments. The
decision would therefore hinge on the interpretation of those
facts. Taking up the contention of the Danish government
that a statute of limitation operated between nations as be-
tween individuals, the arbitrator held that the lapse of time
would not preclude payment if the merits of the case should
prove that compensation ought to be made. It might, how-
ever, be a just cause for criticism by the Danish government.^^
In regard to the question whether there were ligitimate
grounds for suspecting the two vessels, he answered in the
affirmative. It was therefore the duty of the Danish author-
ities to take precautions. As to whether there was reason-
able ground to object to the measures taken by the Danish
authorities, he observed that the facts in the case did not
justify the terms "seizure and detention" used in the Amer-
ican argument. The measures adopted by the authorities of
St. Thomas consisted in demanding a "bond of moderate
amount" and a personal guarantee that, if the vessel were
allowed to be repaired in a Danish port, neither it, nor its
cargo, would be used against a nation friendly to Denmark.
This was necessary in virtue of the Danish law forbidding the
free export of arms. "The ships were in no sense seized
nor detained and the precautionary measures .... were
cheerfully acquiesced in by the consignees and the commercial
agent of the United States." He therefore held that the

71 For the correspondence relative to the extension of the invitation to
Sir Edmund Monson to become the arbitrator in the case, see Foreign
delations of the United States, 1889, pp. 152-158.

72 It is interesting to note here that Sir Edmund Monson disagreed
on this subject with Henry Wheaton when, in regard to the Bergen prize
claims, he stated that a certain time must come when claims become
invalid on account of the lapse of time, and that, if a third party were
to arbitrate the case, the claims would most likely be held invalid as
nearly seventy years had passed since they arose. For Henry Wheaton 's
argumentation, vid. sup. Chapter HI, and Executive Documents, 28 Cong.,
1 Sess., Vol. n, Doc. 264.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 135

measures were reasonable and the United States had no cause
for complaint. As to whether the measures had been kept
in force too long, he observed that the request to reload the
cargo was made on May 7, 1855, and the permission given
shortly afterward/^ There is no evidence that clearance might
not have been obtained earlier had the plaintiff asked for it.
There is therefore no ground to show ''that the precautionary
measures . . . were maintained longer than was necessary."
On the basis of these facts the claims, which were founded
on the precautionary measures of the St. Thomas authorities
taken toward the Benjamin Franklin and the Catharine
Augusta, were disallowed.

The question of the firing on the Benjamin Franklin was
then taken up. The arbitrator held that the chartering of
this vessel by the British steamship company did not in itseK
entitle the vessel to enjoy the privilege of the regular steam-
ers of the company to enter or leave at night without special
permission. Even steamers under the Danish flag did not
enjoy this privilege. "It is clear that the captain of the
Benjamin Franklin neglected to comply with these formal-
ities, and consequently the Danish Government cannot be
fixed with the responsibility of what unfortunately ensued."
From all the facts in the case it was clear ''that neither in
respect to the firing upon the steamship Benjamin Franklin,
any more than in the treatment of that steamer and of her
consort, the Catherine Augusta, is any compensation due from
the Danish government."^*

6. The Mormon Problem.

During the last seventy years regular waves of Mormon
missionary propaganda have swept over Denmark. The first
one came in 1850 when two "Apostles," Snow and Dykes,
arrived from Utah. Snow made Copenhagen his center of

73 As stated in Chapter IV clearance was given to the two ships May
26, 1855, after the proper documents had been presented to the authori-
ties. Executive Documents, 45 Cong., 3 Sess., Vol. XVT, Doc. 33, pp.
63-64.

74 For text of the award, see Foreign Belations of the United States,
1889, pp. 158-160. See also J, B. Moore, International Arbitration, Vol.
II, pp. 1185-1207.

136 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

activity, while Dykes labored around Aalborg in Jutland/'
A few years later the Mormons attempted to establish their
work on the island BornholmJ^ Many of the converts emi-
grated from Denmark to Utah because they could there prac-
tise their newly-embraced doctrines of polygamy. During
the seventies our foreign office inquired of the Danish gov-
ernment what was being done to prevent migration to Amer-
ica for polygamous purposes. The Minister of Foreign Affairs
answered that his government was pleased to know that the
United States was interested in the problem, as Denmark was
powerless in the matter since it was not against Danish law
to join the Mormon church. Furthermore there was no legal
way to stop emigration which had for its purpose a future
state of polygamy, for, according to Danish law, a purpose
which had been given no expression was not punishable.
Therefore, the only way to put a stop to Danish Mormon
emigration was to stop polygamy in Utah, — ^that would re-
move the condition which aided the propagation of the Mor-
mon faith in European countries.^^

In May, 1897, John E. Risley received a petition from C.
N. Lund, president of the Scandinavian Mission of the
Mormon Church, requesting the intervention of the American
representative in behalf of two Mormon missionaries, American
citizens, who had been expelled from Denmark because they
preached Mormon doctrines. He claimed that they had not
preached polygamy and that therefore they had not broken the
law of the land. Risley was uncertain how to act, hence he
wrote to Washington for instructions. These were sent in
July of the same year and were to the effect that, if any
doctrines were preached which were contrary to the laws of
Denmark, the Mormon missionaries could not expect Amer-
ican protection. If, however, they were "law-abiding and
moral teachers, they should have equal treatment with other
propagandists. ' '^*

75 Hansen og Olsen, De DansTce Baptisters Eistorie, pp. 74, 91.

76 Ibid., p. 111.

77 Foreign Belations of the United States, 1880, pp. 346-347.

78 Ihid., 1897, pp. 121-124. It does not appear from the correspondence
what Risley did for the Mormons.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 137

In March, 1900, the Mormon question came up again be-
cause the Danish government banished two Mormon mission-
aries. They appealed to Laurits S. Swenson, the American
representative at Copenhagen, for protection. He succeeded
in getting the foreign offtce of Denmark to stay the execu-
tion of the decree of banishment, which had been issued by
the Minister of Justice. An investigation was held concerning
the work of the two missionaries, which revealed that they
had done nothing contrary to law but had been banished for
preaching Mormonism in general. It was shown by several
affidavits that polygamy was no longer a tenet of Mormonism.
The American minister therefore asked the Danish govern-
ment to revoke its decree of banishment. He received the
reply that, since the United States in 1879 and 1881 had re-
quested Denmark to prevent the migration of Mormons to
the United States and since the emigration records showed
that a large number of people of the Mormon faith had been
migrating to Utah to the detriment of the Danish state, the
order could not be revoked. A month's stay of the execution
of the decree was, however, granted.'^®

Since 1900 the Mormon question has caused very little
trouble as the Danish government has become more liberal on
the subject.*" Perhaps the fact that polygamy has disap-
peared in the United States has done its part to remove the
problem.

7. The Status of the American Representative to Denmark.

Denmark has followed the principle of keeping the rank
of her representatives to foreign countries as low as pos-
sible. This was generally done for economic reasons. It was
the custom of the United States to give a representative to
a foreign country the same rank which that nation's repre-
sentative held in Washington. Consequently our representa-
tive at Copenhagen held a rank very low compared with the
size of the nation he represented. This was humilating to
our representative for two reasons. Since his rank in the
diplomatic service was low, his salary was very small. At a

78 Foreign Belations of the United States, 1900, pp. 413-422.
80 Ibid., 1901, pp. 140-141.

138 IOWA STUDIES IN TKE SOCIAL SCIENCES

time when the representatives of the larger European na-
tions at Copenhagen were paid $25,000 a year, our repre-
sentative received only $5,000. Unless he was wealthy he
was unable to take part in the court affairs and the social
functions of the diplomatic corps. On the other hand, our
representative felt humiliated when on various official occa-
sions, because of his low rank, he would have to wait till the
representatives of very small countries, holding high diplo-
matic ranks, had finished their business at the foreign office.

During the early part of the nineteenth century our rep-
resentative in Denmark had held the rank of charge d'affaires.
During the seventies he was styled Minister Resident and his
salary was $7500.*^ In the latter part of that decade his rank
was changed again to charge d'affaires and his salary reduced
to $5000.*^ In 1883 the rank was again changed to Minister
Resident and the office of Consul-General was added, but
the salary continued at $5000.*' Thus it remained for sev-
eral years. On account of this condition Rasmus B. Anderson
recommended to the foreign office that the rank should be
raised to Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary,
that the salary should be raised to $7500, and that there should
be no secretary at the legation,**

In spite of this recommendation nothing had been done in
1889 when Anderson left Copenhagen and Clark E. Carr
took his place. The new minister found it even harder to
get along on the small salary than his predecessor, for he had
his family with him while Anderson had left his in the United
States.*"' In 1890 the matter was brought before Congress by
Senator John Sherman who was in favor of adopting An-
derson's recommendations. Consequently the rank was changed
and the salary raised by a law of July 14, 1890, to $7500.*'

<Ji Statutes at Large, Vol. XVIII, Pt. II, p. 67.

82 Ibid., Vol. XIX, p. 170.

83 Ihid., Vol. XXII, p. 128.

8* Senate MiscelUmeous Documents, 51 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. II, Doc. 135,

pp. 1, 2.

85 Ibid., pp. 3-4.

«« Ibid., pp. 5-6; SUitutes at Large, Vol. XXVI, p. 272; Congressional

Becord, 51 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. XXI, Pt. VIII, p. 7264. For full record

of the bill in Congress see ibid., Index p. 428, House Bill 9603.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 139

In 1892 a rumor reached Denmark, that the American le-
gation would be discontinued. Carr informed the Secretary
of State that this rumor seriously hampered negotiations with
Denmark in regard to the World's Fair.*^ The rumor, how-
ever, was either unfounded or the threat was not carried
out. By a law of February 22, 1907, the salary of our repre-
sentative to Denmark was raised to $10,000,^^ at which figure
it still remains.®®

87 Senate Miscellaneous Documents, 52 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. V, Doe. 127.

88 Statutes at Large, Vol. XXXIV, Pt. I, p. 917.

89 Ibid., Vol. XL, Pt. I, p. 1326. In 1895 the United States sought and
obtained permission from the Danish government for the Peary Belief
Expedition to land in Greenland. Foreign Belations of ithe United
States, 1895, pp. 207-210. The same year complaints were made through
F. Eeventlow, the Danish minister at Washington, that American cattle
shippers were in the habit of securing Danish citizens as helpers on
board the cattle boats and leaving them destitute in foreign ports. Secre-
tary of State Gresham answered that, although the practice was de-
plorable, nothing could be done to remedy the situation at present be-
cause of the lack of appropriate laws under which to prosecute the
shippers. Ihid., p. 214.

CHAPTER VII

RECENT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND DENMARK, 1900-1920

The events of the last twenty years are so recent that they
have scarcely become history. Were it not for one out-
standing incident, this period would be left for the historian
of the future. That event is the purchase by the United
States of the Danish West Indies in 1916-1917. Before tak-
ing up this subject, however, a few minor matters which have
occurred during the twentieth century will be mentioned.

1. Reciprocal Protection of Industrial Designs.

According to the laws of the United States, industrial de-
signs and models made by aliens residing in another country
are protected by our government only when that country ex-
tends reciprocity in protecting the designs and models patent-
ed in the United States. When the proper conditions exist,
the President of the United States is empowered, by procla-
mation, to extend protection to foreign patents.^

In accordance with this law the Danish Envoy at Wash-
ington, Constantin Brun, notified the State Department on
June 8, 1906, that under the law of April 1, 1905, Denmark
had granted protection to American industrial designs and
models on the basis of reciprocity. He therefore requested
that the necessary promulgation be made by the United States
and promised that a corresponding promulgation would be
made in Denmark.^ The promulgations were made in due
order, by the United States on June 22, 1906, and by Den-
mark on August 14, 1906."

2. Reciprocal Protection for Trade-Marks in China.

1 statutes at Large, Vol. XXXII, Pt. I, pp. 1225-1227, law of March 3,
1903.

2 W. M. Malloy, Treaties, etc.. Vol. I, p. 396.

8 Ibid., p. 397. For the Danish promulgation in the Danish language,
see ibid., p. 398.

140

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 141

A similar arrangement was made in 1904. The Danish
government acting through Brun requested the United States
to protect Danish trade-marks duly registered in America
against infringement by our citizens in China. Reciprocally,
the Danish government would protect American trade-marks,
duly registered in Denmark, against infringement by Danish
citizens in China, by causing violators to be brought before
the Danish consular court at Shanghai and punished in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the laws of Denmark, dated
April 11, 1890, and December 19, 1898, and of the Royal
Ordinances, dated September 28, 1894, and September 12,
1902. He also requested that the arrangement be made effec-
tive by an exchange of notes.

The State Department responded soon after and expressed
its willingness to enter into such an agreement, as we already
had similar agreements with other nations. It was pointed
out, however, that we had no law making the infringement of
a trade-mark a criminal offense, but that effective provisions
existed by which damages might be obtained by civil action.
The Danish government accepted this condition and instruc-
ted its consul at Shanghai to act against violators accordingly.
The United States representative at Peking was instructed
to inform our consular agents in China to protect the Danish
trade-marks in their courts according to the agreement.*

3. Payment of the Samoan Claims.

In a treaty between the United States, Germany and
Great Britain in regard to Samoa, signed November 7, 1899,
it was provided (Article III) that claims arising as a result
of the warlike operations at Apia should be paid jointly by the
United States and Great Britain. Danish subjects presented
a claim for $2700 for the "destruction of live stock, injury
to houses, fences, plantations, tanks, and the destruction of
furniture and other effects." Two agents were appointed to
investigate the claims. C. J. B. Hurst served for Great
Britain and R. Newton Crane for the United States. They
found that the value of the material destroyed was exaggerated,

4 For text of the correspondence on thia subject, see W. M. Malloy,
Treaties, etc., Vol. I, pp. 399-401.

142 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

and on December 6, 1905, rendered a decision that $1520
should be paid by the two governments,' By a law of January
30, 1906, the share of the United States, amounting to $760,
was allowed to the Danish claimants.*

4. Arhitration Conventions.

In agreement with Article XIX of the Hague Convention
of 1899^ to which the United States and Denmark were sig-
natories, an arbitration treaty was concluded at Washington
on May 18, 1908, by Acting Secretary Robert Bacon and
Constantin Brun. It provided that matters of a legal nature
and questions relating to the interpretation of treaties failing
to be settled by diplomacy should be referred to the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, provided they
did not involve "the vital interests, the independence, or the
honor of the two Contracting States, and do not concern
the interests of a third party." It was further agreed that
before any case was put before the court a special agree-
ment should be concluded "defining clearly the matter in
dispute, the scope of the powers of the arbitrators, and the
period to be fixed for the formation of the Arbitral Tribunal
and the several stages of the proceedure." These preliminary
agreements should be satisfied in due form. This convention
was to last for a period of five years.* It does not appear
that any case ever arose under its provisions.

During the early years of Woodrow Wilson's administra-
tion, his Secretary of State, William J. Bryan, concluded a
series of conventions "for the advancement of the cause of
general peace."* One of these was concluded with Denmark
on April 17, 1914, and was signed by Secretary Bryan and
Constantin Brun. It provided that disputes which should

» Senate DocumenU, 59 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. IV, Doc. 160.
« Statutes at Large, Vol. XXXIV, Pt. I, p. 635.

For the Samoan treaty, see ibid.. Vol. XXXI, pp. 1875-1877.

7 W. M. Malloy, Treaties, etc.. Vol. 11, p. 2023.

8 American Journal of International Law, October 1908, pp. 335. ff.
For text of the treaty, see W. M. Malloy, Treaties, etc., Vol. I, pp. 401-
402.

» For the index to Bryan's treaties for the advancement of general
peace, see Statutes at Large, Vol. XXXVIII, Pt. II, p. 2299.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 143

fail to be adjusted by diplomacy should be submitted to an
International Commission of five members. "One member
shall be chosen from each country, by the Government there-
of; one member shall be chosen by each Government from
some third country; the fifth member shall be chosen by
common agreement between the two Governments." Neither
country should declare war nor begin hostilities while the
work of the commission was going on. The two governments
pledged themselves to "endeavor to adjust the dispute directly
between them upon the basis of the Commission's finding."
The treaty was to remain in force for five years and further
until twelve months after one of the parties had given
notice of its termination.^"

5. The Purchase of the Danish West Indies.

The attempt made by President Lincoln and William H.
Seward to purchase the islands of St. Thomas and St. John,
as noted in Chapter V, ended in failure largely for political
reasons. The refusal of the Senate to ratify the treaty, which
had originated in this country, left the United States gov-
ernment in a peculiar situation. As the Monroe Doctrine is
generally interpreted, the United States would oppose the
transfer of the islands to another European country. It was
the good fortune of the United States, therefore, that Den-
mark was not very anxious to get rid of the islands. Had
she decided, after the Senate's refusal to ratify the treaty,
to transfer the islands to some European power, say Ger-
many, it seems that our government would either have had
to acquiesce or change its mind on the question of purchase.

The unsuccessful transaction of the sixties had a peculiar
influence on the inhabitants of the islands. The plebiscite
had shown that they were all in favor of the transfer. The
action of the Senate cruelly disappointed the islanders and
left them restless and discontented. They had hoped for
much improved conditions under the government of the United
States. The people, whether Caucasian or Negro, had very
little in common with Denmark. Even the language used
was English, although the official language was Danish. Men

10 Ibid., pp. 1883-1885.

144 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

who were far-seeing realized that the purchase of the islands
by the United States at some future date was inevitable."

The question of the transfer of the islands came to the
front again and again until the purchase was finally con-
summated. It was a constant temptation for Denmark to
sell the West India possessions because the sale might bring a
neat sum of money into the Danish treasury. Added to this
was the fact that the islands were a financial burden to the
mother country, while both Germany and Great Britain were
willing to purchase them and were in every way better
equipped to take care of them.

In 1874 a rumor reached the United States that Germany
was trying to negotiate a treaty with Denmark by which
Danish Schleswig, which Prussia had taken by force in 1864,
was to be re-ceded to the mother country for the island of
St. Thomas. Secretary Fish instructed Michael J. Cramer
to discover whether there was any truth in the rumor. Cramer
reported that the charge d'affaires of the German Empire
at Copenhagen (the regular minister being absent) had stated
positively that the rumor was unfounded. George Bancroft,
our representative at Berlin, stated that he had assurances
from the German government that no negotiations were in
progress and that it would not accept the Danish islands as
a gift. He added, however, that the decision on the Alabama
claims had shown the German naval authorities how weak
would be their position in case of a war, and that they were
anxious to obtain coaling stations in various parts of the
world. It seems that Hamilton Fish was not convinced for
he gave orders to our representatives abroad to be watchful
in case any negotiations of that character should occur."

The dissatisfaction of the people of the Danish West
Indies came to a head in October, 1878, when a revolt broke
out in St. Croix as the result of a reduction in wages when
the laborers asked for an increase. A riot was started in
which forty-three sugar plantations were destroyed, the
damages amounting to $1,100,000. About one-half of the
town of Fredericksted was burned to the ground, and only

11 The Nation (1869), Vol. VHI, pp. 248-249.

12 Foreign Eelations of the United States, 1874, pp. 368, 439-440.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 145

with difficulty was the riot finally quelled.^^ During the
following winter a commission of three was sent from Den-
mark to investigate the conditions. The report of this com-
mission was very gloomy. The Minister of Finance had a
measure introduced in the Rigsdag to the effect that the gov-
ernment should make temporary loans to the sufferers.^*

After 1867 conditions in the Danish West Indies had grown
worse year by year. Before that date the islands had been
able to furnish money for their own government expenses
and even at times to pay money into the state treasury. The
sugar export from St. Croix had decreased from 15,000 hogs-
heads in 1865 to 3,800 in 1878. When introducing the bill for
financial aid to the islands, the Minister of Finance said: "it
is high time a final determination should be reached as to
the exact position to be assumed by the mother country toward
these islands, for the present state of things is no longer
tenable.""

It is not surprising that under the circumstances a rumor
should arise again that Denmark was trying to sell the
islands.^® The State Department instructed Michael J. Cramer
to inquire into the report, inasmuch as we could not regard
with indifference their transfer to any European power. The
reply of the Danish government was to the effect that no
negotiations were under way, but that the islands were
suffering greatly and England would be better able to take
care of them. Just what England would do was not known
to Denmark.^^ It would seem that both at this time as well
as in 1874 there was some truth in the rumor in spite of
official denials.

For more than ten years the matter rested, but in 1892,
when Clark E. Carr visited Jacob Estrup, the Danish Prem-
ier, to obtain copies of the Icelandic books containing the
sagas of the discovery of America by the Northmen for the

13 Ibid., 1878, pp. 160-161; Ibid.,

" Ihid., 1879, p. 307.

15 Ibid., 1880, p. 345.

i« Ibid., 1879, pp. 308-309.

17 Ibid., 1879, pp. 308-309, 311.

146 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Columbian Exposition at Chicago, the conversation accidentally
turned to the unsuccessful treaty of 1867. Estrup made the
statement that, while Denmark was not seeking a buyer for
the islands, she would be willing to consider a proposal by
the United States. Later the same opinion was expressed by
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Reedts-Thott. Premier
Estrup authorized Carr to mention the matter to his govern-
ment, in writing to the State Department about this, Carr
showed that Denmark was not in financial difficulties, but
that various improvements which she intended to make might
become a reality if money could be obtained."

Although Carr's correspondence did not elaborate upon the
term "improvements," except to mention the re-erection of
Christiansborg Castle which had burnt to the ground in 1884,
there can be very little doubt in the minds of those that know
the history of Denmark during this period. For years the
conservative or Hojre party had been in favor of a policy of
military fortifications at certain strategic points, especially at
the capital, Copenhagen. This was opposed by the liberals or
Venstre. The Hojre party had a majority in the aristocratic,
appointive, upper house of the Rigsdag, known as the
Landsthing, but (after the election of 1884) could only count
on twenty out of one hundred and two members in the
lower house, or Folkething. It was therefore impossible for
the conservatives to carry any measure proposed. When
the conservative administration under the leadership of the
Premier Jacob Estrup attempted to carry through their
cherished plans, the liberals under the leadership of Kristen
Berg blocked them by refusing to allow money for the ordinary
government expenses. This was done the first time when the
Rigsdag failed to pass the finance bill for the fiscal year, April
1, 1877, to March 31, 1878. The King, therefore issued a
royal ordinance, which provided for the raising of money
without the consent of the Rigsdag. This action, of course, was
unconstitutional and had to be enforced by gendarmes who
patrolled the country to prevent rioting. The royal ordinance
continued in force for many years as neither the Hojre nor

18 House Documents, 57 Cong., 1 Bess., Vol. XLVIII, pp. 2795-2797.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 147

the Vensire party was willing to give way.^® It is natural
that under these circumstances Estrup might wish to raise
money for the administration's program through the sale of
the Danish West Indies.

A short time after the suggestion was made to Clark E.
Carr, a new political party got into control at Washington
and, somewhat later, Jacob Estrup was succeeded in the
premiership by Reedtz-Thott, who by wise concessions was
able to compromise with the liberals and obtain money through
constitutional means.^° Consequently the question of the trans-
fer of the islands was lost sight of for the time being, although
John W. Foster had sent a telegram to Clark E. Carr on
February 4, 1893, instructing him to go ahead with the ne-
gotiations.^^

In January, 1896, the new representative at Copenhagen,
John E. Risley, wrote to Secretary of State Richard Olney
that the New York papers had aroused much comment in
Copenhagen by stating that negotiations were in progress for
the sale of the islands, and that, if the United States did
not buy the islands, Germany would. Risley asked the Di-
rector General of Foreign Affairs concerning the truth of the
report. The latter stated that the rumor was not true but
that Denmark would be willing to sell the islands. Since the
defeat of the treaty of 1867 in the United States Senate,
Denmark surely would not take the official initiative in re-
opening the question. If the United States should make a
proposition, it would receive courteous consideration.^^

It does not appear that the Democratic party was in favor
of the purchase, since nothing was done during Cleveland's
administration. The Republican partj^, however, seemed to be

18 For the text of the royal ordinance and the early part of the party
struggle, see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1877, pp. 119-124.
For fuller accounts of the parliamentary struggle in Denmark from
1875-1901, see Cambridge Modern History, Vol. XII, 292-293; Frederick
A. Ogg, Governments of Europe, pp. 559-568; E. N. Bain, Scandinavia,
pp. 428-431.

20 Hid.,

21 Hmise Documents, 57 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. XLVII, pp. 2797-2798.

22 Ihid., pp. 2798-2799.

148 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

favorable to the idea. In its national platform of 1896 there
was a plank favoring the purchase of the islands in order
to obtain a naval station in the West Indies.2^ Thus, the
party had reversed intself on the subject since the days of
Charles Sumner. Speeches were made and articles written by
men in favor of the purchase, and Charles Sumner and his
associates were taken to task for their shortsightedness.^* It
was natural, then, that the Republicans should attempt to
purchase the islands. But before a definite treaty was made
a little episode took place which deserves to be mentioned.

It appears that a Danish naval officer, known as Walter
Christmas,^" who had been courtmartialed and dismissed from
the service, conceived the idea of recovering his social stand-
ing by leading a movement to sell the Danish West Indies
to the United States. He also hoped to restore his wasted
fortune by obtaining a commission of ten per cent for the
sale.^^. In December, 1899, he succeeded in getting into per-
sonal touch with President McKinley, who referred him to
John Hay, the Secretary of State. Hay seemed interested
and gave Christmas a letter of introduction to the American
Ambassador at London. The Danish Envoy at Washington
and the American representative at Copenhagen knew nothing
about the work of Christmas. Christmas and Henry White,
the secretary of the American Legation at London, went to
Denmark to negotiate the sale with the Danish officials. Ravn,
the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, was much surprised
to learn what was going on. While he treated White very
courteously, he flatly refused to admit Christmas to his office.
Christmas, however, appealed to the Danish Premier and used
effectively John Hay's letter of introduction. As a result he
finally gained admittance to the foreign office. He was
assisted in the negotiations by three other Americans, Niels
Gron, Henry H. Rogers, and Charles R. Flint, Christmas

»8 Beview of Beviews, Vol. XVII, p. 549.

*•• W. M. Jones, "Two Great American Treaties," Beview of Beviews,

Vol. XVn, p. 560.

25 His full name was Walter Christmas Dirchinck Holmfeldt. House

Beports, 57 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. IX, Doc. 2749, pp. 1-2.

«« The Nation, Vol. LXXV, p. 340.

DANISH- AMEBIC AN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 149

informed the Danish officials that he could negotiate a sale
for the islands, but that money would be needed to carry
the treaty through the United States Senate. "When this was
brought out, Denmark refused to carry the matter any further
and the affair was dismissed.^^

During Roosevelt's first administration the Danish repre-
sentative at Washington, Constantin Brun, and John Hay
susceeded in negotiating a treaty for the transfer of the is-
lands to the United States for $5,000,000. This treaty was
ratified by the Senate and by the Danish Folkething, the low-
er house of the Rigsdag, but was rejected by the Landsthing,
the upper house of that body. It is generally conceded, or
at least believed, that the defeat was due to German influence.^®

For some time the question of purchasing the Danish West
Indies rested. Meantime, economic conditions were getting
worse in the islands and the population was decreasing.^^ The
approaching completion of the Panama Canal made it still
more desirable for the United States to possess a good harbor
in the West Indies. From the standpoint of location the
harbor at St. Thomas was the best in existence. It was
therefore natural that the question of purchasing the islands
would arise again.

The outbreak of the war in 1914 and the fact that it was
believed that Germany would make a strong bid for the
Danish West Indies, if she should come out victorious in the
World War, were perhaps the main reasons why negotiations
were renewed for the purchase of the islands. A treaty was
concluded between the two powers in the city of New York
on August 4, 1916, and signed by Robert Lansing for the
United States and by Constantin Brun for Denmark. The

27 The Nation, Vol. LXXV, p. 320; North American Beview, CLXXV,
pp. 500-505. In the spring of 1902 the whole affair was investigated
and proved to be a scheme of Walter Christmas and his associates. See
the "Richardson Investigation," House Reports, 57 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol.
IX, Doc. 2749.

28 The Nation, October 30, 1902, Vol. LXXV, pp. 340, 393; Congressional
Beoord, 64 Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. LIV, Pt. IV, pp. 3647-3651. For full
text of the treaty of 1902, see House Documents, 57 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol.
XLVII, p. 2788.

29 The Nation (1903), Vol. LXXVI, p. 283.

150 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Senate ratified the treaty on September 7, 1916. The ex-
change of ratifications took place on January 17, 1917, and the
formal transfer of the islands was made on March 31, 1917, at
which time the purchase price of $25,000,000 was paid to the
Danish Envoy at Washington/"

Besides the customary articles in treaties of this type pro-
viding for cession and payment. Article III mentions a large
number of grants, concessions and licenses which the Danish
government had granted various firms. These are guaranteed
to remain inviolate under the government of the United States.
The question of the Danish National Church in the islands
became the subject of separate notes exchanged between the
two governments on January 3, 1917. The arrangement here
made was that the islands might be put on the same basis in
regard to religion as that guaranteed by the Constitution of
the United States.^^

In conformity with the Danish constitution, the treaty
had to be ratified by the Rigsdag. Before the subject was
taken up in that body for discussion, the administration
caused a plebiscite to be held in the islands which turned out
to be overwhelmingly in favor of the transfer.'* The question
was also put before the people of the home country in order
that the Rigsdag might learn public opinion in regard to the
matter. The date set for the election was December 14, 1916.
The liberal students of Denmark, backed by the administration
and the Copenhagen newspaper Politiken, led the movement
in favor of the sale. They argued that Denmark should con-
centrate her attention on her northern colonies, Greenland,
Iceland and the Faero islands, and get rid of the unprofitable
West Indies. The conservatives, backed by the Nationaltidende,
another Copenhagen newspaper, held that Denmark should not
part with any of her territory.'* During the week of De-

80 statutes at Large, Vol. XXXIX, pp. 1706-1717.

81 Ibid., pp. 1716-1717.

82 Congressional Beoord, 64 Cong., 2 Seas., Vol. LIV, Pt. VT, p. 697.
33 Politiken, December 4, 7, 14, 1916. Practically everj- issue of Politiken
from August 1 to December 28, 1916, contains articles dealing with the
sale of the islands. On December 7, 1916, the paper issued a supplement
edited by the Radical Students' Association. This contained statements

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 151

cember 6-12, 1916, great massmeetings were held in twenty-
five strategic points in different parts of the kingdom. These
meetings were under the leadership of the radical students
who spoke vehemently against the "unsound sentimentalism"
of the conservatives.** The fact that since the treaty was
made and ratified by the United States a very destructive
cyclone had passed over the islands and destroyed close to
a million dollars' worth of property was also used effectively
by the pro-sale element.*^

When the election returns were complete, it was found that,
out of 1,250,000 voters in the kingdom, only 441,290 had used
the ballot. Of these about 283,000 were in favor of the sale
and the rest against it. From this the conservatives drew the
conclusion that, as only one-fifth of the voters had expressed
themselves in favor of the sale, the West Indies should be
retained. The conclusion, however, might fairly be reached
that the election showed that the people in general did not
care a whit whether the islands were sold or retained. On
December 20, 1916, the Folkething voted 90 to 16 in favor
of the sale, and the following day the Landsthing followed
with a favorable vote of 40 to 19. The King signed the
treaty on December 22, 1916** As stated above, the transfer
was completed three months later. Thus was completed a trans-
action which was surely beneficial to Denmark and, we trust,
will not be regretted by the United States.*^ At the time the
transfer took place, the United States Congress had already
passed an act providing for a temporary government as well
as for the payment of $25,000,000 to Denmark.*^

by every member of the Council for the Colonies, who were all in favor
of the sale. See Tillceg til Politiken, December 7, 1916.

34 Ibid.

35 The cyclone struck the islands October 9-10, 1916. Politiken, Decem-
ber 7, 1916.

36 Politiken, December 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 1916.

37 For a brief history of the Danish West Indies, see House Documents,
57 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. XL VII, pp. 2765 ff; Congressional Beoord, 64
Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. LIV, Pt. VI, pp. 694-697. For a more complete
history of the islands, see Waldemar Westergaard, The Danish West
Indies, 1671-1917.

38 Statutes at Large, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. I, pp. 1132-1134.

APPENDICES
APPENDIX A

An extract of a letter from Andreas Peter Bernstorff to Ditlev
Reventlow, dated Copenhagen, December 27, 1777.

"Si 1 'ind6pendance de I'Am^rique septentrionale n 'avert pas d'autres
suites que de mettre des bomes a 1 'ambition des Anglois et de les
mettre hors d'6tat d 'usurper 1 'empire tyrannique sur les mers, je la
regarderois comme un bonheur, et je n'aurois pas besoin d 'arguments
pour m'en consoler, mais quand je pense aux difficultes qu'il y aura
de soutenir alors nos possessions dans ces parages 61oign6s, la diminution
du commerce de la Baltique, le danger que la peche de Groenlande, si
voisne de l'Am6rique, ne pent que courir, la rivalit6 pour toutes les
productions du nord en g6n6ral et la superiority que la France re-
prendra des 1 'instant que I'Angleterre cessera de la lui disputer, alors
je ne puis que m'inquieter, et pr6voir, un avenir rempli de doutea et
d 'incertitudes. L'Angleterre se propose certainment de se stipuler,
meme en reconnoissais 1 'ind^pendance de ses colonies, des avantages
dans la commerce suffisants pour faire entrer les produits de I'Am^rique
et surtout le tabac dans sa proper balance, mais cette ressource lui
sera encore vivement contest^e. Je soubgonne qu'il existe d6jk un
traits de commerce entre le congres et al France, qui asseure k celle-ci
des avantages futurs decisive, et si mes conjectures sent fonde&s, je
crains que ce sera \k le germe d'une guerre presque certaine, que
I'Angleterre poussera jusque h son triomphe ou jusques k son
an^antissement parfait. L'emprunt de 25 millions que la France vient
d'ouvrier, est uniquement destine aux d^penses que le retablissement de
sa marine exige.''^

APPENDIX B

An extract of a letter from A. P. Bernstorflf to the Council of State,
dated March 17, 1780.

"Wachsen Uns vielleicht durch die Unabhangigheit von America
solche Vortheile zu, die Uns wegen aller iibrigen zubesorgenden Folgen
schadlos halten kdnnten? Nein! gerade das Gegentheil. Ea ist kein
eintziger Staat von Europa, Engelland selber nicht ausgenommen, fiir
den diese Unabhangigheit so drohend und so nachtheilig ist, als fiir
Dannemark; und es ist Pflicht fiir mich, die Hauptbeweise dieses von
mir langst behaupteten Satzcs anzufiihren.

1) Es is eine Unmoglichheit fiir Dannemark seine Colonien, die als

1 Aage Friis, Bematorfftke Papirer, Vol. Ill, pp. 541-542.

152

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 153

Zuckerinseln ein besonderer Gegenstand des Neides der Nordamerieaner
sind, gegan kiinftige Angriffe derselben zu vertheydigen.

2) K6nnen wir verschiedene producten dieser lender, als z. E. des
Reises, Tobaeks, und Indigo nicht ganzlich entbehren, haben aber
selber keine, die innen niitzlich seyn kfinnten und zum Tausche dienlich
waren; miissen sie also mit baarem Gelde oder mit Zucker bezahlen.

3) Sind sie in Anaehung aller unseser zur Ausfuhr dienlichen Wahren,
fast ohne Ausnahme, unsere BivaJe: Insonderheit was das Korn, daa
Holz, und was noch bedenklicher ist, die Fiseherey betrifft. Ja sie
haben in Ansehung des Wallfish .... wegen ihre Lage solche
natiirliche Vortheile, dass so bald sie nicht mehr werden bezwungen
seyn, diese Ihre Wahren nach Engelland zu fiihren sondem nach alle
Markte und Hafen von Europa bringen Konnen sie Uns ohnfehlbar von
denselben ganzlich ausschliessen werden

4) Wird durch ihre directe Earth nach den Hafen der Mittel-
landische See, der Handel mit den production der an dem Ostsee
belegenen Lander, dergestalt fallen, dass der ZundzoU so betrachtlich
leiden wird, dass der Schade wohl vorausgesehen, aber gewiss nich
berechnet werden kann "2

APPENDIX C

The treaty to which the Danish diplomat referred in his negotiation
with Franklin was that between Charles II of England and Frederick
III of Denmark. It was concluded February 13, 1660, Old Style,
or February 23, 1661, New Style. Article V reads as follows:

"Concordatum quoque est, quod neuter praedictorum Regum alterius
inimicos seu rebelles in Regnis et Provinciis suis recipiet, aut tolerabit
dummodo inimicos ejus aut rebelles esse reseiverit. Et si forte aliqua
tapeta .... vel alia cujuscunque bona mobilia ad Regum Magnae
Britanniae spectantia penes Regem Daniae et Norwegiae, aut aliquem
subditorum suorum jam nunc sunt, aut de futuro, protimus restituantur,
et transmittantur ad Regem Magnae Britanniae, aut tradantur iis quos
sua Majestas ad ea recipienda deputaverit. Item, si qui eorum, qui
rei sunt illius nefandi paricidii in Regem Carolum Primum Britanniae
Magnae admissi, ac legitime de eodem scelere attincti, condamnati et
convicti, vel jam sunt in Dominiis Regis Daniae, vel post illuc ad-
venient, statim quam Regi Daniae, vel aliquibus officiariis innotuerit,
vel relatum fuerit, prehensi in custodiam dentur, et vincti in Angliam
remittantor, vel in corum manus tradantur, quos dictus Rex Magnae
Britanniae iis custodiendis, denique revehendis praef ecerit. ' '3

The treaty is thus introduced: "De konincklijcke Denemarcksche
Secretarius hier door passerende communiceerde dit volghende Tractaet

2 Ed. Holm, "Danmarks Neutralitetsforhandlinger, 1778-1780" Eistorish liis-
shrift, 3 dje Rsekke, Vol. V. pp. 77-78.

3 Jacques Bernard, Recueil des Traitez, Vol. IV, p. 30; Lieuwe van Aitzema,
Zaken van Staat en Oorlogh, Vol. IV, p. 845.

154 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

/tusschen sijn koningh ende die van Engelandt gemaecktAoewel sonder
dato/ofte onderechrijvingfe. "*

The following footnote is also found in Du Mont, op. oit., Vol. VT,
p. 348. "Ce meme Traits se trouve deux fois dans la premiere Edition
de ce Grand Becueil de HoUande Tom. IV. la premiere fois pag. 29,
avec un Preambule, sur la Copie d'Aitzema, et la seconde fois pag.
697, sur une Copie manuscrite; dat^ du Fevrier 1660. Celli-ci difere
en quelque de toutes les autres ct peut passer pour authentique, ayant
6t6 publico sous les jeux de la Cour et du Parlement, par I'Imprimeur
du Boi. On croit que la Date en doit 3tre entendue selon le stile
d'Anglcterre qui rovient au mois de Fevrier 1661, stile Gregorien."

APPENDIX D

The statement upon which the historians, Fredericia and Schafer base
their conclusions in regard to the origin of the Sound Dues reads as
follows :

"Vom Liibecker Tage im July 1423 erfahren wir: 'Na der tiid
begherden se (des koninges rad to Kopenhavene), uppe dat de crone
wat hebben mochte to erer herlicheyd, int erste, dat eyn islik schip in
dem Orssunde streke unde geve also vele, also de stede sulven wolden,
dat redelik were, odder dat alle Zeevund der cronen halfl worde unde deme
dat tovoren tobehorede, efte dat men den tollen to Schone vorhogede,
wente de schepe vormerden sik van dage to dage unde de penning
vorerghede sik. Unde bii dem sulven lesten artikele bleven se' "s

APPENDIX E

Aabent Kongebrev.

JuU 20de, 1633.
"Efftersom vi haffuer ladett sette brokar ved den haffn for vor
kjobsted Helsingor, da haffuer vi naadigste for guod andseet, at her
effter skall ungiffues haffne penge i saa maader som effterfolger: fdrst
skall huer skude eller skibe giffue aff huer lest om sommeren to
schilling Dansch, och huer som vil legge offuer om vinteren skaU giffue
4 schilling Dansch; desligeste skall huer baad giffue om sommeren I
sosUng og om vinteren I skilling Dansch. "«

* We have obtained the date from Ivaro Qnistgaard, Index Chronolofficut, 1200-
1789, p. 104.

B Dietrich Schafer, "Zor Frage nach der Einfnhmng des Sundzolls," Hantiteh*
Oetchichttblaetter, Jalxrgaiig, 1875, pp. 34-35.

« Sjselandske Registre No. 19, fol. 143. Quoted by C. F. Wegener, OeheimerarkiveU
Aartberetninifer, Vol. Ill, p. 94.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 155

APPENDIX F

Table of Money Values^
Danish Currency before 1873.

1 Eosenoble

Specie dollar.

Specie dollar

Specie dollar.

Specie dollar.

Goldgulden :

Bixdollar

BixdoUar

BixdoUar.

Ort

,= 4% RixdoUars

.= 2 EixdoUars —

.= 12 Mark

.= 192 Skilling

.= 48 Stivers

Bixmark

Stiver.

Skilling.

Modem Danish Currency.

1 Krone

1 American Dollar

:1 1/3 Bixdollars =

= 3 Marc banco of Hamb 'g=

= 6 Mark (Danish) =

= 4 Ort (or Bixort) =

= 24 Skilling =

= 16 Skilling =

= 20 Skilling =

= 4 Skilling =

$2.27

1.07

1.07

1.07

1.07
.71
.53%
.53%
.53%
.13^

.11

.021/5

.0055

..=100 ore

.=3 Kroner 76 6re.

..= $ .26.8

APPENDIX G

SundzoUpass.*
BEI SB. KCENIGL, MAJEST^T VON DhAJ^MABK, DEE WENDEN,

ETC. ETC.
Zollkammer in Oeresund hat sich geburlich gemeldet der Schiffsfiihrer
N. N. Schiff N. N. 131. N. Lasten von Stettin, kommt von Stettin
mit umstehender Ladung gehend nach Sunderland und hat klarirt, wie
sich gebiirt.

Oeresund-ZoUkammer, den 25 November 1844.

Holten.
Vorbemeldeter Schiflfsfiihrer hat geladen:

819 Stiick eichener Sehiflfhfilzer
Zoll: 24 Bthl. 28 St.
Foring: — Bthl. 47 St.

Feuergelder :

23 Bthl. 29 St.
4 Ethl. 24 St.

28 Ethl.

5 St.
Ot. Prosch.

7 This table is worked out from facts presented in Executive Doctunentt, 33 Cong.,
1 Sess., Doc. 108, p. 3; William Guthrie, A New Geographical, Historical, and
Commercial OrammMr, p. 662, folder; and John Macgregor, Oommereial Statiatiea.
Vol. I, p. 158.

8 Each ship passing the Sound had to obtain a similar certificate as a receipt
that Sound Dues were paid. This sample is taken from H. Scherer, Der SundzoU,
Beilage B, pp. 302-303.

156 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

8p. Bdlr. Bt.
Zollamts-Gebiiren : 3 —

Inspecteur : 1 6 — N. B. weshalbf % Unvollat.

: Schiffspapieref

Copie : — 8 — N. B. Fiir Abschrift des Passes

Mulct : 1 N. B. Weil die Papiere wahr-

scheinlich nicht durch den Capt.
Oder Steuermann zur ZoUkam-
mer gebracht sind. § 34 der Conv.
G. Prosch

APPENDIX H

Specifications of the Sound Dues p. Constantia of Fayal, Captain J.
Chriszostomo from Fayal bound for Baltic.

SHIPPERS CONSIGNEES

Joao d 'Almeida Lima A. Vieira Maciel.

JAL 17/1 & 3/2 & 9/6 Pipes Wine Sp. 40

Domingos Eibeiro de Carvalho
D. E. G. 20 Pipes Wine

Do.

....Sp.

40

Schultz in Stettin.

A. V. Maciel

FRLP. 71/1

— Pipes Wine"!

IFPS 3/2

— Pipes Wine

5/6

— Pipes Wine

..

2/2

— Pipes Wine

A. J. F. Eocka

AIFE 49/1

— Pipes Wine"

Sp. 147

A. V. Maciel.

MIR

EEIS 22/2 —Pipes Wine

Without bills of Lading according to the Manifest
4/1 & 4/2 & /8/6 Pipes Wine.

Belonging to the Captain
1/2 Pipe Wine free

.Sp. 120

Sound Customhouse the 8 Juli, 1843
Pr. Olrik. Engelsen.

~.Sp. 21 24

Sp.

Spc. Bdlrs. 368 24

9 A similar bill was made out by the castomhonse officers for the cargo of each
ship. This sample is taken from H. Scherer, Der SundzoU, Beilage N, p. 812.

DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 157

APPENDIX I

United States Representatives at Copenhagen
Name and residence Bank Time of Service

Minister 1810-1812.

d'affaires 1812-1819.

1819-1827

d 'affaires 1827-1835

d'affaires 1835-1841.

d'affaires 1841-1842.

d'affaires 1842-1846.

d'affaires _ 1847-1849.

d'affaires. 1849-1851.

d 'affaires 1852-1853.

d 'affaires'!
Resident l 1853-1858.

George W. Erwing, Mass -Special

John M. Forbes. Charg^

No representative

Henry Wheaton, N. Y Charg6

Jonathan F. Woodside, Ohio Charge

Isaac R. Jackson, Pa -Charge

William "W. Irwin, Pa -Charge

Robert P. Flenniken, Pa Charg4

Walter Forward, Pa ~ - Charge

Miller Grieve, Ga X^h&Tg6

rCharg^
Henry Bedinger,

Va J Minister

James M. Buchanan, Md Minister Resident 1858-1861.

Bradford R. Wood, N. Y .Minister Resident 1861-1865.

George H. Yeaman, Ky Minister Resident. 1865-1870.

Michael J. Cramer, Ky J Minister Resident I 1870-1882.

ICharg6 d'affaires I

James P. Wickersham, Pa Charg6 d'affaires 1882

Henry B. Ryder .Charg6 d 'affaires ad interim 1882-1883.

Wickham Hoffman .Minister Resident 1883-1885.

Rasmus B. Anderson, Wis JVIinister Resident. 1885-1889.

fMinister Resident; En-~j
Clark E. Carr, 111 |voy Extraordinary and(. 1889-

Minister Plenipotenitary |

John E. Risley, Ind

Lauritz S. Swenson, Minn

Thomas J. O'Brien, Mich

Maurice F. Egan, D. C

Norman Hapgood, N. Y

Joseph C. Grew, Mass

Envoy Extraordinary

and

"Minister Plenipotentiary"

ri893-
1897-
1905
1907-

1920

1893.

1897.
1905.
1907.
1918.
1919.
1921.

Danish Representative at Washington

Name
J. Blicker Olson.

Peder Pederson

Steen Bille

Torben Bille

Rank Time
-Minister Resident

-Minister Resident..

Charge d'affaires..

Charge d 'affaires...

W. R. Raaalfiff Charge d'affaires..

J. Hegermann-Lindencrone. Charg6 d 'affaires..

Carl Steen Anderson Bille Minister Resident..

P. L. E. de L6ven8m Minister Resident..

of Service
...1800-1805.
...1805-1826.
...1826-1854.
....1854-1858
._1858-1866.
...1866-1880.
-.1880-1884.
„1884-1888.

158 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

F. W. Spoimeck. Minister Resident 1888-1894.

F, de Eeventlow Minister Resident 1894-1895.

fEnvoy Extraordinary"|
Constantin Brun _| and Minister Plenipo- i 1895-1908.

jtentiary j

Count Moltke | Envoy Extraordinary 11908-1913.

\ and I

Constantin Bran [Minister Plenipotentiary! 1913-

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. PRIMARY SOURCES

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Haghe, 1669.
American Annual Register, 18Sl-18Si, Vol. XII. 8 vols. New York,

1825-1833.
Amerioan Journal of International Law, 1908, Vol. II, '* Official

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American State Papers, Naval Affairs, Edited by Lowrie, Walter,

and Clarke M. St. Clair. 2 vols. Washington, 1832-1834.
American State Papers, Foreign Eelations. Edited by the Secretary

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1857-1858, 3dje R<Bkke, Vol. I. A collection of documents in

the Danish language connected with the abolition of the Sound

Dues.
Anon., "The St. Thomas Treaty." A translation from Daghladet,

April 24, 1869. Copenhagen.
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Elizabeth Donnan. Annual Beport of the American Sistorioal

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1897.
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Friis. 3 Bind. Kfibenhavn, 1913. A collection of letters.
Bigelow, John, France and the Confederate Navy. New York, 1888.

Contains much of the correspondence connected with the Stonewall

case.

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162 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

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DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 163

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164 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

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DANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1776-1920 165

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INDEX

Aabenraa, 95.

Aalborg, Mormons at, 136.

Aalborghus, 14.

Adams, John, 11, 12, 27.

Alabama, 100, 132, 144.

Alexander I, of Russia, 38.

Alexander, Lucy, 59.

Alfred, flagship of John Paul Jones, 59.

Allegiance, problem of, 100 ff. See also
Yeaman.

Alliance, American frigate, 11, 32, 58.

American Emigrant Co., 111.

Amsterdam, treaty with America, 17 ; stand-
ard of sugar, 127.

Anderson, Rasmus B., 112, 116, 120, 123,
157; takes up the Butterfield claims for
arbitration, 133; on the problem of Am-
erican ministers in foreign states, 138.

Anglo-Danish treaty, of 1660, 18, 20, 62,
63, 153; of 1670, 20; of 1780, 20; of
1846, 68; of extradition, 115.

Arman, shipbuilding firm at Bordeaux,
France, 97, 98, 99.

Azpurua, K., 88.

Bacon, Robert, 142.

Baden, Gustav L., Danish historian, 67.

Bainbridge, Capt. Wm., 37. See also Nis-

sen, Tripoli.
Baltic sea, 80, 81.
Bancroft, Edward, at London, 23.
Bancroft, George, at Berlin, 144.
Baptists, Danish, 101.
Barbadoes, 89.
Barron, Com. Samuel, 37.
Bartram vs. Robertson, 121.
Bashaw of Tripoli, 38.
Basseterre, 30.
Bayard, T. F., 114, 116, 120.
Bedinger, Henry, 72, 75, 78, 157.
Benjamin Franklin, 87 ff, 129, 132; claim

disallowed, 135.
Benson, John A., 116; case, 115.
Benton, Capt. Thomas, 19.
Benton, Thomas H., 76.
Bergen, city in Norway, 11, 15, 32, 58.
Bergen prizes, 11, 15, 18, 21, 32, 34; the

case ended, 58-65 ; referred to, 134 note.
Berg, H. H., governor of St. Thomas, 89,

90, 128, 131.
Berg, Kristen, 146.
Berlin, 29, 60, 144.
Berlinske Tidende, 124.
Bernstorff, Andreas Peter, Danish Premier,

10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 20, 21, 24, 63, 152;

hostile to America, 17 ; letter to the royal

Council in answer to the Prince Royal,

17; returns to power 1784, 22.
Betsy, English merchantman, one of tht*

Bergen prizes, 11, 58.
Bigelow, John, 100 note.
Bille, Carl Steen Anderson, 157.
BiUe, F. de, 131, 132.
Bille, Steen, Danish representative at

Washington, 49, 85, 157.

167

Bille, Torben, Danish representative iX

Washington, 72, 84, 129, 157.
Blaine, James G., Sec. of State, 134.
Bissel, Commodore, 106.
Blome, Baron de, 13, 18, 23.
Bluhme, Count, 79, 94, 98.
"Boot Kathrine", 14.
Bordeaux, 97, 98.
Bornholm, Mormons at, 136.
Boston Monthly Magazine, 69.
Bramley-Moore, 74.
Brandt, Enevold, 14.
Bremen, 94, 116. See also Hanseatic towns,

Hamburg.
Bremerhaven, 86.

British Royal Mail Steam Packet Co., 89.
Broholm, Rev. Augrust, 101 note.
Brun, Constantin, Danish minister at

Washington, 117, 140, 142, 149, 158.
Bryan, William J., 142.
Buchanan, James, 70, 75, 84.
Buchanan, James M., 92, 157.
Buck, O. N., 47.
Bund, German, 85.
Buren, Martin van, 53, 54.
Butterfield claims, origin, 87 ff; arbitration

of, 128 ff; claims disallowed, 136.

Calhoun, John C, 60, 70.

Cameron, J. B., 89.

Cameron, Senator Simon, 108.

Cammet and Co., 90, 91.

Campbell, self styled representative from

Denmark, 30 note.
Cape Francois, 30, 36.
Carmichael, William, 21.
Caroline Mathilde, 13, 14; at Celle in Han-
over, 15.
Carr, Clarke E., 119, 123, 138, 145, 147,

157.
Carstensen, Chamberlain, 106.
Cass, Lewis, 84.
Castonier, Major, 89, 131.
Catharina II, of Russia, 25, 76.
Catharine Augusta, 87 ff, 130, 132; claim

disallowed, 135.
Cattegat, 42, 66, 82, 97.
Ceara, Brazil, 95.

Charles II, King of England, 153.
Charlotte Amalie, harbor at St. Thomas,

104.
Charming Betsy, Murray vs., 33, 34.
Charming Polly, English merchantman, one

of the Bergen prizes, 11, 58.
Cheops, 99.
Cherbourg, 100.
Chezaulx, M.de, French consul at Bergen,

12.
China, America aids Denmark in, 125;

trade-marks in, 140-41.
Christian III, King of Denmark, 69.
Christian IV, King of Denmark, 69.
Christian V, King of Denmark, Diary of,

69.
Christian VII, King of Denmark, 13.

168 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Christian IX, of Gliickabarg, King of Den-
mark, 76.

Christian August, Prince, in Norway, 40.

Cliristiansborg castle, 146.

Christianople, treaty of, 68.

Christiansand, Americans at, 89; StonetpaU
at, 97.

Christmas, Walter, episode, 148, 149.

Christopher II, King of Denmark, 68.

City of Mexico, 88.

Clay, Henry, 48, 49, 60.

Clayton, John M., 86, 86.

Cleveland, Pres. Grover, 119, 147.

Commtrce, 52.

Committee of Secret Correspondence, 9, 10.

Confederacy, 93 ff; Confederate States, 98.

Connell, John, 53.

OMt«t(llation, U. S. warship, 33.

CotmtittUion, U. S. frigat«), 38.

"Convoy cases" 42-46, 60, 52.

Copenhagen, Congress at, 78, 84; bombard-
ed by England, 38.

Counter-claims, Danish, 18 S.

Coup d'itat, Jan. 17, 1772, the fall of
Struensee, 14, 15.

Cramer, Michael J., 103, 111, 114, 118, 131,
132, 144, 145, 157.

Crane, R. Newton, 141.

Crimean War, 72.

Criminals, importation of, 110.

Crone, V. C, 110.

Cushing, Caleb, 69.

Dagbladet, 108.

Danish Baptists, 101; archives of, 101
note; history of, referred to, 136 note.

Danish National Church, in Virgin Isl-
ands, 160.

Danish West Indies, 19, 87, 93, 130, 140;
Seward's attempt to purchase, 103 S;
plebiscite in 1867, 105, 107; plebiscite in
1917, 150; purchase of, 143-151. See also
St. Thomas.

Dardanelles, 78.

Danzig. 67.

Dashswood, Charles, 44.

Davis, John C. B., Acting Sec. of State,
112, 131.

Deane, Silas, 9, 10.

Democratic party, opposed to the purchase
of the Danish West Indies, 147.

Denmark, attitude toward American Revo-
lution, 9, 10, 17 ; referred to by Henry
Wheaton, 61-62; attitude toward the
Civil War, 93 ff; refuses to give England
her fleet, 38.

Dollner, H.. 96.

Doolittle, Senator, in Denmark, 106.

Duane, Wm. J., 56.

Dunkirk, 18.

Dykes and Snow, Mormons in Denmark,
186.

Eames, Charles, 88.

Egan, Maurice F., 167.

Elbe, 81.

Elsinore, 69 ; used by Russia, 71 ; consul
at. 97.

England, captures Danish fleet, 38; treaty
concerning Samoa, 141; willing to pur-
chase Danish West Indies, 144, 146;
bombarded Copenhagen, 38.

"Era of Struensee," 18.

Erving, George W., Envoy to Denmark,
41, 61, 167.

Estrup, Jacob, Danish Premier, 145, 147.
Evarts, Secretary of State, 114.
Experiment, 35.
Extradition, problem of, 114 ff.

Faer6 Islands, 150.

Farragut, Admiral, at Copenhagen, 105.

Fenian movement, 103.

Fish, Hamilton, 111, 126, 131, 132, 144.

Fleker6e, Norway, 18.

Flenniken, Robert P., American minister

at Copenhagen, 70, 157.
Flint, Charles R., 148.
Florida, 98.
Folkething, lower chamber of Bigsdag, 146.

149, 151.
Forbes, John M., 46, 167.
Forward, Walter, 157.
Foster, John W., 147.
France, in Revolutionary War, 16; might

object to sale of St. Croix, 105: senda

criminals to America, 118, 114.
Franklm, 37.

Franklin, Benjamin, 10, 12, 13, 21, 63, 153.
Franks, J. C, U. S. marshal, 116.
Franks, Wm. B., 116.
Fredericia, J. A., 67, 164.
Frederick, Fort, 89.
Frederick III, King of Denmark, 153.
Frederick VI, King of Denmark, 65.
Fredericksted, 144.
Frelinghuysen, F. F., 111.
"French certificates of origin," 42-45, 60.
Frijs, Count E. Juelwind, 105, 130.
Fulton, Robert, 66.

General Simeoe, British privateer, 86.

Gener, Mr. Jos6, 88, 90.

Geoff roy, M. de, 104.

George III, 13, 14.

Germany, at war with Denmark, 71, 85,
94; sending criminals to America, 110,
114; opposed to American pork trade,
122, 124; treaty with, concerning Samoa,
willing to purchase Danish West Indies,
144, 147, 149.

Geyser, 121.

Gibraltar, 78.

Girand, Lieut. P., 96.

Great Britain, see England.

Great Northern Telegraph Co., 126.

Greenland, 160.

Gresham, W. Q., 128, 139 note.

Grew, Joseph C, 167.

Grieve, Miller, 157.

Gron, Niels, 148.

Guadeloupe, 81, 38.

Gunnison, John G., 59.

Gunnison, Nathaniel, 69.

Hall, M., Danish Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, 92, 93, 128, 129.

HaU, J. P., 122.

Hamburg, 30, 46, 47, 94, 122.

Hanseatic towns, correspondence between
67-68; at the Copenhagen Confernce, 82.

Hansen, George P., 97, 110.

Hapgood, Norman, 167.

Harlan, Senator James, 108.

Havana, 95.

Hawaii, 121.

Hawley, Rev. Charles, 106.

Hay, John, 117, 148, 149.

Hector, 62.

INDEX

169

Hegerman-Lindencrone, J., see Linden

crone.
Helm, Charles J., 88, 128, 129, 131.
Eendrick, brig, 30, 32, 34, 37, 47, 53, 55,

56 note.
Henry, 19; referred to, 30 note.
Hillier, Benj., 30.
Hoffman, Wickham, 157.
Eojre, Danish political party, 146 ff.
Holm, Edward, Danish historian, 15.
Homestead Act, 100.
Hope, 44.

Hornkvoeg (Kvceg), 124 ff.
Horaa, alias United States, 87.
Houze, De La, French minister at Copen-
hagen, 24, 25.
Hoyt, Jesse, 56.
Hurst, C. J. B., 141.

Iceland, 150.
Icelandic books, 145.

Irvin, William, W., American representa-
tive at Copenhagen, 62, 70, 157.
Isaacsen, Peter, 39, 40.

Jackson, Andrew, 54, 58.

Jackson, Isaac R., 157.

Jacmel, 35.

Japan, buys the Stonewall, 100.

Jarlsberg, Count Wedel de, 29.

Jay, John, 12.

Jefferson, Thomas, 24, 32.

Jensen, Mads, alias Jbrgensen, 111.

Johnson, President Andrew, 107, 110.

Jones, John Paul, in European waters, 11,
13; negotiating with Denmark, 23 ff.
See also, Bergen prizes, Janette Taylor,
Reventlow-Criminil, Benjamin Franklin,
Wolodimer, Catharina II, De la Houze,
Thomas Jefferson.

Jonkjobing, treaty of, 41.

Jiirgen Lorentzen, case of, 95 ff.

Keith, Sir Robert M., 14.

King, Rufus, American representative at
the Court of St. James, 29.

Kronborg, 14. See also Elsinore.

Krusse, Eduart, 69.

Kvoeg (Hornkvoeg), 124 ff.

Lahn, 116.

Landais, Capt. Peter, 11, 13, 32, 58.

Landsthing, upi)er chamber of Rigsdag,
146, 149, 151.

Landtag, opposed to Sound Dues, 74.

Lansing, Robert, signs treaty of 1916, 149.

League of Armed Neutrality, 10, 62.

Lear, Tobias, 38.

Lee, Arthur, 10.

Leeward Islands, 30.

Lewis and Cox, 129.

Lex regia, of Holstein, 75.

Lincoln, President, 95, 104, 143; sending
Colt's pistols to the Danish king, 95
note.

Lindencrone, J. Hegerman, 111, 125, 131,
132, 157.

Livingston, Robert, 19; proposes that Eur-
opean powers negotiate with U. S.
through England if they will not recog-
nize our independence, 20.

Loening, U. S. consul, 116.

London, Protocol of, 76.

Lovenorn, P. L. E., 120, 157.

Liibeck, 67.

Lucas, Toussaint, 35.

Lund, C. N., a Mormon, 136.

McDermott, Hugh F., 77.

McKinley, Pres. William, 148.

Madison, James, 36, 41.

Madrid, 29.

Magee, Rufus, 114.

Maley, Shattuck vs. 35; Lieut. William, 35.

Mann, Dudley, 93.

Marcy, William L., 72, 84, 129, 132.

Marshall, John, Chief Justice, 34, 36.

Martinique, 33.

Mercator, 35, 45, 47, 53, 55.

Messina, 78.

Methodist Episcopal Church, seeks per-
mission to operate in Denmark, 109 note.

Mississippi valley, Danes in, 101.

Moltke, Count A. V., Danish Premier, 71.

Moltke, Count, representative at Washing-
ton, 158.

Money values, 155.

Monongahela, 106.

Monroe, James, 47, 58.

Monroe Doctrine, 143.

Monson, Sir Edmund, arbitrator in the
Butterfield case, 133-35.

Moore, Lieut. H. T., 95.

Morganbladet, 113.

Mormon problem, 135-137.

Morning Light, warship, 95.

Morris, Andrew, 37.

Morris, Gouv., 26.

Murray, Capt., 33, 34; reimbursed by
Congress, 35.

Nationaltidende, 150.

Napoleon, 38.

Napoleon III, 99.

New York Times, 77.

New York Tribume, 78, 82.

Niles, U. S. minister at Turin, 87.

Nissen, Nicholas C, aid given by N. to
Americans at Tripoli, 37 ; joint resolu-
tion thanking, 38.

Norfolk, 91.

Norway, suffers during Napoleonic wars,
40 ff. See Bergen, Bergen prizes, Chez-
aubc.

Nystad, treaty of, 76.

O'Brien, Thomas J., 157.

Olcott, John N., 87, 90.

Olinde, see Stonewall.

Olney, Richard, 147.

Olson, Sir P. Blicher, 30, 35, 157.

Ordination of Episcopalian Ministers, 27.

Oxholm, General D', 75.

Paez, Gen. JosS A., 88.

Page, Capt. V. P., 98.

Palmer, Admiral, 106.

Palmerston, Lord, 74.

Panama Canal, influence on the purchase

of the Danish West Indies, 149.
Parana, 89.
Parke, Mathew, Captain of marines on

the Alliance, 59.
Parke, Wm. C, 59.
Parton, James, 104 note.
Patagons, Spanish dollars, 55.
Patent, from King of Denmark to Jones,

26.
Peary Relief Expedition, 139.
Pederson, Peder, Danish minister to the

United States, 37, 48, 63, 157.
Pernambuco, 91.

170 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Perry, Commodore M. C, 86.

Persigny, Count, 74.

Peters, Judge, 34.

Peter the Great, 76.

Pickering, American war vessel, 80, 82.

Petroleum Test, in Denmark. 126.

PhUadelphia, 37.

Pickett, J. T., 90, 129.

Picquet, Monsieur LaMotte, 59.

Pierce, Edward L., 108.

Plebiscite, demanded by Denmark, 106,
160.

Plessen, Fru, 14.

Politiken, 150.

Polytechnic Institute, 126.

Pomeroy, John P. See Benson, John A.,
115, 116.

Port-au-Prince, 36.

Porter, James D., 112.

Port Republic, 35.

Preston, William B., 85.

Prince Royal of Denmark, a friend of the
American colonies, 17.

Protection, of industrial designs, 140' by
tariff. See Tariff.

Providentia, 19.

Prussia, attitude toward American Revolu-
tion, 9; attitude toward Sound Dues, 74,
77; war with Denmark, 80, 85, 9i, 104;
rumor Prussia wiU trade Schleswig for
St. Thomas, 144.

Pnggard, Danish merchant, 97.

Pyramus, H. M. 8., 44.

Quiberon Bay, 59, 97.

Raasloff, General W. R., 96, 102, 104, 157.

Radical Students' Association, 150.

Ranger, 69.

Ravn, Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs,
148.

Reedtz-Thott, Danish minister, 119, 125,
146, 147.

Reimer, Capt. T. W., 95, 96.

Rendsborg, royal order of, 38.

Representative, status of American, in Den-
mark, 137 ff.

Republican party, favorable to the pur-
chase of the Danish West Indies. 147-
48.

Reventlow, Count F. de, representative at
Washington, 127, 139 note, 158.

Reventlow, Ditlev, 10, 152.

Reventlow-Criminil, Count, Danish Pre-
mier, 62.

Reviere, Amous de la, 97, 100.

Rhea, Capt. of the Hope, 44.

"Richardson Investigation," of the Walter
Christmas episode, 149.

Richardson, Justice, 121.

Riemenschneider, 118.

Rigtdag, 105, 107, 126, 145, 160; parties
and chambers in, 146.

Rio de Janeiro, 95.

Risley, John E., 124, 136, 147, 157.

Roenne, Baron von, 85 ff.

Rogers, Henry H., 148.

Roosevelt, Pres. Theodore, 117, 149.

Rosencrone, Baron, Danish Minister of
Foreign Affairs, 21, 27.

Rosenkrantz, Baron, Danish Premier, 41.

Rosenohrn-Lehn, Baron O. D., 103, 120,
131.

Ruhl, John E., 88.

Russia, attitude toward American Revolu-

tion, 9, 10; Oommeree and Hector casM,

62.
Ryder, Henry B., Ill, 167.
Saaby, Hans Rudolph, 29, 89.
St. Christopher, 30, 32. See St. Kitts.
St. Croix, reciprocity with, 56-68; West

India island, 90, 105, 121 ; revolution in

1878, 144.
St. Domingo, 85.
St. John, one of the Danish West Indies,

105, 148.
St. Kitts, 80. See St. Christopher.
St Petersburg, 25, 29.
St. Thomas, 33, 35, 36, 87, 95, 104, 130,

132, 134, 135, 143, 144, 149.
Salomansen, 118.
Samoan claims, 141-48.
San Bias, 90, 91.
Sanger, von, 74.
Saphorin, M. de St., Danish envoy to The

Hague, 27.
Sayre, Stephen, attempting to negotiate a

treaty of commerce with Denmark in

1777, 10, 11.
Schifer, Dietrich, 67, 164.
Scheelt, Capt. Peter, 30.
Schimmelman, Count, Danish Premier, 52.
Schleswig-Holstein question, 76; war, 85;

second war, 94, 98; rumor that Prussia

will trade Schleswig for St. Thomas,

144.
Scholten, General P. von, 66.
Schonheyder, Danish naval officer, 98.
Seward, Wm. H., 93, 96, 102, 104, 129,

143.
Shanghai, 125, 141.
Shattuck, Jared, 33, 35, 47; v«. Maley,

35 ff.
Sherman, Senator John, 138.
Short, Wm., 26, 30.
Snow and Sykes, Mormons in Denmark,

135.
Soderstrom, Richard, 86.
Sorenson, Richard, 36.
Sorenson, Die, a criminal, 110.
Soro, 68.

Sould, Pierre, 129.
Sound Dues, 16, 17, 42; abolition of, 66>

85 ; opposed in Prussia, 74 ; recognized

by treaty of Vienna, 73; favored in

England, 74; favored by Russia, 75
Spain, attitude toward American Revela-
tion, 9.
Sphinx, See Stonewall.
Sponneck, Count, F. W., 79, 168.
Strkodder. See Stonewall, 97, 100.
Steman, Count de, Danish Minister of

Justice, 63.
Stonewall, case of the, 97 ff.
Struensee, Johan Frederik, 14.
Sumner, Charles, opposed to the purchase

of Danish West Indies, 107 ; referred to,

148.
Siisquehannah, 106.

Sweden, attitude toward American Revolu-
tion, 9, 16; at war with Denmark, 23,

25 note ; sending criminals to Ameriefli

114.
Swenson, Laurits S., 137, 157.
Swift, case, 43.
Talbot, Silas, 36.
Tariff, "of Abominations," 66; on sugar,

121. 124, 127; Wilson-Gormon, 124, 127.
Taylor, Janette, niece of John Paul Jones,

69.

INDEX

171

Taylor, Moses, 96.

Texas fever, 124.

ThingvaUa, 113, 116; Steamship Line, 121,
va. United States, 121 note.

Trade-Marks protected in China, 140 ff.

Trade, problems of, 119 ff. 56-58.

Treaty of Christianople, 68; of Tilsit, 38.

Treaty, U. S. and Denmark, of 1783-84,
21, 22; of 1826, 47, 50, 71, 72, 120, 122;
abrogated, 72; of 1830, 50-56; of extra-
dition, 114-17; postal convention, 118; on
weights and measures, 118; on trade-
marks, 119; on copyrights, 119; on But-
terfield claims, 133-35; on arbitration,
142 ; on general peace, 142-43 ; purchas-
ing the Danish West Indies, 149-151 ;
United States and Holland, 21; U. S.
and Spain on extradition, 115, 117.

Trent affair, 95.

Trichinosis, from American iM)rk, 122.

Tripoli, 37.

Turin, 87.

Tyler, John, 60.

TJhl, Edwin F., 128.

Union, English merchantman, one of the
Bergen prizes, 11, 58.

Vnited States, a warvessel, 85 ff.

Upshur, Secretary of State, 78.

Utah, 136, 137.

Vedel, Danish Director-General, 124.

Venezuela, rebellion in, 88, 90, 132; Den-
mark's duty toward, 130.

Tenstre, Danish political party, 146 ff.

Vera Cruz, 91.

Vergennes, French minister, 19, 24.

Virgin Islands, 103. See Danish West
Indies, St. Thomas.

Walewski, Count, 74.

Walterstorff, Baron de, 21, 63.

Warren, James, Lieutenant on the AUianee,

58.
Washington, 111.
Webster, Daniel, 70.
Welles, Gideon, 96.
West Indies, Danish, trade in, 56, 57 note ;

rights of Americans in, 49-50. See also,

Danish West Indies, St. Thomas.
Wheaton, Henry, minister to Denmark,

50-56, 157; minister to Prussia, 60-62;

on the treaty of 1830, 60-62; compared

with Monson on statute of limitation, 134

note.
White, Henry, 148.
Whitney vs. Robertson, 121 note.
Wickersham, James P., 157.
Williams, S. Wells, 126.
Wilkes, Capt. Charles, 95.
Wilson-Gorman tariff, 124, 127. See

Tariff.
Wilson, Woodrow, 142.
Windward Islands, 89.
Winchester, George, 56.
Wisconsin, Danish Baptists in, 101.
World War, influence on the purchase of

the Danish West Indies, 149.
Wolodimer, 25.

Wood, Bradford R., 93, 97, 98, 157.
Woodside, Jonathan F., 157.
Wraxall, Sir N. W., 15.
Wright, Thomas, 33.

X. Y. Z. affair, 30.

Teaman, George H., 102, 108, 110, 129,
157.

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